






The lack of a definition of compulsion plagues Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and scholarship, producing 
analytical confusion and worse.  Surprisingly, neither Fifth Amendment jurisprudence nor scholarship offers a 
definition of what it means to “compel” a person to self-incriminate, even though the concept of compulsion is 
critical to an understanding of the constitutional prohibition on compelled self-incrimination.  The Supreme 
Court has occasionally referred to an overborne-will test for compulsion, but that test is of dubious provenance 
and difficult to apply.  The Court frequently ignores the overborne-will test, and it cannot be reconciled with a 
good deal of Fifth Amendment doctrine.   
Starting with the paradigm of compulsion that gave rise to the Fifth Amendment, this Article offers a definition of 
compulsion that can be defended on both originalist and nonoriginalist grounds: An official undertaking to induce 
a witness to provide evidence by threat of punitive sanctions.  This definition explains large swaths of Fifth 
Amendment doctrine that courts and commentators alike find confusing or indefensible, and facilitates normative 
assessments of doctrine as well.  It also charts a course for future development of Fifth Amendment law.  The 
definition of compulsion, for example, suggests that Fifth Amendment protections apply whenever a suspect is 
confronted with a threat of punitive sanctions unless he submits to questioning, and debate over the propriety of 
asserted Fifth Amendment waivers and associated interrogation tactics should focus on whether the suspect is 
confronted with a threat of punitive sanctions beyond those that could be imposed as a result of conviction at a 
fair trial.  Defining compulsion, moreover, illustrates the manner in which the Fifth Amendment limits 
inquisitorialism in the criminal process. 
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There is uncharted terrain at the core of the constitutional prohibition 
on compelled self-incrimination.  This article seeks to map it. 
The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”1  Most of the terms 
of this prohibition—variously characterized as either a right or a privi-
lege—are well understood.2  A “person,” for purposes of the Fifth Amend-
 
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 2 Although reference is frequently made to a Fifth Amendment “privilege,” see, e.g., KENNETH S. 
BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (7th ed. 2013) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE] (referring to “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination”), this term is in some respects 
misleading.  Leonard Levy, for example, wrote: 
I call it a “right” because it is one.  Privileges are concessions granted by the government 
to its subjects and may be revoked . . . .  Although the right against self-incrimination 
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ment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, is a natural person, thereby excluding 
corporations, partnerships, or other collective entities.3  Whether a pro-
ceeding is a “criminal case” is primarily determined by whether there is a 
legislative intent to treat it as such, though proceedings formally denomi-
nated as noncriminal are deemed “criminal” when no non-punitive pur-
pose for imposing a sanction is apparent.4  A “witness” is one who provides 
testimonial evidence, that is, factual information or assertions that are the 
product of human cognition, as opposed to physical evidence.5  Finally, self-
incrimination occurs when the witness’s statements could reasonably be 
used against the witness in a criminal case or could lead to the acquisition 
of such evidence.6  Although, at the margins, these elements of the Fifth 
Amendment right may produce some difficult questions, they are in the 
main reasonably determinate and coherent.7 
There is no comparable clarity when it comes to the meaning of “com-
pulsion.”  Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and scholarship have failed—
indeed they have barely made an effort—to define what it means to “com-
pel” an individual to self-incriminate.8  The explanation for this difficulty is 
apparent; as George Thomas and Marshall Bilder once put it, “[b]ecause 
testimony is inherently volitional,” the Fifth Amendment poses “interpre-
tive problems that are insurmountable if ‘volitional’ and ‘compelled’ are 
both given robust meanings.”9  They added: “The paradoxical nature of 
volitional-but-compelled testimony explains why the self-incrimination 
clause continues to puzzle courts and commentators.”10  In other words, 
 
originated in England as a common-law privilege, the Fifth Amendment made it a consti-
tutional right, clothing it with the same status as other rights, like freedom of religion, that 
we would never denigrate by describing them as mere privileges. 
  LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION vii (1968). 
 3 E.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104–16 (1988); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 
87–94 (1974). 
 4 E.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368–74 (1986); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248–54 
(1980).  One can assert the protections of the Fifth Amendment, however, outside of the contours 
of a “criminal case” when one reasonably fears that the information sought might subsequently 
be used to incriminate in a criminal case.  See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671–72 
(1998); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984). 
 5 E.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 592–99 (1990); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 
207–14 (1988). 
 6 See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 189–91 (2004); Ohio v. Reiner, 532 
U.S. 17, 20–22 (2001) (per curiam). 
 7 But cf., e.g., Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L REV. 351, 366–400 (2012) (ques-
tioning whether the distinction between testimonial and physical evidence comports with devel-
opments in neuroscience). 
 8 See infra Part I.A. 
 9 George C. Thomas III & Marshall D. Bilder, Aristotle’s Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 245 (1991). 
 10 Id. (footnote omitted).  Cf. Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the 
Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 62, 72–73 (1966) 
(“[A]ll incriminating statements—even those made under brutal treatment—are ‘voluntary’ in 
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pretty much any statement by one under official pressure to talk could be 
deemed in some measure voluntary in that the witness must decide whether 
to yield to the pressure, and in some measure compelled by the pressure to 
speak.  Thus, if it is true, as Akhil Amar and Renee Lettow once wrote, that 
“[t]he Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an unsolved 
riddle of vast proportions,”11 the lack of a workable test for what it means to 
“compel” an individual is surely a primary cause.  The discussion that fol-
lows fills this surprising gap. 
Part I below demonstrates the absence of anything approaching a usable 
account of compulsion in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and scholarship.  
Part II then undertakes to define compulsion by looking to what was regard-
ed as the paradigm of compulsion when the Fifth Amendment was framed.  
Although experience since the framing era has refined some of the ambigui-
ties lurking in this conception, the framing-era paradigm of compulsion, Part 
II submits, offers a promising definition of Fifth Amendment compulsion. 
Part III turns to what seems to be a serious problem—the paradox of 
waiver.  In Miranda v. Arizona,12 the Supreme Court famously held that cus-
todial interrogation involves compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment, but added that a suspect under custodial interrogation, once 
properly advised of his rights, may waive the right to be free from com-
pelled self-incrimination, provided the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.13  Fifth Amendment rights can also be lost if not invoked; it is 
settled that “an individual under compulsion to make disclosures as a wit-
ness who revealed information instead of claiming the privilege lost the 
benefit of the privilege.”14  Yet, a voluntary decision to waive (or decline to 
claim) a right by one already “under compulsion” seems nonsensical; how 
can one “under compulsion” to speak somehow voluntarily surrender a 
right to remain silent?  Part III uses the definition of compulsion to address 
this apparent paradox, and demonstrates that in most cases where individ-
uals are said to have waived or forfeited Fifth Amendment rights, no com-
pulsion was present.  There are, however, some cases in which compulsion 
 
the sense of representing a choice among alternatives.  On the other hand, if ‘voluntariness’ in-
corporates notions of ‘but-for’ cause, the question should be whether the statement would have 
been made even absent inquiry or other official action.  Under such a test, virtually no statement 
would be voluntary because very few people give incriminating statements in the absence of offi-
cial action of some kind.”). 
 11 Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 
93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 857 (1995). 
 12 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 13 Id. at 455–58, 467–76.  The Court has continued to insist that those under custodial interrogation 
are capable of giving knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waivers of Fifth Amendment rights.  See, 
e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382–87 (2010); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 
572–75 (1987); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420–24 (1986). 
 14 Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1976). 
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is present yet waiver is appropriate—when the only threat of sanctions fac-
ing a suspect involves a threat of lawful sanctions imposed after a fair trial. 
Finally, Part IV applies the definition of compulsion to a number of hot-
ly disputed Fifth Amendment issues, and demonstrates that the concept of 
compulsion helpfully explains and justifies even intensely controversial as-
pects of doctrine.  The definition of compulsion, for example, supplies firm 
grounding for the holding that individuals undergoing custodial interroga-
tion must be warned of their rights in Miranda, and, by disaggregating com-
pulsion from Fifth Amendment waiver, it refutes the charge that Miranda 
involves an illegitimate form of prophylactic constitutional law.  The defini-
tion of compulsion also supports the still-controversial rule prohibiting an 
adverse inference based on a criminal defendant’s failure to testify an-
nounced in Griffin v. California,15 while explaining the limits of that rule.  
Part IV also demonstrates that the definition of compulsion provides guid-
ance on still-unsettled questions of Fifth Amendment law, and can set a 
course for the future development of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 
I.  THE ELUSIVE DEFINITION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT COMPULSION 
Surprisingly, Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and scholarship contain 
nothing approaching a workable conception of what constitutes compulsion 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.  The absence of a workable 
definition, moreover, has caused considerable problems in Fifth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. 
A.  The Absence of a Workable Definition 
The Supreme Court last offered a definition of “compulsion” some four 
decades ago, when it addressed the question whether the Fifth Amendment 
requires that a grand jury witness suspected of wrongdoing must be warned 
that he is a target of the investigation.16  After observing that “[t]he constitu-
tional guarantee is only that the witness not be compelled to give self-
incriminating testimony,” the Court wrote:  “The test is whether, considering 
the totality of the circumstances, the free will of the suspect was overborne.”17 
The provenance of this Fifth Amendment overborne-will test is dubious; 
the sole authority that the Court cited to support it was a case addressing 
“the standard demanded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
 15 380 U.S. 609, 614–15 (1965). 
 16 See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 182 (1977). 
 17 Id. at 188 (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)).  This was likely a dictum un-
necessary to the decision; the Court’s actual holding was: “Because target witness status neither 
enlarges nor diminishes the constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination, poten-
tial-defendant warnings add nothing of value to protection of Fifth Amendment rights.”  Id. at 
189. 
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Amendment for determining the admissibility of a confession.”18  Indeed, in 
due process jurisprudence, it has long been settled that if the defendant’s 
will was overborne, a confession must be suppressed as involuntary.19  If, 
however, statements branded as impermissibly compelled within the mean-
ing of the Fifth Amendment because a suspect’s will has been overborne are 
also, and for the same reason, barred from use as evidence by the Due Pro-
cess Clause, the overborne-will test for compulsion renders the Fifth 
Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause inexplicable surplusage.20   
The problems with the overborne-will test, however, go well beyond re-
dundancy.  Under the overborne-will test, virtually any confession could be 
deemed compelled.  Whenever an interrogation converts a suspect pro-
claiming innocence into one who has confessed, surely the suspect’s will 
could be fairly characterized as overborne.21 
Likely the most sophisticated effort to address this problem was undertak-
en by Thomas and Bilder who, relying on the work of the philosopher Harry 
Frankfort, argued that compulsion is present when some external force pro-
duces a “second-order volition” to confess inconsistent with a suspect’s “first 
order desire” not to do so.22  It is far from clear that this distinction between 
first-order desires and second-order volitions is tenable,23 but even Thomas 
and Bilder ultimately conceded that because a skillful interrogator may be 
able to alter a suspect’s “first-order desire” or “second-order volition,” their 
approach “is no better at providing practical guidance than any of the other 
solutions that seek to uncover the will of the suspect.”24 
 
 18 Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540.  At the time, the Court took the position that the prohibition on com-
pelled self-incrimination was not incorporated within the Due Process Clause.  See Cohen v. Hur-
ley, 366 U.S. 117, 118 n.1 (1961). 
 19 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385, 397–402 (1978); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1973); Haynes v. Wash-
ington, 373 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601–02 (1961); 
Rogers, 365 U.S. at 543–45; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 149.  As it has evolved, 
due process jurisprudence developed a two-pronged voluntariness inquiry: “[T]he admissibility of 
a confession turns as much on whether the techniques for extracting the statements, as applied to 
this suspect, are compatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction 
will not be secured by inquisitorial means as on whether the defendant’s will was in fact over-
borne.”  Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985) (citations omitted).  For a helpful discussion 
of this evolution, see Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 309, 330–61 (1998). 
 20 For a more elaborate argument along similar lines, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Mi-
randa, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 440–46 (1987). 
 21 Cf. Donald A. Dripps, Against Police Interrogation—And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 710 (1988) (“Given that confession is, from the standpoint of self 
interest, irrational . . . what ‘person of ordinary firmness’ . . . would do so unless he found the ‘in-
terrogation pressures overbearing’?”). 
 22 Thomas & Bilder, supra note 9, at 269–72. 
 23 For an expression of skepticism on this point, see Ronald J. Allen, Theorizing about Self-Incrimination, 
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 729, 733–34 (2008). 
 24 Thomas & Bilder, supra note 9, at 272–74. 
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Even this concession likely understates the problems.  There is no ready 
way to tell whether a skillful interrogator has persuaded or compelled a sus-
pect to confess; yet, as Albert Alschuler observed, “compulsion does not en-
compass all forms of persuasion.  A person can influence another’s choice 
without compelling it . . . .”25  Beyond that, there may be a plethora of mo-
tives underlying any given confession, including not only the interrogator’s 
influence, but also from the suspect’s own guilt or other psychological 
needs.  Assessing the role that each factor plays, of course, poses enormous 
difficulties.  After all, as Thomas and Bilder acknowledged, “[e]xternal ob-
servers have no measure of the internal human will.”26 
Given the difficulties of the overborne-will test, it should come as little 
surprise that the jurisprudence applying it has long been criticized as con-
fusing and inconsistent.27  It even is unclear that the Court itself takes the 
overborne-will test seriously; the Court seems perfectly willing to ignore it 
when the mood strikes.  For example, the Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment forbids a judge or prosecutor to comment on a defendant’s 
decision not to testify at trial in Griffin v. California.28  Griffin reasoned that 
adverse comment on a defendant’s failure to testify “is a penalty imposed 
by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege.  It cuts down on the privi-
lege by making its assertion costly.”29  Yet, when a defendant fails to testify, 
his will has not been overborne; instead, he has hewed to his decision to 
remain silent.  Under Griffin’s conception of compulsion as the imposition of 
a cost on silence, Fifth Amendment compulsion is not confined to cases 
when a suspect’s will has been overborne. 
The Court has also held that the prohibition on compelled self-
incrimination forbids public employers from discharging employees for re-
fusing to waive Fifth Amendment rights in official inquiries relating to their 
duties.30  It later added that the Fifth Amendment does not allow the gov-
ernment to bar individuals from performing public contracts if they refuse 
to waive their Fifth Amendment rights in official inquiries related to the 
 
 25 Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. 
L. REV. 2625, 2626 (1996). 
 26 Thomas & Bilder, supra note 9, at 272 (footnote omitted). 
 27 See, e.g., YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND 
POLICY 6–25, 69–76 (1980); GEORGE C. THOMAS III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF 
GUILT: FROM TORTURE TO MIRANDA AND BEYOND 146–56 (2012); George E. Dix, Mistake, Ig-
norance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 275, 300–10, 
328–29; Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2236–37 (1996); 
Penney, supra note 19, at 361–62; Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 
SUP. CT. REV. 99, 101–03. 
 28 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
 29 Id. at 614. 
 30 See Uniformed San. Men Ass’n v. City of New York, 392 U.S. 280, 282–85 (1968); Gardner v. 
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276–78 (1968). 
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performance of the contracts,31 or to bar persons from elective office if they 
assert Fifth Amendment rights before a grand jury or other investigative 
body in an inquiry relating to their duties.32  The Court also held that the 
Fifth Amendment forbids a court from sanctioning an attorney who advised 
his client to refuse to produce requested documents in reliance on the Fifth 
Amendment.33  Yet, in these cases, like Griffin, the investigative targets re-
mained silent; the government failed to overbear their will.  Whatever one 
thinks of these cases, it is hard to understand how they can be reconciled 
with the view that compelled self-incrimination occurs only when the gov-
ernment overbears an individual’s will.34 
Beyond that, if compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment 
means that a suspect’s will has been overborne, then one under compulsion 
could never voluntarily waive Fifth Amendment rights—by this definition, a 
suspect under compulsion lacks volition because his will has been overborne.35  
Yet, as we have seen, the concept of a voluntary waiver of Fifth Amendment 
rights, even by those subject to the compulsion, is well-established.36 
In light of the manifold problems lurking in the overborne-will test, it is 
small wonder that, in recent decades, although it occasionally makes pass-
ing reference to the concept of an overborne will,37 far more frequently, the 
Court, even as it observes that the prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination is at issue only when compulsion is present, offers no defini-
tion of or test for compulsion.38  Sometimes, the Court uses the term “coer-
 
 31 See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82–84 (1973). 
 32 See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 802–08 (1977). 
 33 See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458–68 (1975). 
 34 For an argument that the overborne-will test cannot explain even Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 
493 (1967), which prohibited the use in a criminal case of statements made by police officers after 
they were warned that they would be fired if they remained silent, see Steven D. Clymer, Com-
pelled Statements from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1342–47 (2001). 
 35 For a more extensive argument along these lines, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, 
and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV. 941, 944–46 (2001). 
 36 See supra text accompanying notes 12–14. 
 37 See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 705–06 (1993) (“Long before Miranda was decided, it 
was well established that the Fifth Amendment prohibited the introduction of compelled or in-
voluntary confessions . . . . [T]he courts enforced that prohibition by asking a simple and direct 
question: Was the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice, or was 
the defendant’s will ‘overborne’?”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); Minnesota v. Mur-
phy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984) (“Although warnings . . . might serve to dissipate any possible co-
ercion or unfairness resulting from a witness’ misimpression that he must answer truthfully even 
questions with incriminating aspects . . . we decline to require them here since the totality of the 
circumstances is not such as to overbear a probationer’s free will.”) (citations and internal quota-
tions omitted); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657–58 (1976) (“Nothing in this case sug-
gests the need for a . . . presumption that a taxpayer makes disclosures on his return rather than 
claims the privilege because his will is overborne.”). 
 38 See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 111 (2010); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 
34–38 (2000); Ohio Adult Par. Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 286–88 (1998); Illinois v. Per-
kins, 496 U.S. 292, 296–98 (1990); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 209–13 (1988); Colorado 
v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572–74 (1987); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312–14 (1985); New 
 
May 2017] COMPULSION 897 
cion” as a synonym for compulsion, but without offering any definition of 
coercion.39  Even if coercion and compulsion are properly treated as syno-
nyms, this merely trades one imprecise term for another; there is nothing 
approaching consensus about coercion’s meaning.40 
In Miranda, the Court shed a bit of light on the meaning of Fifth Amend-
ment compulsion, writing that “the process of in-custody interroga-
tion . . . contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine 
the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak,”41 though it failed to 
offer much in the way of a definition of or a test for compulsion.42  Even this 
 
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 722–24 (1979); 
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 339 (1978); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 471–77 
(1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397–401 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 
433, 440 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973). 
 39 See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) (“The sole concern of the Fifth Amend-
ment . . . is governmental coercion.”); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311 (referring to “the official coercion 
proscribed by the Fifth Amendment”); Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 n.7 (“[A]bsent actual coercion by 
the officer, there is no constitutional imperative requiring the exclusion of the evidence that re-
sults from police inquiry . . . .”); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448 (“Cases which involve the Self-
Incrimination Clause must, by definition, involve an element of coercion, since the Clause pro-
vides only that a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.”); Malloy v. Ho-
gan, 378 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (“[T]he American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not 
inquisitorial, and . . . the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay.  Governments . . .  
may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth.”) (citation omit-
ted).  See also Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 
387, 473 (1996) (referring to “the traditional Fifth Amendment prohibition of coercion”). 
 40 See, e.g., Michael Kates, Markets, Sweatshops, and Coercion, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 368 
(2015) (“Coercion is a philosophically contested concept.  Indeed, the problem is even worse than 
that.  For not only is there sharp disagreement in the philosophical literature as to what is the 
correct definition or meaning of coercion but the nature of that disagreement ranges over a 
number of different dimensions as well.”). For a survey of philosophical conceptions of coercion, 
see Scott Anderson, Coercion, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 27, 2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/#NozNewAppCoe.  Professor Alschuler contended 
that coercion is included within the concept of compulsion: “‘Coercion’ refers to actions by hu-
man beings that improperly influence choice.  ‘Compulsion’ includes these actions, but it also 
(and perhaps more clearly) includes human actions that disable choice entirely and natural events 
that either deprive a person of choice or else strongly influence his choice.”  Albert W. Alschuler, 
Miranda’s Fourfold Failure, 97 B.U. L. REV. 849, 851 n.10 (2017).  Perhaps so, but this still does 
not provide much in the way of precision. 
 41 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 463, 467 (1966). 
 42 The Miranda Court wrote that “the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically 
rather than physically oriented,” id. at 448, and that “[e]ven without employing brutality, the 
‘third degree’ or the specific stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial interrogation 
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.”  Id. at 455.  It 
then observed: “In each of the cases, the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and 
run through menacing police interrogation procedures.  The potentiality for compulsion is force-
fully apparent . . . .”  Id. at 457.  The Court found it “obvious” that “the interrogation environ-
ment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner” 
and “carries its own badge of intimidation” that, even if not involving “physical intimida-
tion . . . is equally destructive of human dignity.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  It concluded: “An indi-
vidual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, 
and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than un-
der compulsion to speak.”  Id. at 461.  At no point in Miranda does anything like a definition of or 
 
898 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:4 
bit of guidance, however, proved unstable; the Court has come to label Miran-
da and its progeny as “prophylactic” in that they impose broader constraints 
on interrogation than the Fifth Amendment itself.43  If, however, Miranda is 
prophylactic, the meaning of compulsion becomes even more elusive; perhaps 
Miranda’s conception of compulsion is broader than the Constitution’s. 
Most leading scholars, while acknowledging that the Fifth Amendment 
reaches only “compulsion,” offer no definition or test for it.44  Some schol-
 
test for compulsion appear.  For a more elaborate discussion of Miranda’s failure to address the 
meaning of compulsion, see John F. Stinneford, The Illusory Eighth Amendment, 63 AM. U.L. REV. 
437, 464–72 (2013). 
 43 See, e.g., Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 103–06; United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 638–41 (2004) (plu-
rality opinion); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770–73 (2003) (opinion of Thomas, J.); Davis 
v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1994); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690–92 
(1993); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202–03 (1989); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 
528 (1987); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-08; Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654–58; Tucker, 417 U.S.at 438–46.  
Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) (“In Miranda, the Court noted that reli-
ance on the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an involun-
tary custodial confession, a risk that the Court found unacceptably great when the confession is 
offered in the case in chief to prove guilt.  The Court therefore concluded that something more 
than the totality test was necessary.”) (citations omitted). 
 44 See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE supra note 2, § 125; Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The 
Self Incrimination Clause Explained and its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 251–
56 (2004); Amar & Lettow, supra note 11, at 904–09; Lawrence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: 
The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 59, 108–09, 
149–53 (1989); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 117–22 (2004); 
Kate E. Bloch, Fifth Amendment Compelled Statements: Modeling the Contours of their Protected Scope, 72 
WASH. U.L.Q. 1603, 1642–48 (1994); Charles E. Moylan & John Sonsteng, The Privilege against 
Compelled Self-Incrimination, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 249, 267–79 (1990); Thomas & Bilder, su-
pra note 9, at 245, 274–82.  Perhaps the scholar who has come closest to offering a definition or 
test is Mark Godsey, who wrote, “if the police impose a penalty on a suspect during an interroga-
tion to punish silence or provoke speech . . . such a penalty would constitute compulsion in viola-
tion of the self-incrimination clause . . . .”  Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession 
Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 516 
(2005).  The seeming simplicity of the proposal becomes muddied, however, by Professor God-
sey’s definition of a “penalty” as measured by reference to “the baseline of the parties at the time 
and place of the interrogation,” which “is determined by analyzing the objective facts regarding 
the suspect’s rights and conditions at the beginning of the interrogation . . . . The baseline is 
largely a function of the environment in which the interrogation takes place and the rights the 
parties are generally allowed in this setting.”  Id. at 518, 525.  This inquiry is sufficiently impre-
cise that Professor Godsey admits “it is not clear whether an interrogation itself constitutes an ob-
jective penalty in violation of the self-incrimination clause.”  Id. at 528.  Indeed, every time a po-
lice officer appears on the scene and starts asking pointed questions of a potential suspect, one 
might think the “baseline of the parties” has been altered, yet it seems unlikely that all efforts by 
the police to persuade suspects to cooperate with an investigation amount to compulsion.  Con-
versely, if a suspect is already in custody at the time at which an interrogation begins, perhaps 
questioning alone does not alter the “baseline of the parties at the time and place of the interroga-
tion,” at least if the baseline “is largely a function of the environment in which the interrogation 
takes place and the rights the parties are generally allowed in this setting.”  Id. at 525.  A test this 
imprecise does not offer a terribly workable solution to the problem of defining compulsion.  Cf. 
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 40–47 (2002) (plurality opinion) (rejecting use of a “baseline” to de-
termine if a change in a prisoner’s status amounts to Fifth Amendment compulsion because “em-
phasis of any baseline, while superficially appealing, would be an inartful addition to an already 
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arly treatments even skip any consideration of compulsion.45  We are left 
with what Thomas and Bilder wrote is “[t]he lack of a workable test for 
compulsion,” a seemingly inevitable problem because the inquiry “in-
volve[s] . . . a determination of the unknowable—whether the will of [the 
suspect or the interrogator] prevailed.”46 
Among legal scholars, there is little disagreement; Joseph Grano, for ex-
ample, acknowledged: “Even were it possible . . . to take literally the notion 
of an overborne will, we do not have the tools to make such an empirical 
inquiry.”47  Professor Alschuler concluded that “[e]fforts to define compul-
sion and related words like coercion, duress, and involuntariness in terms of 
a subjective sense of constraint are unproductive.”48  William Stuntz once 
 
confused area of jurisprudence”).  The same problem infects efforts to utilize the concept of a co-
ercive threat to illuminate compulsion, since it requires reference to a baseline in order to identify 
a threat that can leave the actor worse off.  See George C. Thomas III, A Philosophical Account of Co-
erced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79, 86–92 (1993).  Depending on one’s view of the 
baseline and the extent to which official interrogation involves an implicit threat, virtually all in-
terrogation might be regarded as coercive. 
 45 See, e.g., 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2250–84 (John 
T. McNaughton rev. 1961); MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 3–23 (1980). 
 46 Thomas & Bilder, supra note 9, at 258–59 (footnote omitted). 
 47 JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 63 (1996) (footnote omitted).  Most 
advocates of a voluntariness or overborne-will test, in contrast, fail to address its difficulties in ap-
plication.  See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective 
on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1128–29 (1998); Stephen 
J. Markman, Miranda v. Arizona: A Historical Perspective, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 193, 199–200 
(1987).  For his part, Professor Grano argued that instead of endeavoring to define compulsion or 
voluntariness, the constitutional inquiry into the permissibility of interrogation tactics should be 
governed by the Due Process Clause and “premised on notions of fundamental fairness that are 
rooted in some ‘objective’ source, such as tradition or concepts of ordered liberty and justice.”  
GRANO, supra, at 95 (footnote omitted).  The classic objection to identifying substantive due-
process limitations on governmental power imposed by reference to history, tradition, or some 
notion of fundamental values, however, is that the process is all too likely to collapse into subjec-
tivity and judicial policymaking.  See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174–77 (1952) 
(Black, J., concurring); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 60–72 (1980); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862–
64 (1989).  Professor Grano acknowledged that the Court had yet to develop a sufficiently objec-
tive due process jurisprudence, but believed that a rigorous inquiry tethered to objective factors 
can minimize the likelihood that judges will read their personal values into the concept of due 
process.  See GRANO, supra, at 95–99.  Experience since Professor Grano’s expression of opti-
mism, however, does not offer much hope of determinacy.  The last time the Court was asked to 
assess an interrogation technique under the Due Process Clause, in a case involving a suspect 
who had been shot by police, leaving him blinded and paralyzed, and who was questioned as he 
was undergoing emergency treatment, the Court divided 4-3 on the permissibility of the interro-
gation, with the remaining two Justices evidently unable to make up their minds.  See Chavez, 538 
U.S. at 774–76 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (finding no due process violation because interrogation 
did not interfere with medical treatment or otherwise do harm); id. at 779–80 (opinion of the 
Court) (leaving due process claim for remand); id. at 795–99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (finding a due process violation because interrogation created an impression 
that treatment was being withheld). 
 48 Alschuler, supra note 25, at 2626 n.6. 
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toyed with the notion that compulsion “mean[s] police conduct that 
thwarts rational self-interested decision making by the suspect,”49 though he 
ultimately found this account wanting.50  Indeed, preserving a suspect’s 
ability to make a rational choice seems to have little to do with Fifth 
Amendment compulsion – a suspect could rationally choose to submit to 
interrogation rather than torture, for example, yet few would doubt that 
compulsion was exerted in forcing the choice on the suspect.51  Professor 
Stuntz eventually abandoned the effort to define compulsion, writing, 
“compulsion can mean almost anything.”52 
Ronald Allen and Kristin Mace once predicted that instead of formulat-
ing a definition or test for compulsion, “the Court will continue the com-
mon-law process of locating the various types of pressure along a continu-
um and using social conventions to determine how much pressure is 
permissible.”53  There is reason to doubt, however, that Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence can achieve anything like coherence in the absence of a defi-
nition of compulsion. 
B.  The Need for a Definition 
The problems that arise in the absence of a clear conception of compul-
sion are well-illustrated by the splintered decision in Salinas v. Texas.54 
Genovevo Salinas agreed to be questioned at a police station by officers 
investigating a double murder.55  He answered an officer’s questions until 
he was asked if his shotgun would match shells recovered at the crime sce-
ne; at that point, he “[l]ooked down at the floor, shuffled his feet, bit his 
bottom lip, cl[e]nched his hands in his lap, [and] began to tighten up.”56 
Then, “[a]fter a few moments of silence, the officer asked additional ques-
tions, which [Salinas] answered.”57  Salinas did not testify at his subsequent 
trial, but “prosecutors used his reaction to the officer’s question [about the 
shells] as evidence of his guilt.”58 
In an opinion joined only by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice An-
thony Kennedy, Justice Samuel Alito rejected Salinas’s contention that the 
prosecution’s evidentiary use of his silence violated the Fifth Amendment 
 
 49 William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1264 (1988). 
 50 See id. at 1264–72. 
 51 Cf. Peter Westen & Stewart Mandell, To Talk, To Balk, or To Lie: The Emerging Fifth Amendment Doc-
trine of the “Preferred Response”, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521, 521 (1982) (“The privilege against self-
incrimination protects people from being put to certain choices.”). 
 52 William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 804 (1989). 
 53 Allen & Mace, supra note 44, at 256. 
 54 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013). 
 55 Id. at 2178 (plurality opinion). 
 56 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
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under Griffin’s no-adverse-comment-on-silence rule, relying on the rule that 
“a witness who ‘desires the protection of the privilege . . . must claim it’ at 
the time he relies on it.59  Salinas, Justice Alito observed, never invoked the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment during his interview, even though “it 
would have been a simple matter for him to say that he was not answering 
the officer’s question on Fifth Amendment grounds.”60 
Justice Alito’s opinion is seemingly a triumph of form over substance.  
Although, as Justice Alito noted, silence in the face of an interrogator’s ques-
tions is not considered an invocation of the Fifth Amendment rights,61 if a 
suspect states that he does not wish to answer, that is considered an invoca-
tion.62  Justice Alito never doubted Griffin’s applicability when a suspect ex-
pressly invokes Fifth Amendment rights during police questioning, yet he 
failed to explain why the Griffin right to be free from an adverse comment on 
silence should turn on the fact that Salinas remained silent rather than (para-
doxically) announcing that he was remaining silent, which would qualify as 
an invocation.63  Nor did he explain why Salinas was under sufficient com-
pulsion during a voluntary police interview to permit him to invoke a right to 
be free from compelled self-incrimination.  Perhaps Salinas merely exhibited a 
preference to remain (selectively) silent not rooted in the Fifth Amendment.64 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, rejected Justice 
Alito’s reliance on an invocation requirement, and argued that the prosecu-
tion’s use of Salinas’s selective silence under interrogation as evidence 
against him effectively converted Salinas into a witness against himself, in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.65  Yet, on the question whether Salinas 
was subject to compulsion within the meaning of the Amendment, Justice 
Breyer did no more than cite Griffin, offering neither a definition of compul-
 
 59 Id. at 2179 (further internal quotations omitted) (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 
427 (1984)). 
 60 Id. at 2180. 
 61 Id. at 2182 (citing Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 375–76, 380–82 (2010)). 
 62 See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381–82; Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103–06 (1975). 
 63 The closest Justice Alito came to an explanation was when he wrote that an invocation “ensures 
that the Government is put on notice when a witness intends to rely on the privilege so that it 
may either argue that the testimony sought could not be self-incriminating, or cure any potential 
self-incrimination through a grant of immunity.  The express invocation requirement also gives 
courts tasked with evaluating a Fifth Amendment claim a contemporaneous record establishing 
the witness’ reasons for refusing to answer.”  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179 (citations omitted).  Yet, 
despite Salinas’s failure to invoke, the government remained free to argue that the questions he 
was asked did not call for incriminating answers, or it could have offered him immunity.  Moreo-
ver, since an invocation requires no more than a simple declaration that Salinas “wanted to re-
main silent or that he did not want to talk with the police,” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382, an invoca-
tion would have shed little light on Salinas’s reasons for remaining silent.  
 64 For a more elaborate critique along similar lines, see Tracey Maclin, The Right to Silence v. The Fifth 
Amendment, 2016 U. CHI. LEG. F.  255, 275–80, 283. 
 65 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2185–86. 
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sion nor an explanation for how Salinas was compelled to incriminate him-
self during a concededly voluntary interview, in which he evidently retained 
the ability to decide which questions he would answer.66 
Justice Clarence Thomas’s opinion, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, 
was the only one to treat with the question whether Salinas was subject to 
compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.  He concluded 
that “[a] defendant is not ‘compelled . . . to be a witness against himself’ 
simply because a jury has been told it may draw an adverse inference from 
his silence.”67  Although Griffin held to the contrary when it comes to com-
ment on a defendant’s failure to testify at trial, in Justice Thomas’s view, 
“Griffin ‘lacks foundation in the Constitution’s text, history, or logic’ and 
should not be extended.”68 
Justice Thomas is not alone in attacking Griffin; Judge Henry Friendly, 
for example, wrote that Griffin “gave inadequate weight to the language of 
the amendment that testimony must be ‘compelled’; presenting an unpleas-
ant consequence is not compulsion unless the unpleasantness is so great as 
in effect to deprive of choice.”69  Moreover, since Griffin, the Court has fre-
quently permitted the use of an adverse inference based on an individual’s 
refusal to answer potentially incriminating questions in a variety of contexts 
outside of a defendant’s silence at a trial or sentencing.70 
 
 66 Id. at 2185, 2190.  Moreover, as Professor Alschuler observed, the dissent anomalously privileges 
the suspect who communicates evidence of guilt through silence over one who speaks.  See 
Alschuler, supra note 40, at 867–68.  If Salinas were subject to compulsion, then presumably any 
form of resulting testimony from him, whether based on an inference from his silence or, even 
more clearly, his express statements, may not be used against him under the Fifth Amendment. 
 67 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). 
 68 Id. (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 341 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 69 Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 671, 700 (1968).  See also, e.g., Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 306 (1981) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (“A defendant who chooses not to testify hardly can claim that he was compelled to testify.”); 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 621 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Since comment by coun-
sel and the court does not compel testimony . . . the Court must be saying that the California 
constitutional provision places some other compulsion upon the defendant to incriminate himself, 
some compulsion which the Court does not describe and which I cannot readily perceive.”); Off. 
Leg. Pol’y, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Report to the Attorney General on Adverse Inferences from Silence, 22 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1005, 1095 (1989) [hereinafter OLP Memo] (“The government does not 
compel the defendant to remain silent.  That reflects the defendant’s own choice, and permitting 
adverse comment on silence, far from ‘compelling’ a choice not to testify, actually makes the 
choice of remaining silent less attractive.”).  For scholarly criticism along similar lines, see, for ex-
ample, Donald B. Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Griffin v. California 
after Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REV. 841, 853–66 (1980); Jeffrey Bellin, Reconceptualizing the Fifth 
Amendment Prohibition of Adverse Comment on Criminal Defendants’ Trial Silence, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 229, 
249–62 (2010); and Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1327, 1341–
49 (2009). 
 70 See, e.g., Ohio Adult Par. Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 288 (1998) (clemency interviews); Bax-
ter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317–20 (1976) (prison disciplinary proceedings).  For an argu-
ment that the Griffin caselaw has become incoherent, see James J. Duane, The Extraordinary Trajec-
 
May 2017] COMPULSION 903 
Salinas demonstrates the problem with the Court’s failure to define Fifth 
Amendment compulsion.  The opinions of Justices Alito and Breyer, by 
eliding that issue, fail to address the question whether Salinas was com-
pelled to incriminate himself, which may explain why they could not com-
mand a majority of the Court.  Only Justice Thomas addressed that issue; 
but, in doing so, he found it necessary to repudiate a substantial body of 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence built on the edifice of Griffin.71  Indeed, 
Griffin seems in some jeopardy; not only did Justice Thomas expressly attack 
it in Salinas, but Justice Alito went to some lengths to avoid reaffirming its 
core holding.72  It is not for nothing that some believe “Griffin is on its last 
legs.”73  Yet, even Justice Thomas’s opinion in Salinas failed to define com-
pulsion; it only expressed a view about what compulsion is not. 
The practical consequences of identifying compulsion in the constitu-
tional sense are considerable.  When the presence of compulsion is uncon-
tested, as when a court issues an immunity order requiring a witness to tes-
tify on pain of contempt, the Fifth Amendment requires that the resulting 
testimony be immunized for all purposes, and cannot be used even for pur-
poses of impeaching the witness’s subsequent testimony,74 or as a source of 
investigative leads that may produce a subsequent prosecution.75  Similarly, 
when an interrogator compels an individual to confess within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment, any additional evidence derived from the confes-
sion must also be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”76  When only 
a Miranda violation is at stake, however, in the absence of compulsion in the 
constitutional sense, the Court regards itself as empowered to craft a more 
limited exclusionary rule that permits illegally-obtained statements to be 
used when the costs of exclusion are thought to outweigh the benefits of 
adhering to Miranda.77  For example, as long as they were not actually com-
pelled, a suspect’s statements obtained in violation of Miranda can be used 
to impeach,78 and to acquire additional evidence such as further admissions 
 
tory of Griffin v. California: The Aftermath of Playing Fifty Years of Scrabble with the Fifth Amendment, 3 
STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 1 (2015). 
 71 See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327–30 (1999) (holding that a sentencing judge 
may not draw an adverse inference from defendant’s silence in sentencing proceedings); Carter v. 
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301–05 (1981) (requiring a trial judge on request to instruct the jury to 
draw no adverse inference from defendant’s failure to testify). 
 72 Justice Alito described Griffin as holding that “a criminal defendant need not take the stand and 
assert the privilege at his own trial.”  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179.  This formulation manages to 
avoid restating, much less endorsing, the core holding of Griffin. 
 73 Christopher Slobogin, Lessons from Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CALIF. L. REV. 699, 729 n. 146 (2014). 
 74 See, e.g., New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 456–60 (1979). 
 75 See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38–44 (2000). 
 76 See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222–26 (1968). 
 77 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657–59 (1984). 
 78 See, e.g., Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 720–24 (1975). 
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made after the administration of the requisite warnings,79 or physical evi-
dence.80  Thus, it becomes all the more important to define compulsion in 
order to determine when the broad rule of exclusion required by the Fifth 
Amendment should be employed.  It is to this task that we now turn. 
II.  DEFINING COMPULSION 
In common parlance, the term “compel” connotes not so much an in-
ternal psychological process as the application of an external force to pro-
duce a result.81  For an originalist like Justice Scalia, who believed that the 
words of a legal text “must be given the meaning they had when the text 
was adopted,”82 contemporary usage will not do; but framing-era sources 
define “compel” in similar terms.83 
The insight suggested by both contemporary and framing-era usage is 
that compulsion should be defined by reference to the external pressures 
placed on an individual.  As we will see, this insight bears considerable fruit. 
A.  A Proposed Definition 
While they differ on details, there is widespread agreement among 
scholars that the prohibition on compelled self-incrimination reflected the 
English repudiation of the practice of investigative tribunals such as the 
High Commission and Star Chamber to require individuals to provide 
sworn testimony.84  Those who refused to take the oath ex officio required by 
 
 79 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305–09 (1985); but cf.  Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 
614 (2004) (plurality opinion) (deliberate use of two-stage questioning with warnings given only 
after an incriminating statement is made requires exclusion); id. at 620–22 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (same). 
 80 See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 637–41 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 644–45 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 81 See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 253 (11th ed. 2003) (defining “com-
pel” as “to drive or urge forcefully or irresistibly” and “to cause to do or occur by overwhelming 
pressure”) [hereinafter MERRIAM-WEBSTER]; III THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 599 (2d 
ed. 1989) (defining “compel” as “[t]o urge irresistibly, to constrain, oblige, force”) [hereinafter 
OED]. 
 82 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 78 (2012). 
 83 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN WHICH WORDS ARE 
DEDUCED FROM THEIR ORIGINALS 425 (1755) (defining “compel” as “[t]o force to some act; to 
oblige; to constrain; to necessitate; to urge irresistibly”); 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 67 (1828) (defining “compel” as “to drive by force; to 
coerce”). 
 84 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 45, at 3-23; ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
TODAY 2–7 (1955); LEVY, supra note 2, at 266–332; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 2251; 
Alschuler, supra note 25, at 2638–47; Benner, supra note 44, at 68–92; Edwin S. Corwin, The Su-
preme Court’s Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3–9 (1930); Lawrence 
Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the In-
voluntary Confession Rule (Part II), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 538–45 (1992); John H. Langbein, The His-
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these tribunals faced contempt or other punitive sanctions.85  Under the 
rule of pro confesso, for example, a refusal to take an oath was treated as a 
confession to the crime under investigation.86  These practices provoked 
enormous opposition; Leonard Levy, for example, summarized the objec-
tions to the use of compelled oaths by the High Commission thusly: 
Victims of the High Commission could only protest feebly that the oath ex officio 
was a device of the devil, a violation of the law of the land, an instrument of the 
Spanish Inquisition akin to torture.  The real objection to the Commission was 
its purpose, the fact that it was meant to punish the purest promptings of con-
science, but its oath procedure remained the foremost target of its opponents.87 
Once these objections prevailed, the prohibition on compelled self-
incrimination became widely recognized as “an established, respected rule 
of the common law, or, more broadly, of English law generally.”88 
Prior to the Revolution, the prohibition on compelled testimony spread 
to the American colonies.89  Adherence to the prohibition survived inde-
pendence; between 1776 and 1783, eight states adopted constitutions or 
bills of rights that provided that no person could be “compelled to give evi-
dence against himself,” or, in the case of Massachusetts, “furnish evidence 
against himself.”90  During the consideration of the original constitution, 
four of the ratifying states recommended placing this prohibition in the 
United States Constitution.91  Although the formulation employed by James 
Madison in his draft of what became the Fifth Amendment prohibition on 
compelled self-incrimination differed from that employed in the states, 
 
torical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1074–
84 (1994); E.M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4–12 (1949); 
Penney, supra note 19, at 315–18; R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 769–74 (1935). 
 85 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 2, at 130–33, 203–04, 250; Charles M. Gray, Self-Incrimination in Inter-
jurisdictional Law, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 47, 79–80 (1997) [hereinafter ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT]; Langbein, supra 
note 84, at 1073. 
 86 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 2, at 132, 203–04, 269; Daniel L. Vande Zande, Coercive Power and the 
Demise of the Star Chamber, 50 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 326, 338–39 (2008–10). 
 87 LEVY, supra note 2, at 268–69.  For discussions along similar lines, see, for example, Alschuler, 
supra note 25, at 2639–51; Alfredo Garcia, The Fifth Amendment: A Comprehensive and Historical Ap-
proach, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 209, 218–21 (1998); Penney, supra note 19, at 315–18; and William J. 
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 412–16 (1995). 
 88 LEVY, supra note 2, at 313. 
 89 See, e.g., id. at 368–404; Benner, supra note 44, at 84–88; Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsider-
ing the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1100–04 
(1994); Morgan, supra note 84, at 18–23; Pittman supra note 84, at 775–83. 
 90 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND ORIGINS § 9.1.3 
(Neil H. Cogan ed. 1997) [hereinafter COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]. 
 91 See id. at § 9.1.2; LEVY, supra note 2, at 416, 418–21. 
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there is no evidence that it was understood as anything other than a codifi-
cation of the  preexisting rule against compelled testimony.92 
Originalists should find much significance in this discussion.  Originalism 
does not confine itself to the semantic meaning of constitutional text as found 
in framing-era dictionaries and the like; the manner in which the framing-era 
public would have understood constitutional text is of critical importance.  As 
the Court has written in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia: 
[W]e are guided by the principle that “[t]he Constitution was written to be un-
derstood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and or-
dinary as distinguished from technical meaning.”  Normal meaning may 
of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical 
meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding 
generation.93 
Among those who contend that the original meaning of constitutional 
text is interpretively binding, many if not most advocate reliance on the fram-
ing-era public’s understanding.94  This approach seems to follow from the 
widespread if not universal view among originalists that legal texts are 
properly understood to reflect the meaning they were given at the time they 
were crafted.95  On this view, the historical origin of the prohibition on com-
 
 92 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 2, at 422–30; Benner, supra note 44, at 88–90; Thomas Y. Davies, Far-
ther and Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment: The Recharacterization of the Right Against Self-
Incrimination as a “Trial Right” in Chavez v. Martinez, 70 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1008–09 (2003); 
Lewis Mayers, The Federal Witness’ Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Constitutional or Common Law?, 4 
AM. J. LEG. HIST. 107, 110–19 (1960); Moglen, supra note 89, at 1121–24; Richard A. Nagareda, 
Compulsion “To Be a Witness” and the Resurrection of Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575, 1607–08 (1999).  
The consideration in Congress of what became the Fifth Amendment is remarkably unilluminat-
ing when it comes to original understanding of the prohibition on compelled self-incrimination.  
See COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 90, § 9.1.1. 
 93 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 
282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)) (internal citations deleted) (second brackets in original). 
 94 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 621 (1999) 
(“[T]he objective original meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the words used in 
the constitutional provision at the time of its enactment.”); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. 
Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551 (1994) (“[T]he text of the 
Constitution, as originally understood by the people who ratified it, is the fundamental law of the 
land.”) (footnote omitted); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132 (2003) (“[H]ow the words and phrases, 
and structure . . . would have been understood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-
informed reader of those words and phrases, in context, at the time they were adopted, and with-
in the political and linguistic community in which they were adopted . . . .”) (footnote and paren-
thetical omitted); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 677 (1991) (“[A] constitutional provision’s ‘objective meaning’ to the 
public at the time the provision was ratified . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
 95 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 35–37 (2011); RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 92–117 (2004); 
GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 
67–90 (1992); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS 
28–53 (1994); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 160–212 (1999); Hans W. Baade, “Origi-
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pelled self-incrimination has great interpretive significance since the Fifth 
Amendment codified a widely-understood and longstanding prohibition. 
Nonoriginalists should also regard the origin of the rule against com-
pelled self-incrimination as of critical import.  After all, nonoriginalists do 
not doubt that any inquiry into the meaning of a legal text has a starting 
point in the framing era, even if the understanding of the text may evolve in 
light of felt experience.96  In his defense of nonoriginalism, for example, Jed 
Rubenfeld argued that when a constitutional provision is directed at a par-
adigmatic evil, it should be understood as a commitment to prohibit the evil 
that gave it rise, without precluding an interpretation that proscribe addi-
tional practices regarded as sufficiently similar to warrant similar constitu-
tional prohibition.97  Even if one is skeptical about whether one can readily 
identify a discrete paradigmatic abuse at which most constitutional provi-
sions are directed,98 that skepticism seems unwarranted when it comes to 
the Fifth Amendment, which does seem to have been constructed with a 
particular paradigm in mind.99  Indeed, the Supreme Court has justified its 
willingness to extend the Fifth Amendment beyond the abuses that gave it 
rise by assessing whether contemporary interrogation tactics raise concerns 
 
nal Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1103–07 (1991); Cal-
abresi & Prakash, supra note 94, at 550–59; Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, 
and the Interpretation of “This Constitution”, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1186–1259 (1987); Charles Fried, 
Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100 HARV. L. REV. 751, 756–60 (1987); 
Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-
Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1641–57 (2009); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Orig-
inal Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226, 229–
36 (1988); Kesavan & Paulsen, note 94, at 1127–48; Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Con-
stitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1833–36 (1997); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the 
Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512–14 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, We 
Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 38–42 (Robert W. 
Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011). 
 96 Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (Holmes, J.) (“[W]hen we are dealing with 
words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize 
that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen 
completely by the most gifted of its begetters.  It was enough for them to realize or to hope that 
they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat 
and blood to prove that they created a nation.  The case before us must be considered in the light 
of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.”). 
 97 JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 99–124 (2005). 
 98 For an expression of skepticism along these lines, see Brannon P. Denning, Brother, Can You Para-
digm?, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 81, 98–110 (2006) (reviewing RUBENFELD, supra note 97). 
 99 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Paradigm-Case Method, 115 YALE L.J. 1977, 1986–87 (2006).  Indeed, many 
leading nonoriginalist arguments about the Fifth Amendment start with framing-era understand-
ings and then endeavor to justify their evolution.  See, e.g., KAMISAR, supra note 27, at 35–37; 
Morgan, supra note 84, at 27–30. 
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fairly analogous to those that originally produced the prohibition on com-
pelled self-incrimination.100 
The paradigm that gave rise to the widespread acceptance of a prohibi-
tion on compelled self-incrimination suggests that compulsion, in the consti-
tutional sense, whether considered in terms of original meaning or as a 
starting point for nonoriginalist construction, references a particular inves-
tigative tactic.  On this view, compulsion is properly defined in terms of the 
paradigm of compelled self-incrimination: An official undertaking to induce a 
witness to provide evidence by threat of punitive sanctions. 
B.  Scrutinizing the Definition 
The proposed definition and its constituent elements nicely explain Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Although there are some important ambigui-
ties in the definition that need to be examined, the definition provides a 
remarkably good account of Fifth Amendment compulsion. 
1.  Official Undertaking to Induce 
As we have seen, the paradigm of compulsion did not involve an effort to 
plumb the internal psychology of a suspect, but rather focused on a particular 
investigative tactic involving an official effort to obtain evidence from a wit-
ness.  Accordingly, the first element of the definition of compulsion identifies 
a necessary though not sufficient condition for the presence of compulsion—
an official undertaking to induce an individual to provide evidence. 
True to the paradigm, Fifth Amendment jurisprudence has long limited 
the prohibition on compelled self-incrimination to official undertakings to 
induce.  In Miranda, for example, the Court cautioned that “[v]olunteered 
statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment . . . .”101  
The Court later added that the Fifth Amendment is implicated only when 
interrogators employ “a measure of compulsion above and beyond that in-
 
100 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990) (“Because the privilege was designed 
primarily to prevent ‘a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their 
stark brutality,’ it is evident that a suspect is ‘compelled . . . to be a witness against himself’ at least 
whenever he must face the modern-day analog of the historic trilemma—either during a criminal 
trial where a sworn witness faces the identical three choices, or during custodial interrogation 
where, as we explained in Miranda, the choices are analogous and hence raise similar concerns.”) 
(citation, footnote, and some internal quotations omitted).  Cf. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41 
(2002) (plurality opinion) (“Determining what constitutes unconstitutional compulsion involves a 
question of judgment: Courts must decide whether the consequences of an inmate’s choice to 
remain silent are closer to the physical torture against which the Constitution clearly protects or 
the de minimis harms against which it does not.”). 
101 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).  Accord, e.g., Ohio Adult Par. Auth. v. Woodard, 
523 U.S. 272, 286 (1998); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984).  Cf. LEVY, supra note 
2, at 374–75 (“Never in history has the existence of the right placed the state under an obligation 
to prevent a person from incriminating himself.”) (footnote omitted). 
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herent in custody itself,” involving “words or actions on the part of the po-
lice . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incrim-
inating response from the suspect.”102 
The importance of tying compulsion to an official-undertaking-to-
induce rather than a suspect’s internal psychology is made particularly clear 
by Colorado v. Connelly,103 in which the Court rejected the view that the Fifth 
Amendment barred the use of a confession by an individual who, by virtue 
of mental illness, “was not capable of making a ‘free decision with respect to 
his constitutional right of silence . . . and his constitutional right to confer 
with a lawyer before talking to the police.’”104  The Court wrote that “the 
Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned ‘with moral and psychological 
pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coer-
cion.’”105  Connelly has been subject to fierce criticism from those who be-
lieve that it gives short shrift to concerns about the reliability of confes-
sions.106  Yet, Connelly is faithful to the paradigm of compulsion by focusing 
on the requirement that the government induce an individual to provide 
incriminating evidence. 
The same point explains the Court’s conclusion that the contents of a 
voluntarily-created document are not protected by the Fifth Amendment 
because the author was not compelled to produce them, but requiring an 
individual to produce such documents pursuant to court order is subject to 
Fifth Amendment protection when the act of production would involve tes-
timonial self-incrimination.107  The role of the government in undertaking 
to induce an individual to provide evidence is therefore critical; it is this as-
pect of Fifth Amendment compulsion that is captured by the official-
inducement element of the proposed definition. 
Another illustration of the importance of the official-inducement ele-
ment involves a criminal defendant’s ability to testify in his own defense.  In 
the framing era, criminal defendants were not permitted to testify by virtue 
of their presumed interest in the outcome of the case, though they were of-
ten permitted to give unsworn statements.108  In the nineteenth century, this 
 
102 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980) (footnotes omitted). 
103 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
104 Id. at 169 (quoting People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 729 (Colo. 1985)). 
105 Id. at 170 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985)).  The Court added that the Fifth 
Amendment does not apply “whenever the defendant feels compelled to waive his rights by rea-
son of any compulsion, even if the compulsion does not flow from the police.”  Id. 
106 See, e.g., Benner, supra note 44, at 65–66; George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 
1986 and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231, 272–76 (1988). 
107 See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35–40 (2000); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 
610–14 (1984). 
108 See, e.g., George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 624–50, 662–66 (1997); 
John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The Constitutionalization of American Self-Incrimination 
Doctrine, 1791–1903, 77 TEX. L. REV. 825, 835, 849–52 (1999).  Leonard Levy once argued 
that in light of the framing-era rule that disqualified criminal defendants from giving sworn testi-
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rule came under assault by those who argued that the reliability of the crim-
inal process would be improved if the defendant could testify.109  One of the 
arguments advanced against permitting a criminal defendant to testify, 
however, was that criminal defendants, if permitted to testify, would be im-
permissibly compelled to incriminate themselves by virtue of the need to 
meet the prosecution’s case.110  Yet, this argument ultimately did not carry 
the day; between 1864 and 1900, federal law and the law of every state ex-
cept Georgia changed to permit criminal defendants to testify.111 
The removal of the bar on testimony of a criminal defendant suggests a 
rejection of the notion that criminal defendants, if permitted to testify, are 
subject to compulsion in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court eventually opined that a criminal defendant confronted 
with the prosecution’s case is not under compulsion within the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment.112  The official-inducement element of the proposed 
 
mony, the Fifth Amendment would have had to reach unsworn statements or it would have been 
a “meaningless gesture.”  Leonard Levy, The Right Against Self-Incrimination, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1569, 1570, 1572 (Leonard Levy et al. eds., 1986).  This is a 
considerable overstatement; even if limited to a prohibition on compelled oaths, the Amendment 
would have been meaningful if only to preclude a return to that practice.  For an argument along 
these lines, see Ralph Rossum, “Self-Incrimination”: Original Intent, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 275, 276–77 (Eugene W. Hickock ed., 
1991). 
109 See, e.g., Joel N. Bodansky, The Abolition of the Party-Witness Disqualification: An Historical Survey, 70 
KY. L.J. 91, 120–29 (1981). 
110 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 578–79 (1961); Bodansky, supra note 109, at 115. 
111 See, e.g., Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577–78; Bodansky, supra note 109, at 93. 
112 See, e.g., Ohio Adult Par. Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 287 (1998) (“[T]here are undoubted 
pressures—generated by the strength of the government’s case against him—pushing the crimi-
nal defendant to testify.  But it has never been suggested that such pressures constitute ‘compul-
sion’ for Fifth Amendment purposes.”); Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 847 (1973) (“In-
troduction of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending to implicate the defendant in the 
alleged crime increases the pressure on him to testify.  The mere massing of evidence against a 
defendant cannot be regarded as a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination.”); McGau-
tha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 217 (1971) (“[T]he policies of the privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination are not offended when a defendant in a capital case yields to the pressure to 
testify on the issue of punishment at the risk of damaging his case on guilt.”); Yee Hem v. United 
States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925) (“[T]he practical effect of the statute creating the presumption is 
to compel the accused person to be a witness against himself may be put aside with slight discus-
sion . . . . The same situation might present itself if there were no statutory presumption and a 
prima facie case of concealment with knowledge of unlawful importation were made by the evi-
dence.  The necessity of an explanation by the accused would be quite as compelling in that case 
as in this; but the constraint upon him to give testimony would arise there, as it arises here, simp-
ly from the force of circumstances and not from any form of compulsion forbidden by the Consti-
tution.”).  Somewhat inconsistently, on other occasions, the Court has characterized a defend-
ant’s testimony as a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights.  See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 
348, 364 (1996); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 496–97 (1926); Caminetti v. United 
States, 242 U.S. 470, 494 (1917).  These statements, however, appear to rest not on the view that 
a criminal defendant is under compulsion to testify but can waive the right to be free from com-
pulsion; but rather on the view that once a defendant has voluntarily disclosed incriminating facts 
by testifying, no Fifth Amendment right remains.  As the Court has put it: “Disclosure of a fact 
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definition of compulsion explains why this is so.  Although prosecutors may 
sometimes fashion their case hoping that it will force the defendant to the 
stand, we do not think of the prosecution’s case-in-chief as an undertaking 
to induce the defendant to provide evidence, rather than an undertaking to 
discharge the prosecution’s burden of proof.  To be sure, the stronger the 
prosecution’s case, the greater the threat that the defendant will face puni-
tive sanctions, but without an undertaking to induce the defendant to pro-
vide evidence, a threat of conviction, without more, does not produce com-
pulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 
The official-inducement element also makes comprehensible the much-
criticized required records doctrine, which provides that despite the poten-
tially incriminating character of the required disclosures, as an incident of an 
otherwise proper noncriminal regulatory regime, a business can be required 
to maintain and produce records reflecting its compliance with pricing regu-
lations,113 a driver can be required to stop and identify himself at the scene of 
an accident,114 and an individual whose custody of a child is subject to judi-
cial supervision can be required to produce the child for judicial proceed-
ings.115  Commentators have been harshly critical of this doctrine, arguing 
that a regulatory scheme cannot be enforced by compelling individuals to 
provide incriminating evidence.116  Yet, this element of the proposed defini-
tion renders the doctrine readily reconcilable with the Fifth Amendment. 
In the cases in which the required records doctrine has been recognized, 
the regulatory scheme at issue was directed not at undertaking to induce 
individuals to provide evidence, but rather at shaping primary conduct.  
The laws at issue in these cases, by requiring individuals to make disclosures 
about particular regulated activities, were official undertakings to provide 
an ex-ante incentive for individuals to comply with police power regulations 
involving pricing, driving, child custody and the like; these laws promoted 
“compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State’s pub-
lic purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws.”117  Accord-
ingly, the disclosure requirements at issue, though enforced by criminal 
 
waives the privilege as to details,” as long as there is no “reasonable danger of further crimination 
in light of all the circumstances, including any previous disclosures.”  Rogers v. United States, 
340 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1951).  Accord, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321–22 (1999); 
1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 133; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 2276. 
113 See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32–35 (1948) (requiring the keeping of records in ac-
cordance with government regulations does not transfer the Fifth Amendment privilege to those 
records). 
114 See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427–34 (1971) (plurality opinion); Id. at 439–58 (Harlan, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
115 See Baltimore City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 558–62 (1990). 
116 See, e.g., Amar & Lettow, supra note 11, at 869–73; David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1141–42 (1986); Nagareda, supra note 92, at 
1642–45. 
117 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 556. 
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sanctions, were efforts to shape primary conduct and promote compliance 
with noncriminal regulatory objectives, not official undertakings to induce 
individuals to provide evidence.118  Conversely, some disclosure require-
ments directed at narrow classes of individuals likely to be engaged in un-
lawful activities violate the Fifth Amendment because, rather than under-
taking to shape primary conduct, they operate to induce individuals to 
provide incriminating information or to identify themselves as potential 
prosecutive targets by invoking the Fifth Amendment.119  One cannot iden-
tify the line between permissible regulation directed at primary conduct and 
impermissibly inducing of an individual to supply incriminating evidence 
with mathematical certainty, but this is precisely the line that the proposed 
definition of compulsion tells us needs to be drawn.120 
The official-inducement element not only explains these important if 
much-debated aspects of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, but also neatly 
elides many of the problems of the overborne-will test.  As we have seen, 
the overborne-will test is plagued by the difficulties in determining why an 
individual chooses to submit to interrogation.121  The objection to the com-
pelled oath that gave rise to the prohibition on compelled self-
incrimination, however, inhered in the investigative tactic itself—the threat 
of punitive sanctions deployed to induce individuals to provide evidence—
and not to the psychological effect that the threat produced in particular 
individuals.  Thus, identifying compulsion does not require a case-by-case 
inquiry into the effect of threatened sanctions on a particular witness.  
Faithful to the historical paradigm, this element of the definition makes 
clear that compulsion does not turn on an individual’s psychology or his 
subjective reaction to an investigative technique, but rather on an objective 
 
118 Cf. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000) (“[T]he fact that incriminating evidence may 
be the byproduct of obedience to a regulatory requirement, such as filing an income tax return, 
maintaining required records, or reporting an accident, does not clothe such required conduct 
with the testimonial privilege.”) (footnotes omitted).  For arguments similarly stressing the non-
criminal objectives of the regulatory schemes upheld in the required-records cases, albeit without 
linking the doctrine to the meaning of compulsion, see Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Toward a 
Unified Theory of Testimonial Evidence under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1135, 
1179–80 (2007); and Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 26 (1986). 
119 See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 26 (1969) (holding that a regulation to pay a transfer 
tax on marijuana violates the Fifth Amendment); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 100 
(1968) (holding that an obligation to register and pay a tax on a firearm if it is not acquired by 
lawful transfer or importation violates the Fifth Amendment); Marchetti v. United States, 390 
U.S. 39, 42, 56 (1968) (holding that a requirement that individuals in the business of taking wa-
gers register and pay an excise tax violates the Fifth Amendment); Albertson v. Subversive Activi-
ties Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 70–79 (1965) (holding than an obligation for the Communist 
Party to register with the Subversive Activities Control Board violates the Fifth Amendment). 
120 Cf. Stuntz, supra note 49, at 1287 (arguing that in the required records cases, “[t]he only solution 
is to make judgments of degree”). 
121 See supra text accompanying notes 21–36. 
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assessment of an investigative tactic—whether it is an official undertaking to 
induce individuals to provide evidence. 
2.  A Witness Providing Evidence 
An analytically distinct element of the proposed definition requires that 
the authorities undertake to induce not just anyone, but specifically a wit-
ness, and to a particular end—to provide evidence. 
Context always matters when reading legal texts; surely the term “com-
pel” should be considered in the context in which it appears.  The Fifth 
Amendment does not refer to compulsion in the abstract, but rather com-
pulsion “to be a witness.”122  The term “witness,” in turn, generally refers to 
those who provide testimony or evidence.  For example, referring to the 
right of an accused under the Sixth Amendment “to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him,”123 the Supreme Court defined witnesses as “those 
who ‘bear testimony.’”124  And, as we have seen, at the framing, the Fifth 
Amendment was regarded as equivalent to the state-law prohibitions on 
compulsion to “give” or “furnish” evidence.125  Thus, context suggests that 
compulsion, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, must be directed at a 
witness, for the purpose of inducing the witness to provide evidence. 
Some might find the manner in which this element of the proposed def-
inition is stated to be overbroad.  After all, many of the arguments that gave 
rise to the prohibition against compelled self-incrimination focused on the 
significance of compelling individuals to provide sworn testimony, which 
was thought to implicate religious injunctions against compelled oaths and 
produce a form of spiritual coercion by forcing individuals to choose be-
tween confession and eternal damnation.126  The compelled oath, it was 
 
122 U.S. CONST. amend V.  The discussion that follows focuses on the requirement that an individu-
al be compelled to be a witness because this illuminates the character of compulsion.  It does not, 
however, consider the additional requirement that the individual be compelled to be a witness 
against himself—that is, the requirement of self-incrimination.  That element of the Fifth Amend-
ment right is analytically distinct from the inquiry into compulsion.  Whether an individual has 
become a witness against himself involves consideration not of the character of compulsion, but 
instead whether the substance of the information that an individual is compelled to provide could 
be used to incriminate.  See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 190 (2004) (Fifth 
Amendment applicable only when there is “reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the wit-
ness from his being compelled to answer”) (citation omitted).  Indeed, a classic example of com-
pulsion involves a witness ordered to testify under immunity, where the presence of compulsion is 
plain, even though the testimony cannot be used to incriminate.  See, e.g., New Jersey v. Portash, 
440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (“The information given in response to a grant of immunity may well 
be more reliable than information beaten from a helpless defendant, but it is no less compelled.”). 
123 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
124 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (citation omitted). 
125 See supra text accompanying notes 90–92. 
126 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 2, at 23–24; LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT? 14 (1959); Alschuler, supra note 25, at 2641–43; Moglen, supra note 89, at 1100–
01. 
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said, amounted to “a form of torture more cruel than physical torture be-
cause it tormented one’s soul by tempting a man to save himself from pun-
ishment by perjuring himself at the expense of dishonoring God’s name and 
risking eternal damnation.”127  Even putting spiritual concerns aside, com-
pelled testimony has been thought to produce “the cruel trilemma of self-
accusation, perjury or contempt . . . .”128  Some have therefore argued that 
the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable when interrogators seek unsworn 
statements.129  This view suggests that the second element of the proposed 
definition is overbroad, since it reaches any official undertaking to induce 
an individual to provide evidence, even if the evidence comes in the form of 
an unsworn confession or other statement. 
To be sure, a definition of compulsion limited to efforts to obtain sworn 
testimony would leave investigators free to compel unsworn confessions, but 
only under the Fifth Amendment.  As we have seen, the Due Process 
Clause forbids the use of involuntary confessions as evidence; accordingly, 
limiting the Fifth Amendment to compulsion to provide sworn testimony 
would not leave torture and other coercive forms of interrogation not in-
volving sworn testimony beyond the reach of the Constitution.  Indeed, his-
torically, the rule against involuntary confessions developed separately from 
the rule against compelled self-incrimination.130  Accordingly, those who 
would limit the Fifth Amendment to compulsion of sworn testimony regard 
the Amendment’s application to unsworn interrogation as a “hopeless con-
founding of self-incrimination with due process.”131 
This attack on the breadth of the witness-providing-evidence element of 
the proposed definition is strengthened by framing-era practice.  There is 
no framing-era precedent for anything resembling police interrogation be-
cause there was nothing in the framing-era analogue resembling a police 
force with investigative responsibilities.132  There is, however, framing-era 
 
127 LEVY, supra note 2, at 24. 
128 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
129 See, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1457, 1488 
(1997) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)). 
130 See, GRANO, supra note 47, at 124–25; Benner, supra note 44, at 99–101; Godsey, supra note 44, at 
484; Penney, supra note 19, at 322; Henry E. Smith, The Modern Privilege: Its Nineteenth-Century Ori-
gins, in ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 85, at 153. 
131 William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Taking Miranda’s Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REV. 813, 840 
(2005). 
132 Framing-era law enforcement consisted of constables and sheriffs whose duties were confined to 
executing warrants, responding to breaches of the peace, making arrests for offenses committed 
in their presence, and pursuing offenders when summoned in the wake of a crime.  See, e.g., 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 28–29, 68 
(1993); Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Dis-
tortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 239, 419–32 (2002); George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James 
Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1468–72 
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precedent for judicial interrogation.  Despite the emergence of the prohibi-
tion on compelled self-incrimination, English law permitted unsworn exam-
ination of criminal defendants by judicial officers at preliminary hearings, 
authorized under a statute enacted during the reign of Queen Mary.133 
These examinations often produced confessions that were treated as admis-
sible evidence at trial.134  The Marian preliminary examination spread to 
the American colonies, and seems to have persisted even after the adoption 
of the Fifth Amendment and its state-law analogues.135  Historical practice 
accordingly suggests that a criminal defendant could be required to provide 
evidence as long as he was not compelled to take an oath.  Indeed, Profes-
sor Alschuler has argued that the Fifth Amendment should be understood 
to permit a return to some form of the Marian procedure for judicial exam-
ination of suspects.136  In Salinas, Justice Thomas, citing Professor 
Alschuler’s article, contended that the Marian preliminary examination 
properly informs inquiry into the scope of the Fifth Amendment.137 
Yet, Fifth Amendment jurisprudence has never limited compulsion to 
efforts to obtain sworn testimony.  In the very first case in which the Su-
preme Court considered a Fifth Amendment objection, it invalidated a 
statute authorizing courts to order importers to produce business records in 
a criminal forfeiture proceeding or face an adverse judgment, even though 
the statute did not require the importer to be sworn, on the ground that “a 
compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner of 
goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness 
against himself . . . .”138  Subsequently, in Bram v. United States,139 the Court 
 
(2005).  See also Herman, supra note 84, at 543 (“Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, in-
terrogation was essentially a judicial or quasi-judicial task.  Although law enforcement officers ex-
isted during the formative period of the privilege, their function was to keep the peace and ap-
prehend offenders, not to interrogate.”) (footnotes omitted). 
133 2 & 3 Phil. & M., ch. 10 (1555) (Eng.). 
134 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 2, at 325; Alschuler, supra note 25, at 2653–54; Benner, supra note 44, 
at 80; Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-
Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part I), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 124–25, 141 (1992); 
Langbein, supra note 84, at 1059–61.  For an analysis of the text and operation of the statute con-
tending that its original purpose was to have justices of the peace undertake an appropriate inves-
tigation of alleged criminal conduct rather than obtain statements from the defendant, see JOHN 
H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE 
15–45 (1974). 
135 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 25, at 2656; Davies, supra note 92, at 1002–03; Moglen, supra note 
89, at 1095, 1123–25.  See also George C. Thomas III, Colonial Criminal Law and Procedure: The Royal 
Colony of New Jersey 1749–57, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 671, 694 (2005) (finding defendant’s 
statements at preliminary examinations admitted at trial in five of forty-eight New Jersey cases 
studied). 
136 See Alschuler, supra note 25, at 2670. 
137 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  To 
similar effect, see Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331–33 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
138 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634–35 (1886). 
139 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
916 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:4 
held that the Fifth Amendment barred the use of an unsworn statement of 
an accused under police interrogation, reasoning that the interrogator effec-
tively compelled Bram to provide evidence.140  In Miranda, the Court, rely-
ing in significant part on Bram, reaffirmed that the Fifth Amendment ap-
plied to custodial interrogation even if unsworn.141  On this point, the 
Court has never backtracked.142 
Of course, one might believe that Fifth Amendment jurisprudence has 
not been faithful to a proper conception of compulsion, and therefore fault 
the second element of the proposed definition as replicating an error re-
flected in the case law.  Yet, there is a solid case to be made that the Fifth 
Amendment reaches unsworn but compelled statements, based on two in-
terrelated considerations. 
First, considered in terms of either original meaning or ordinary par-
lance, the text of the Fifth Amendment is not limited to compelling individ-
uals to provide sworn testimony.  In terms of original meaning, most likely 
the Fifth Amendment was considered equivalent to the state-law prohibi-
tions on compelling individuals to give evidence regardless of its form; 
Richard Nagareda has assembled compelling evidence on this point,143 as 
has Justice Thomas.144  Indeed, in one of its earliest cases considering the 
Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court concluded the phrases “to be a wit-
ness” and one who “gives evidence” were interchangeable.145  One can be a 
“witness” who gives “evidence,” however, even when one is not under oath, 
as when a suspect provides an incriminating though unsworn statement lat-
er offered as evidence against him.146  Nor does the term “witness” inevita-
bly refer to one under oath; in both ordinary and framing-era parlance, in-
dividuals who have seen an event are often referred to as “witnesses” 
regardless whether they have testified under oath.147 
 
140 Id. at 562. 
141 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460–67 (1966). 
142 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 
582, 596, n.10 (1990). 
143 See Nagareda, supra note 92, at 1607. 
144 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 52–53 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
145 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 584, 586 (1892). 
146 Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004) (holding that persons making unsworn 
statements under circumstances that make them likely to be used as evidence against an accused 
are “witnesses” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse “witnesses”). 
147 As far back as the first edition of Webster’s dictionary, the multiple meanings of the term “wit-
ness” were evident; the first edition defined witness as: 
1. Testimony; attestation of a fact or event.  2. That which furnishes evidence or proof.  3. 
A person who knows or sees any thing; one personally present; as, he was witness; he was 
an eye-witness; 4. One who sees the execution of an instrument, and subscribes it for pur-
pose of confirming its authenticity by his testimony; 5. One who gives testimony; as, the 
witnesses in court agreed in all essential facts. 
  2 WEBSTER, supra note 83, at signature 114.1 verso (explanatory examples omitted).  This dual 
meaning that can reference to both sworn and unsworn witnesses persists in contemporary usage.  
See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 81, at 1439; 20 OED, supra note 81, at 464. 
May 2017] COMPULSION 917 
Second, even if, in the framing era, the form of compulsion of greatest 
concern involved compelled oaths, that is no reason to ignore other forms 
of compulsion.  As we have seen, a primary objection to the compelled oath 
was that it was regarded as so coercive as to amount to torture.148  It would 
be odd, however, to read the Fifth Amendment as prohibiting compulsion 
to provide sworn testimony because it was regarded as coercive, while leav-
ing other similarly coercive vehicles for obtaining testimony, such as obtain-
ing an unsworn statement through physical torture, outside the ambit of 
compulsion.  Indeed, the opponents of compelled oaths frequently likened 
them to the use of torture or other coercive means for obtaining confessions 
that could be used as evidence regardless whether they were sworn.149  Alt-
hough the spiritual coercion implicit in a compelled oath was likely of spe-
cial concern in the framing era, in a more secular era, the threat of secular 
sanctions if one does not submit to official questioning may well have more 
potency than the threat to one’s soul of swearing falsely.150  When the oath 
fades in significance, there is less reason to draw a sharp distinction between 
sworn and unsworn interrogation. 
There is also reason to doubt the importance of framing-era judicial ex-
amination of unsworn defendants as a precedent suggesting the view that 
only compulsion of sworn testimony is addressed by the Fifth Amendment.  
In England, the persistence of the Marian preliminary examination is un-
surprising; since the Marian statute was not repealed, judges remained ob-
ligated to apply it despite the prohibition on compelled self-
 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 88, 126–28. 
149 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 2, at 327–29; Herman, supra note 134, at 170–209.  As Justice Story put 
it when describing the Fifth Amendment, placing no evident weight on whether a confession was 
sworn, the Fifth Amendment: 
is but an affirmance of a common law privilege.  But it is of inestimable value.  It is well 
known, that in some countries, not only are criminals compelled to give evidence against 
themselves, but are subjected to the rack or torture in order to procure a confession of 
guilt.  And what is worse, it . . . . has been contrived, (it is pretended,) that innocence 
should manifest itself by a stout resistance, or guilt by a plain confession; as if a man’s in-
nocence were to be tried by the hardness of his constitution, and his guilt by the sensibility 
of his nerves.  Cicero, many ages ago, though he lived in a state, wherein it was usual to 
put slaves to the torture, in order to furnish evidence, has denounced the absurdity and 
wickedness of the measure in terms of glowing eloquence, as striking, as they are brief.  
They are conceived in the spirit of Tacitus, and breathe all his pregnant and indignant 
sarcasm.  Ulpian, also, at a still later period in Roman jurisprudence, stamped the prac-
tice with severe reproof. 
  III JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 660 
(1833) (footnotes omitted).  Significantly in this respect, Professor Langbein observed that in 
eighteenth-century England, there is some indication that the prohibition on compelled self-
incrimination was coming to be applied to the questioning of even unsworn defendants.  See 
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 280–81 (2003). 
150 Cf. Alschuler, supra note 25, at 2667 (“In our era, however, the fires of hell have smoldered.  
Oaths have lost their terror and even their meaning.”). 
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incrimination.151  Moreover, John Langbein has demonstrated that even 
after its recognition, the right against compelled self-incrimination re-
mained largely a dead letter in England as long as the rule barring defense 
counsel in criminal cases remained in force because, in the absence of de-
fense counsel, defendants had little choice but to speak to defend them-
selves.152  Thus, the persistence of the unsworn examination in England 
may say more about the need for counsel to make the prohibition on com-
pelled self-incrimination effective than anything else. 
The Marian examination may have had even less probative value in the 
United States when it comes to assessing the scope of the Fifth Amendment.  
For one thing, it is unclear how frequently judicial examination of criminal 
defendants occurred; there is some indication that framing-era lawyers and 
commentators believed that the Marian statutes were not part of the com-
mon law followed in America.153  For another, framing-era practice may 
shed little light on the scope of the Fifth Amendment because it is unclear 
that the right against compelled self-incrimination was consistently recog-
 
151 Even if the prohibition acquired something like constitutional status in England, this would not 
likely have been thought to provide a basis for ignoring or invalidating the Marian statute; the 
general view taken in English law was that Parliament was the supreme authority on the constitu-
tionality of legislation.  See, e.g., CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW 
CONCEPTS 32–39, 106–07 (1930); David Jenkins, From Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the 
British Common-Law Constitution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 863, 888–90 (2003).  It was not until 
1848 that a defendant was afforded the right to remain silent at a preliminary hearing.  See 11 & 
12 VICT. CH. 42 (1848) (Eng.).  As Blackstone put it, seemingly recognizing the tension between 
judicial examination of the accused and the prohibition on compelled self-incrimination: 
The justice before who such prisoner is brought is bound immediately to examine the cir-
cumstances of the crime alleged; and to this end, by statute . . . he is to take in writing the 
examination of such prisoner and the information of those who bring him; which, Mr. 
Lombard observes, was the first warrant given for the examination of a felon in the Eng-
lish law.  For, at the common law, nemo tenebatur prodere seipsum; and his fault was not to be 
wrung out of himself, but rather to be discovered by other means, and other men. 
  IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 296 (1769) (citation 
and footnote omitted).  For a helpful exploration of the origins of this Latin maxim that encapsu-
lates the prohibition on compelled self-incrimination, see R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1990). 
152 See Langbein, supra note 84, at 1059–62, 1065–71.  To similar effect, see, for example, LEVY, su-
pra note 2, at 320–23. 
153 See, e.g., Moglen, supra note 89, at 1126–29.  See also FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON 
CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 71 (9th ed. 1889) (“In several of the United States, 
among them which Pennsylvania may be mentioned, the [Marian] statute has not been viewed as 
in force; nor has the practice of taking the prisoner’s examination been generally adopted.”) 
(footnote and citation omitted).  One framing-era source put the matter thusly: 
The confession of the defendant, taken on an examination before justices of the peace, or 
in discourse with private persons, it is said, may be given in evidence against the party 
confessing . . . . But it should be observed, that the examination of the offender, being 
taken in pursuance of the statute of England . . . which is not in force in this country, the 
trial of a criminal in this state must be governed by the rules of the common law, and our 
own acts of Assembly; neither of which will justify his own examination in order to con-
vict him. 
  WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 188 (2d ed. 1810). 
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nized in the framing era; there is evidence from colonial New York, for ex-
ample, that the right against compelled self-incrimination was rarely recog-
nized even when it came to sworn testimony.154  Indeed, we have seen that 
in the absence of counsel, Fifth Amendment rights are largely illusory, and 
the shortage of lawyers in early America would therefore have inhibited the 
development of Fifth Amendment rights.  Using the example of New York, 
Eben Moglen observed despite the recognition of a constitutional right to 
counsel, “expansion of the criminal defense practice was slow.”155  Alt-
hough data is sparse, it seems likely that most criminal defendants went un-
represented until well into the nineteenth century.156  They were particular-
ly unlikely to be represented at preliminary hearings, when the accused 
would have had little time to procure counsel.157 
Significantly, judicial examination of the accused did not survive for 
long after American independence; it was abandoned over the course of the 
next century.158  By the late nineteenth century, the prevailing practice was 
to leave to the defendant the decision whether to speak at the preliminary 
hearing.159  This only strengthens the supposition that the persistence of ju-
dicial examination more likely reflected the absence of defense counsel ad-
vancing objections—or silencing their clients—than its consistency with the 
Fifth Amendment. 
 
154 See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW 
YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 656–59 (1944). 
155 Moglen, supra note 89, at 1126.  A study of colonial justice in Frederick County, Maryland, simi-
larly found that only a fraction of defendants had counsel, although by the early nineteenth cen-
tury, the incidence of counsel had dramatically increased.  See James D. Rice, The Criminal Trial 
Before and After the Lawyers: Authority, Law, and Culture in Maryland Jury Trials, 1681–1837, 40 AM. J. 
LEG. HIST. 455, 457–59 (1996) (providing that 17.9% of defendants had counsel during 1767–
1771 and 59.7% of defendants had counsel during 1818–1825).  In contrast, in colonial New Jer-
sey records, George Thomas found appearances at trial by defense counsel in twenty-six of forty-
eight cases, though it is unclear if counsel appeared at the preliminary examination.  See Thomas, 
supra note 135, at 689 (comparing colonial New Jersey and England and finding that in England, 
defendants had counsel in eight of 171 cases while in New Jersey, defendants had counsel in 
twenty-six of forty-eight cases, amounting to “ratios [of] 5% defense counsel in London and 54% 
in colonial New Jersey.”). 
156 See WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 18, 27–33, 226–28 
(1955); ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 79 (1930). 
157 It is notable that in the handful of early cases in which the Supreme Court upheld the admission 
of statements made by a defendant during a preliminary examination as voluntarily made, albeit 
without consideration of the Fifth Amendment, the defendant did not have counsel at the prelim-
inary examination to interpose objection.  See, e.g., Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 310–
11, 313–14 (1912); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 621–24 (1896). 
158 See, e.g., KAMISAR, supra note 27, at 51–55; Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused—A 
Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224, 1231–38 (1932). 
159 See, e.g., I JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 235(b)(2) (1895); WM. L. 
CLARK, JR., HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 35, at 87–88, 93–94 (William E. Mikell 
ed., 2d ed. 1918); EMORY WASHBURN, A MANUAL ON CRIMINAL LAW 112 (1878).  See also 
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 549–52 (1897) (describing the emergence of the rule requir-
ing magistrates to ensure that a defendant’s statement was voluntary). 
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In any event, we have little insight into the framing-era conception of 
the relation between the prohibition on compelled self-incrimination and 
judicial examination; from the framing-era to the end of the nineteenth 
century, no judicial opinion considered the matter.160  Even so, the tension 
between judicial examination and the Fifth Amendment was not unknown 
in the framing era; in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there 
were instances in both England and the United States in which Miranda-like 
warnings were required during judicial examination.161 
Thus, the Marian examination provides highly uncertain evidence of 
the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment.  Perhaps judicial examina-
tion survived only until defense lawyers arrived to assert their clients’ rights.  
The relatively rapid disappearance of compulsory judicial examination, at a 
minimum, suggests that it was not a deeply rooted aspect of criminal pro-
cedure.  Moreover, the fact that the Marian examination was unsworn 
could well have reflected no more than the then-prevailing rule barring 
sworn testimony by a defendant, rather than an understanding that the 
Fifth Amendment barred compulsion of only sworn testimony. 
Finally, stare decisis has its claims as well.  As we have seen, a long line 
of cases has consistently applied the Fifth Amendment to compulsion of 
even unsworn statements.162  Given the development of Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence, it seems clear that the concept of compulsion has come to 
include any official undertaking to induce an individual to provide evi-
dence, whether sworn or unsworn, by threat of punitive sanctions.  The se-
cond element of the proposed definition accordingly reflects this widely-
accepted conception of compulsion. 
3.  By Threat 
The proposed definition also requires that a particular means be used to 
induce an individual to become a witness—by threat of punitive sanctions. 
As we have seen in Part II.A above, when the prohibition on compelled 
self-incrimination first emerged, it was in response to a witness’s legal expo-
sure to a formal threat of sanctions imposed by judicial process, such as the 
 
160 For useful accounts of pertinent jurisprudence through the end of the nineteenth century, see 
Alan G. Gless, Self-Incrimination Privilege Development in the Nineteenth-Century Federal Courts: Questions of 
Procedure, Privilege, Production, Immunity and Compulsion, 45 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 391 (2001); and 
Katharine B. Hazlett, The Nineteenth Century Origins of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 42 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 235 (1998). 
161 See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Magistrates’ Examinations, Police Interrogations, and Miranda-Like Warnings 
in the Nineteenth Century, 81 TUL. L. REV. 777, 784–94 (2007); George C. Thomas III & Amy Jane 
Agnew, Happy Birthday Miranda and How Old Are You, Really?, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 301, 302–03, 
308–16 (2016). 
162 See supra text accompanying notes 138–142. 
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power to hold a recalcitrant witness in contempt or enter judgment against 
him under the pro confesso rule.163 
Similar to the argument that the second element of the proposed defini-
tion is too broad because it is not limited to sworn testimony, some might 
object that in light of the paradigmatic abuse that gave rise to the prohibi-
tion, this third element is overbroad because the paradigm of compulsion 
required a threat of formal sanctions, as opposed to informal extrajudicial 
threats of punishment or other adverse consequences that may follow if an 
individual refuses to provide evidence.  On this view, only compulsion ex-
erted by law, rather than informal or implicit threats, is sufficient.164 
For many, however, this attack on the breadth of the threat element of 
the proposed definition will not seem persuasive.  When determining 
whether compulsion is present, it is hard to understand why the presence of 
compulsion should turn on whether a suspect is threatened with a formal 
judgment of contempt rather than a less formal but perhaps equally alarm-
ing alternative—such as a threat that the suspect will be beaten unless he 
confesses.165  The text of the Fifth Amendment embraces all forms of com-
pulsion, regardless of how it is applied.  Thus, for the same reasons that the 
second element of the proposed definition embraces any effort to convert a 
suspect into a witness, whether sworn or unsworn, the third element em-
braces any threat, whether formal or informal.  Indeed, this is the conclu-
sion that Fifth Amendment jurisprudence long ago reached, and it is re-
flected in this element of the proposed definition. 
Since at least Bram, it has been settled that informal compulsion is cog-
nizable under the Fifth Amendment.  In Bram, the first officer on a ship, sus-
pected of murdering its captain, was taken into custody and brought to the 
office of a detective, where he was stripped, searched, and then questioned.166  
After telling Bram that another crew member “made a statement that he saw 
you do the murder” and that the detective was “satisfied that that you killed 
the captain,” the detective added: “If you had an accomplice, you should say 
so, and not have the blame of this horrible crime on your own shoulders.”167  
In assessing the admissibility of Bram’s ensuing statements, the Court wrote 
that the Fifth Amendment “was in its essence comprehensive enough to ex-
clude all manifestations of compulsion, whether arising from torture or from 
 
163 Cf. Pizzi & Hoffman, supra, note 131, at 843 (“Judges—who might hold a criminal defendant in 
contempt for refusing to testify—seem to have been the Founders’ original targets, not the po-
lice.”). 
164 For exploration of this argument, see, for example, MAYERS, supra note 126, at 82–83; WALTER 
V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 13–18 (1967); and 8 WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 
2252 at 328–29, 329 n.27. 
165 For a more elaborate argument along these lines, see Herman, supra note 84, at 543–44. 
166 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 534–38 (1897). 
167 Id. at 539. 
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moral causes . . . .”168  The Court reasoned that the detective’s comments to 
Bram “produce[d] upon his mind the fear that if he remained silent it would 
be considered an admission of guilt, and . . . den[ied him the] hope of remov-
ing the suspicion from himself.”169  Moreover, the detective had effectively 
“called upon the prisoner to disclose his accomplice, and might well have 
been understood as holding out an encouragement that by so doing he might 
at least obtain a mitigation of the punishment for the crime which otherwise 
would assuredly follow.”170  Bram accordingly held that an interrogator’s 
questions produce compulsion when they create a fear that unless the suspect 
can somehow satisfy the interrogator, or at least offer some grounds for leni-
ency, things will go badly. 
Bram was later extended in Ziang Sung Wan v. United States,171 in which 
the defendant was held for some twelve days and persistently questioned, 
even though he was seriously ill, until he confessed.172  Although the Court 
acknowledged that the suspect had received neither promises nor threats, in 
an opinion by Justice Louis Brandeis, the Court, relying primarily on Bram, 
concluded that the defendant’s confession had been compelled within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment.173  Subsequently, in concluding that the 
Fifth Amendment applied to custodial interrogation, Miranda similarly re-
lied on Bram.174 
Bram is often criticized for conflating the rule against involuntary confes-
sions with the prohibition on compelled self-incrimination.175  Yet, Bram ac-
tually elided the problems with an overborne-will test by focusing on the 
threats or inducements facing the suspect, not the suspect’s subjective reac-
tion to them.  Bram explained that because “the law cannot measure the 
force of the influence used or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the 
prisoner, [it] therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence 
has been exerted.”176  Bram found compulsion not by probing Bram’s psy-
che and finding his will overborne, but because Bram faced a specific threat 
 
168 Id. at 548. 
169 Id. at 562. 
170 Id. at 565. 
171 266 U.S. 1 (1924). 
172 Id. at 10–14. 
173 Id. at 14–17. 
174 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460–62 (1966). 
175 See, e.g., GRANO, supra note 47, at 123–31; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 2266 & n.1; Davies, supra 
note 92, at 1034–37; Godsey, supra note 44, at 477–88.  But cf. Charles T. McCormick, The Scope 
of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEX. L. REV. 447, 453 (1938) (“It may be conceded that in 
time of origin the confession-rule and the self-incrimination rule were widely separated . . . . Nev-
ertheless, the kinship of the two rules is too apparent for denial.  It is significant that the shadow 
of the rack and the thumbscrew was part of the background from which each rule emerged.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
176 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 565 (1897) (quoting WILLIAM O.  RUSSELL & CHARLES S. 
GREAVES, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 478 (Horace Smith & A.P.  Perceval 
Keep eds., 6th ed.  1896)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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of punitive sanctions—if he remained silent, he risked that his silence would 
fail to satisfy his interrogator of his innocence, or, at least, fail to suggest 
some basis to mitigate his culpability.177  In this, Bram is supported by the 
basic insight that “failure to contest an assertion . . . is considered evidence 
of acquiescence . . . if it would have been natural under the circumstances 
to object to the assertion in question.”178  Thus, Bram is faithful to the his-
torical paradigm of compelled self-incrimination, which, as we have seen, 
involves inquiry into whether a threat of sanctions faces a suspect who re-
mains silent, not a mere voluntariness or overborne-will test.179 
In any event, whether or not Bram was correct in the first instance, its 
recognition of informal compulsion is a rule of long standing, and repre-
sents the doctrinal foundation on which the edifice of Miranda stands.  
Moreover, despite post-Miranda jurisprudence that suggested that Miranda’s 
holding is broader than the Constitution requires,180 the Court has con-
firmed that Miranda is rooted in the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on 
compelled self-incrimination.181  Thus, this third element of the proposed 
definition, like the first two, faithfully reflects the longstanding course of 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 
4.  Punitive Sanctions 
The final element of the proposed definition limits compulsion to the 
use of a threat of specifically punitive sanctions.  As Part I.A above explains, 
the paradigmatic abuses that produced the prohibition on compelled self-
incrimination involved a threat of punitive sanctions if an individual refused 
to provide evidence, such as a judgment of contempt or a judgment of con-
viction under the pro confesso rule. 
Some might object that the proposed definition is overbroad because it 
encompasses threats of any effectively punitive sanction, rather than being 
limited to threats of formal and expressly criminal sanctions of the type em-
ployed by the High Commission and the Star Chamber, such as a judg-
ment of contempt, or conviction of a crime pro confesso.  Nevertheless, some 
threats, though not involving criminal sanctions, have been regarded as suf-
ficiently punitive to trigger the Fifth Amendment. 
 
177 For a more elaborate analysis of Bram along these lines, see Penney, supra note 19, at 326–29. 
178 Baxter v.  Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (quoting United States v.  Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 
176 (1975)) (ellipses in original and citations omitted).  For explication of the manner in which the 
law treats silence as an admission by acquiescence, see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 
2, § 262; and 4 JOHN H.  WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, §§ 1071–73 
(James H. Chadbourn rev., 1972). 
179 See supra text accompanying notes 84–92. 
180 See supra text accompanying note 45. 
181 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438–41 (2000). 
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As we have seen, the Court has held that the Fifth Amendment forbids 
the government from requiring public officials, employees or contractors to 
provide potentially incriminating evidence or face loss of their positions or 
contracts.182  The Court has also concluded that an attorney cannot be re-
quired to provide potentially incriminating evidence or face disbarment or 
other professional sanctions.183  This reflects the commonsense reality that 
even nominally noncriminal sanctions may be so effectively punitive in 
character, such as the “threat of substantial economic sanction,”184 or the 
“threat of dismissal from employment,”185 that they effectively produce 
compulsion; they are “sanctions ‘capable of forcing the self-incrimination 
which the Amendment forbids.’”186  Physical violence is doubtless another 
type of effectively punitive sanction capable of forcing self-incrimination.187  
In terms of their punitive character and potency to induce individuals to 
provide potentially incriminating evidence, these sanctions are not mean-
ingfully different from formal criminal sanctions.  Recognizing that com-
pulsion can include threatened sanctions not formally denominated as 
criminal punishment doubtless adds a measure of uncertainty to the defini-
tion of compulsion, but limiting it to a threat of formal criminal liability 
would make form prevail over substance. 
C.  Assessing the Definition 
The proposed definition of compulsion is based on the historical para-
digm of compelled self-incrimination, although it accommodates widely ac-
cepted developments in the understanding of that concept.  To the extent 
that it is broader than would be required to describe investigative tactics 
that gave rise to the original prohibition, it is only because there are ambi-
guities lurking in what it means to be a witness, the concept of threats, and 
the character of punitive sanctions.  Fifth Amendment jurisprudence has 
resolved these ambiguities by choosing substance over form—a witness is 
one who provides evidence whether sworn or unsworn since its incriminat-
ing character is little different; threats are covered whether formal or in-
formal since they can be of equal potency; and all effectively punitive sanc-
tions are embraced whether or not they are formally designated as criminal.  
This is the point Justice Brandeis made in Ziang Sung Wan when he wrote 
 
182 See supra text accompanying notes 30–32. 
183 See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514–16 (1967) (plurality opinion); id. at 519–20 (Fortas, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
184 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82 (1973). 
185 Uniformed San. Men Ass’n v. City of New York, 392 U.S. 280, 284 (1968). 
186 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 
801, 806 (1977)). 
187 Cf. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473–74 (2015) (characterizing use of excessive 
force against a pretrial detainee as “punishment” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause). 
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that “a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may 
have been the character of the compulsion, and whether the compulsion 
was applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise.”188  This elevation of sub-
stance over form has been a consistent theme of Fifth Amendment juris-
prudence, and it is accurately captured by the proposed definition. 
Even for originalists, confining the Fifth Amendment to the precise evil 
the Framers had in mind is a kind of slavish adherence to framing-era expec-
tations that few would endorse.  As Michael McConnell once put it: “[N]o 
reputable originalist . . . takes the view that the Framers’ assumptions and ex-
pectation about the correct application of their principles is controlling . . . . 
[T]he Framers’ analysis of particular applications could be wrong, or . . . cir-
cumstances could have changed and made them wrong.”189  Indeed, original 
meaning is often distorted when framing-era practice is consulted without 
reference to its historical context.190  Changes in technological context pro-
vide one example; although, in the framing era, a “search” for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure in-
volved a physical trespass, no less an originalist than Justice Scalia authored 
an opinion concluding that the term “search” also included “obtaining by 
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the 
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intru-
sion into a constitutionally protected area,’” a conclusion that was necessary 
to “assure[ ] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that 
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”191 
Accordingly, most originalists draw a distinction between original mean-
ing and the original expected applications of constitutional text, and regard 
only the former as binding.192  Perhaps the best example involves Brown v. 
 
188 Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1924) (citing Bram, 168 U.S. 532  (1897)). 
189 Michael W.  McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s 
“Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L.  REV. 1269, 1284 (1997) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
190 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 95, at 10–16, 75–81; RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE 
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 291–94 (1996); Michael C.  Dorf, Integrat-
ing Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 
1804–10 (1997); Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 569, 591–617 (1998); Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 
1205–08; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1169–71 (1993). 
191 Kyllo v.  United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v.  United States, 365 U.S. 
505, 512 (1961)). 
192 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 95, at 6–14; Randy E.  Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 405, 410 (2007); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or 
Two About Abortion), 24 CONST.  COMMENT.  383, 385–89 (2007); Steven G. Calabresi & Livia 
Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 668–72 (2009); Christo-
pher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.  555, 580–82 
(2006); McConnell, supra note 189, at 1284–87; Michael S. Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution 
(and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2059–62 (2006); James E.  Ryan, Laying Claim to the Consti-
tution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA.  L.  REV. 1523, 1539–46 (2011); Rotunda, supra note 
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Board of Education.193  Racial segregation remained common throughout the 
country even after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,194 but 
when addressing its constitutionality in Brown, the Court famously wrote that 
“we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopt-
ed . . . .”195  Virtually all originalists agree; the response of most to Brown is to 
argue that racial segregation is inconsistent with the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s textual commitment to equality, even if the fram-
ing generation did not yet understand the implications of the constitutional 
text it had ratified.196  Similarly, while the Framers had a specific investigative 
tactic in mind when they crafted the Fifth Amendment, its text addresses 
compulsion even when it manifests in different forms.  Even for originalists, 
accordingly, there is ample reason to doubt the interpretive significance of 
the Framers’ likely expectation that compulsion would generally involve 
sworn testimony or formal threats of criminal sanctions.  If the form that 
compulsion takes changes or the understanding of how it operates deepens, 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence should follow.197 
Living constitutionalists, for their part, happily consider changes in con-
text or practice.  As interrogation migrated from the Star Chamber and the 
High Commission to police stations, living constitutionalists argue that the 
Fifth Amendment’s application should follow the same path, rather than 
being confined to practices prevalent in the framing era.198 
Accordingly, the proposed definition should be pleasing to originalists 
and living constitutionalists alike.  It accurately captures both the framing-
era paradigm and the evolution of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence; that 
should be reason enough to embrace it.  There is, however, one remaining 
challenge to the definition—reconciling it with the law of waiver. 
 
95, at 513–14; Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U.L. 
REV. 923, 935 (2009). 
193 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
194 See Michael J.  Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor 
McConnell, 81 VA.  L.  REV. 1881, 1885–93 (1995). 
195 Brown, 347 U.S. at 492. 
196 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 81–83 (1990); PERRY, supra note 95, at 42–44; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Read-
ings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 423–26 (1995).  But see Michael W.  McConnell, 
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1092–1105 (1995) (arguing that 
Brown can be reconciled with framing-era understandings by noting that majorities in Recon-
struction-era Congresses expressed opposition to segregation during consideration of what be-
came the Civil Rights Act of 1875, though admittedly not the requisite two-thirds majority to 
amend the Constitution, and without presenting evidence that the requisite number of states 
would have ratified the Amendment on this understanding). 
197 For an argument along these lines, see Lessig, supra note 190, at 1234–37. 
198 For leading examples of non-originalist argument along these lines, albeit not based on a defini-
tion of compulsion, see KAMISAR, supra note 27, at 35–37, 48–64; Morgan, supra note 84, at 27–
30; Stephen A. Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or Judicial Fiat, 26 
WASHBURN L.J.  1, 12–15 (1986); and Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 437–39. 
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III.  COMPULSION AND WAIVER 
Perhaps the primary reason that Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and 
commentary have made so little progress in developing a definition of com-
pulsion is that it seems so difficult to reconcile a rigorous conception of 
compulsion with the rule that the right to be free from compelled self-
incrimination can be voluntarily waived.  As Professor Alschuler once put 
it: “Although a defendant or suspect might sensibly waive a right to remain 
silent, few sane adults would waive a right to be free of compulsion.”199 
The problem is reflected in the critical reaction to Miranda.  The Court 
wrote: “Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the com-
pulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the 
defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.”200  Accordingly, the 
Court required that those in custody be advised of their rights to remain si-
lent and have counsel present during questioning, and then knowingly and 
voluntarily waive those rights, before any statements made in custodial inter-
rogation are deemed to be consistent with the Fifth Amendment.201  In dis-
sent, however, Justice Byron White reasonably responded that if individuals 
in custody are subject to compulsion to speak, the mere provision of warnings 
could not be expected to somehow eliminate that compulsion and produce 
voluntary waivers.202  Commentators have echoed that criticism ever since.203 
Even putting the debate over Miranda aside, the law of Fifth Amend-
ment waiver, though rarely examined by scholars, is in considerable disar-
 
199 Alschuler, supra note 25, at 2627.  To similar effect, see, for example, Benner, supra note 44, at 
63–64 (“[T]he idea that any sane person would voluntarily (much less knowingly and intelligent-
ly) waive the right not to be subjected to compulsion is pure nonsense.”).  Professor Stuntz’s effort 
to address this point reflects the basic problem; he argued that Fifth Amendment waiver doctrine 
should be understood to permit waiver when the harm at which the Amendment is directed is not 
present, which he characterized as “a relatively narrow evil—the practice of forcing individuals to 
choose between confession and false statement . . . .”  Stuntz, supra note 52, at 766.  But, whenev-
er a suspect is under compulsion to speak, it would seem that the individual is forced to choose 
between confession and false statement, rendering any waiver inconsistent with Professor Stuntz’s 
own formulation. 
200 Miranda v.  Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966). 
201 Id.  at 471–79. 
202 Id.  535–36 (White, J., dissenting). 
203 See, e.g., DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, 
AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 81, 119–20 (2003); THOMAS & 
LEO, supra note 27, at 172–74; Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 71, 
75–76 (2006); Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 375, 384–85 (1997); 
Edwin D. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42, 59–61 
(1968); Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea To Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Con-
fessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662, 671–72 (1986) (reviewing FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL 
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1986)); Penney, supra note 19, at 370–71; Irene 
Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 
N.C. L. REV. 69, 110–12 (1989); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. 
REV. 673, 740, 744–46 (1992). 
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ray.  For decades, the Court cautioned that if an individual voluntarily 
chooses to make potentially incriminating statements rather than invoking 
his Fifth Amendment rights, that constitutes a waiver of Fifth Amendment 
rights.204  The rule that Fifth Amendment rights be invoked or they are lost 
applies even when the individual has not been warned of his Fifth Amend-
ment rights, as long as the individual has not been subjected to custodial in-
terrogation within the meaning of Miranda.205  It would seem, however, that 
a mere decision to answer a police officer’s question could not produce a 
valid waiver of Fifth Amendment rights since waivers must be knowing and 
intelligent, as well as voluntary.206  As one commentator observed, this in-
vocation requirement, instead of demanding a knowing and intelligent 
waiver, “permits the uncounseled witness to give up a valuable right with-
out being aware until after the fact that he is doing so.  One pleasantly dis-
posed could term this ‘gee, you’ll wish you hadn’t said that’ waiver.”207 
At some point, the Court seems to have realized that terming a failure 
to invoke Fifth Amendment rights a “waiver” was insupportable.  By the 
time of Minnesota v. Murphy, the Court admitted that “[w]itnesses who failed 
to claim the privilege were once said to have ‘waived’ it, but we have re-
cently abandoned this ‘vague term,’ and ‘made clear that an individual may 
lose the benefit of the privilege without making a knowing and intelligent 
waiver.’”208  But, if waiver does not explain the rule that Fifth Amendment 
rights must be asserted or they are lost, what does?  Perhaps the rule rests 
on a doctrine of forfeiture.  A rule of invoke-or-forfeit Fifth Amendment 
rights might seem plausible; as Professor Levy wrote: “Historically, it has 
been a fighting right; unless invoked, it offered no protection.”209  Once one 
focuses on the concept of compulsion, however, this reasoning collapses. 
Fifth Amendment rights attach only after an individual is subjected to 
compulsion.  Yet, in Murphy, the Court wrote that its “cases, taken together, 
 
204 See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (“The privilege ‘is deemed waived un-
less invoked.’”) (quoting United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931)); United States ex 
rel. Vajtauer v. Comm’r of Immig., 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927) (“The privilege may not be relied 
on and must be deemed waived if not in some manner fairly brought to the attention of the tri-
bunal which must pass upon it.”); Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 314 (1912) (“[A] de-
fendant, who voluntarily takes the stand in his own behalf, thereby waiving his privilege, may be 
subjected to a cross-examination concerning his statement.”). 
205 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429–34 (1984); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 
648, 656–57 (1976). 
206 See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382–83 (2010); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 
573 (1987); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 
207 Michael E. Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term—Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in 
the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1970).  For a more elaborate discussion focusing on the same 
point in Fifth Amendment waiver law, see George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for 
More Careful Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193, 246–49 (1977). 
208 See Minnesota v. Murphy 465 U.S. 420, 427–28 (1984) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 
U.S. 184, 191 (1957); Garner, 424 U.S. at 654 n.9). 
209 LEVY, supra note 2, at 375. 
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‘stand for the proposition that, in the ordinary case, if a witness under com-
pulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the 
government has not ‘compelled’ him to incriminate himself.’”210  But, once 
an individual is under compulsion, how can he make a free choice about 
whether to “make[] disclosures instead of claiming the privilege”?  Surely 
the Court did not mean to suggest that one under torture must invoke or 
lose Fifth Amendment rights.  Why should one under compulsion be ex-
pected to gather the fortitude to invoke the right against compelled-self-
incrimination or else face forfeiture of the right?211 
The Court sometimes acknowledges that strict adherence to an invoca-
tion requirement is untenable.  It has held, for example, that the invocation 
requirement should not be applied to custodial interrogation,212 cases in 
which an individual faces punitive sanctions for refusing to provide infor-
mation, such when public employees are threatened with dismissal for fail-
ing to submit to questioning,213 or cases in which the assertion of Fifth 
Amendment rights would in itself supply incriminating information to the 
government, such as regulatory schemes targeting classes of individuals like-
ly to be engaged in unlawful activities who are required to disclose infor-
mation about their activities or income.214  The Court has not had much 
success, however, in explaining why it has recognized exceptions to the in-
vocation rule in these contexts and not others.  In Garner v. United States, for 
example, the Court wrote that the assert-or-waive rule is not applied when 
“the relevant factor was held to deny the individual a ‘free choice to admit, 
to deny, or to refuse to answer.’”215  It seems likely, however, that any indi-
vidual “under compulsion” necessarily lacks a “free choice to admit, deny, 
or to refuse to answer.”  Yet, as we have seen, the Court takes the position 
that even witnesses “under compulsion” must assert or lose Fifth Amend-
 
210 See Minnesota v. Murphy 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984) (quoting Garner, 424 U.S. at 654). 
211 Cf. Donald Dripps, Is the Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent? A Proposed Fifth Amendment Synthesis, 17 
CONST. COMMENT. 19, 27 (2000) (“If a suspect on the rack answered questions without asserting 
his privilege, the government would not be heard to argue that the privilege must be claimed and 
that answering the questions waives the privilege.”). 
212 See, e.g., Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013) (plurality opinion); Murphy, 465 U.S. at 
429–30; Garner, 424 U.S. at 657–58; Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 560–61 (1980). 
213 See, e.g., Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (plurality opinion); Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434–35; Garner, 424 
U.S. at 661–63. 
214 See, e.g., Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (plurality opinion); Murphy, 465 U.S. at 439–40; Garner, 424 
U.S. at 658–61. 
215 Garner, 424 U.S. at 657 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941)).  Similarly, in 
Roberts, the Court concluded that a defendant who cooperated with the investigation of the nar-
cotics distribution conspiracy of which he was a member was required to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment at the time of sentencing because he “ha[d] identified nothing that might have im-
paired his ‘free choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer.’”  445 U.S. at 561 (quoting Garner, 424 
U.S. at 657 (further internal quotations omitted)). 
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ment rights,216 without explaining how such individuals retain “a free 
choice to admit, deny, or to refuse to answer.” 
The Court’s efforts to explain the invocation requirement and its excep-
tions have added little but confusion.  Once the definition of compulsion 
advanced above is applied, however, the apparent incoherence of the con-
cepts of invocation and waiver disappears. 
A.  The Invocation Requirement 
In Garner, the Supreme Court observed that although it had long stated 
that “a witness who revealed information instead of claiming the privilege 
lost the benefit of the privilege,” the decision in “[United States v.] Kordel ap-
pears to be the only square holding to this effect.”217  In Kordel, the federal 
government brought suit against a corporation alleging violations of the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and served interrogatories which the dis-
trict court ordered the corporation to answer.218  The corporate officer who 
answered the interrogatories was subsequently indicted, and claimed that 
the interrogatories had compelled him to incriminate himself in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment.219  The Court disagreed, writing that the corporate 
officer “need not have answered the interrogatories.  Without question he 
could have invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination.”220  In Garner, the Court relied on Kordel to hold that the dis-
closures that a taxpayer made on his income tax return were not shielded 
by the Fifth Amendment because the taxpayer made those disclosures in-
stead of asserting his Fifth Amendment rights on the return.221 
There are many confusions lurking in Kordel and Garner, all stemming 
from the Court’s failure to define compulsion.  It might seem that there was 
compulsion aplenty in both cases.  In Kordel, the district court had ordered 
the corporation to answer the interrogatories, and for just this reason, the 
court of appeals had concluded that the corporation’s officers had been 
compelled to provide incriminating evidence.222  In Garner, applicable law 
required a taxpayer to make a complete return or face liability for failure to 
make a return or contempt should the taxpayer disobey a judicial order re-
quiring him to provide information about his tax liability.223  Applying the 
 
216 See supra text accompanying notes 204–08, 210. 
217 Garner, 424 U.S. at 653. 
218 United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1970). 
219 Id. at 6–7. 
220 Id. at 7 (footnote omitted). 
221 Garner, 424 U.S. at 656–57, 665. 
222 See United States v. Detroit Vital Foods, Inc., 407 F.2d 570, 573–74 (6th Cir. 1969), rev’d sub nom. 
United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970). 
223 Garner, 424 U.S. at 651–52. 
May 2017] COMPULSION 931 
definition of compulsion advanced above to these cases, however, neither 
Kordel nor Garner involved compulsion. 
Compulsion, as we have seen, involves an official undertaking to induce 
a witness to provide evidence by threat of punitive sanctions.  Once invoked, 
however, the Fifth Amendment removes the threat of punitive sanctions that 
might otherwise attend a refusal to respond to official inquiries.  For exam-
ple, had they chosen to invoke the Fifth Amendment, the corporate officers 
in Kordel and the taxpayer in Garner would have faced no threat of punitive 
sanctions if they refused to provide evidence—because the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibits compelled self-incrimination, it would have, once invoked, 
prevented the government from attaching punitive sanctions to the refusal to 
provide potentially incriminating evidence.224  Even if the government can 
ordinarily require an individual to provide it with information, an individual 
always has the right to defend against a threat of sanctions attached to an 
official demand for information by invoking the Fifth Amendment.225 
Thus, in both Kordel and Garner, the disclosures at issue were not compelled 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment because the defendants faced no 
threat of punitive sanctions in light of their ability to invoke Fifth Amendment 
rights.  For this reason, the final element of the definition of compulsion ad-
vanced above—a threat of punitive sanctions—was absent.  Hence, the Court 
properly rejected the Fifth Amendment claims in these cases. 
To this, one might ask why, if the Fifth Amendment itself operates as a 
defense to punitive sanctions when an individual is asked to provide poten-
tially incriminating evidence, were the corporate officers in Kordel and tax-
payer in Garner required to expressly invoke Fifth Amendment rights?  Why 
did the Fifth Amendment itself fail to shield them from punitive sanctions 
for refusing to provide the information at issue?  Conversely, one might also 
ask why, if individuals always remain free to invoke Fifth Amendment 
rights, is compulsion ever present?  Nothing in this line of cases straightfor-
 
224 See, e.g., id. at 662–63 (“The Fifth Amendment itself guarantees the taxpayer’s insulation against 
liability imposed on the basis of a valid and timely claim of privilege . . . .”). 
225 See, e.g., Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Int. Res. Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 858 (1984) (rejecting a 
claim that requiring draft registration to receive federal financial assistance violates the Fifth 
Amendment as applied to those who have already failed to timely register because “these appel-
lees, not having sought to register, have had no occasion to assert their Fifth Amendment privi-
lege when asked to state their dates of birth; the Government has not refused any request for im-
munity for their answers or otherwise threatened them with penalties for invoking the privilege”); 
United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263–64 (1927) (“If the form of return provided called for 
answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the 
return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all. . . . It would be an extreme 
if not an extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a man to re-
fuse to state the amount of his income because it had been made in crime.  But if the defendant 
desired to test that or any other point he should have tested it in the return so that it could be 
passed upon.”). 
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wardly address these questions, but one can tease out an answer that turns 
on the character of compulsion. 
In Garner, the Court wrote that if a witness “desires the protection of the 
privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been ‘com-
pelled’ within the meaning of the Amendment.”226  Still, an invocation, 
without more, could hardly create compulsion that does not otherwise exist.  
The Court implicitly acknowledged this point in Murphy, explaining that 
“[t]he answers of . . . a witness to questions put to him are not compelled 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment unless the witness is required 
to answer over his valid claim of the privilege.”227 
Thus, compulsion comes into play by virtue of the government’s response 
to an invocation.  This insight enables us to make some sense of the invoca-
tion requirement.  An invocation does not create compulsion; it instead 
puts the government on notice of its obligation to either test the soundness 
of the invocation or refrain from enforcing a request for evidence through a 
threat of punitive sanctions.  Should the government breach that obligation 
by persisting in a threat of sanctions despite an invocation, compulsion is 
present.  At that point, all the elements of the definition of compulsion are 
satisfied—an official request for information becomes an undertaking to in-
duce a witness to provide evidence through a threat of punitive sanctions. 
There are good reasons to employ an invocation requirement to put the 
government on notice of an individual’s intention to assert Fifth Amend-
ment rights.  Absent invocation, the government may not realize that it 
cannot enforce a demand for information consistent with the Fifth 
Amendment—generally applicable rules like the requirements that inter-
rogatories be answered or that income be disclosed in a tax return ordinari-
ly are not incriminating, and absent an invocation, the government would 
have no reason to know that it must either test the validity of the invocation 
or refrain from enforcing such requirements by virtue of the Fifth Amend-
ment.  As the Court put it in Garner: “Unless a witness objects, a govern-
ment ordinarily may assume that its compulsory processes are not eliciting 
testimony that he deems to be incriminating.”228 
The invocation requirement sensibly functions to require the suspect to 
place the government on notice that he wishes to remain silent, triggering the 
government’s constitutional obligation to refrain from enforcing a request for 
potentially incriminating evidence with a threat of punitive sanctions. 
 
226 Garner, 424 U.S. at 654–55 (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943) (citations 
and internal quotations omitted)). 
227 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984).  To similar effect, see 1 MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 125 at 730 (“[A]s a general rule, compulsion is present only if a witness 
has asserted a right to refuse to disclose self-incriminating information and this refusal has been 
overridden.”) (footnote omitted). 
228 Garner, 424 U.S. at 655. 
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B.  The Exceptions to the Invocation Requirement 
The concept of compulsion nicely explains not only the invocation re-
quirement, but its exceptions as well. 
As we have seen, the invocation requirement is not applied to custodial 
interrogation, when an individual faces punitive sanctions for refusing to 
provide information, and when the assertion of Fifth Amendment rights 
would itself supply incriminating information to the government, such as 
requiring individuals to file tax returns that would identify them as within a 
discrete class of individuals likely to engage in unlawful activities if they in-
voke the Fifth Amendment.229  The common feature in all these contexts is 
that they involve compulsion under the definition advanced above that is 
not eliminated even by an invocation. 
Custodial interrogation has been regarded, at least since Bram, as in-
volving compulsion because, as we have seen, Bram reasons that during offi-
cial questioning of a suspect in custody, compulsion inheres in the threat 
that the suspect’s silence will be taken as a tacit acknowledgement of guilt, 
or at least an indication that interrogators have little reason to show the 
suspect leniency.230  Thus, even if a suspect invoked the Fifth Amendment 
during custodial interrogation, compulsion would persist; even if interroga-
tors honored the invocation, that would fail to eliminate the threat of puni-
tive sanctions that inhere in custodial interrogation because of the risk that 
silence will encourage the interrogators to press forward with prosecution—
or at least fail to dissuade them.231  The presence of compulsion to speak 
regardless whether an invocation would be honored explains the Court’s 
failure to apply the invocation requirement to custodial interrogation. 
The same is true when an individual is expressly threatened with puni-
tive sanctions, as in the cases in which public employees face loss of em-
ployment if they fail to submit to questioning, or in the case hypothesized in 
Murphy, when the Court suggested that invocation would not have been re-
quired in the face an express threat that Murphy’s probation would have 
been revoked if he declined to answer his probation officer’s questions.232  
In the face of an express threat of punitive sanctions attached to silence, an 
invocation does nothing to eliminate the threat, nor the compulsion that it 
creates.  Similarly, using the threat of punitive sanctions to require an indi-
vidual within a discrete class of those likely to be engaged in unlawful con-
duct to either provide information or invoke, in either case identifying him-
self as a likely investigative target, also amounts to compulsion.  In the face 
 
229 See supra text accompanying note 214. 
230 See supra text accompanying notes 166–179. 
231 See, e.g., Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429–30. 
232 Id. at 438. 
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of such threats of punitive sanctions if a suspect exercises the right to re-
main silent, compulsion, as defined above, is present. 
Thus, whenever an individual will remain subject to compulsion under 
the definition advanced above even if he were to invoke, invocation is not 
required.  In such cases, invocation be ineffective, and in such cases, Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence follows the commonsense rule that when com-
pulsion is present, an individual need not somehow exert the fortitude to 
resist it by invoking Fifth Amendment rights.  In this fashion, the definition 
of compulsion advanced above provides the explanation for both the invo-
cation requirement and its exceptions.233 
C.  Fifth Amendment Waiver 
It remains to consider the vexing question of Fifth Amendment waiver.  
The Court tells us that “[a] statement is not ‘compelled’ within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment if an individual ‘voluntarily, knowingly and intelli-
gently’ waives his constitutional privilege.”234  Yet, if one is subject to com-
pulsion, it would seem impossible to voluntarily decide to submit to interro-
gation.  Beyond that, any inquiry into voluntariness encounters the 
seemingly intractable problem of determining what amounts to an act of 
free will, reintroducing all the difficulties inhering in the overborne-will 
test.235  An effort to resolve this seeming paradox begins by considering the 
context, aside from custodial interrogation, in which Fifth Amendment 
waiver most often occurs—pleas of guilty. 
Fifth Amendment waiver is ubiquitous; the Supreme Court tells us that 
every guilty plea requires a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights.236  Indeed, 
 
233 As Justice Alito observed in Salinas, there is another context in which invocation is not required in 
order to gain the protection of the Fifth Amendment—under Griffin, a defendant need not ex-
pressly invoke in order to receive the Fifth Amendment’s protection at trial because “a criminal 
defendant has an ‘absolute right not to testify.’”  Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013) 
(plurality opinion) (quoting Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 433 (1970) (Black, J., dissent-
ing)).  This reasoning is curious; one could say the same of Murphy, who had an absolute right to 
remain silent, as well.  We will postpone consideration of Griffin until Part IV.B.1 below, but we 
will see that the presence of compulsion explains the absence of an invocation requirement in 
Griffin, as it does elsewhere. 
234 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). 
235 For a helpful discussion along these lines, see Allen, supra note 203, at 73–85. 
236 See, e.g., Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004) (“By entering a guilty plea, a defendant 
waives constitutional rights . . . [including] the protection against self-incrimination.”); United 
States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (finding that a defendant must make “waivers” as to 
Fifth Amendment rights if pleading guilty); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993) (discuss-
ing the decision of a potential defendant to “waive” his Fifth Amendment right in the event of a 
guilty plea); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (explaining that the “privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment” is involved in a “waiver that 
takes place when a plea of guilty is entered”). 
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waiver is required because a plea of guilty involves compulsion to incrimi-
nate under the definition of compulsion advanced above. 
To plead guilty, the defendant must make an admission that convicts 
him.  As the Supreme Court has explained, “central” to a guilty plea “is the 
defendant’s admission in open court that he committed the acts charged in 
the indictment.  He thus stands as a witness against himself and he is shield-
ed by the Fifth Amendment from being compelled to do so . . . .”237  In ad-
dition, the record must indicate that the defendant knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his constitutional rights, including “the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and 
applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth,” which cannot be val-
idly waived on “a silent record.”238  For this reason, a guilty plea involves 
questioning of the defendant in open court to ensure that the requisites for 
a valid plea are present.239 
It follows that the guilty-plea process involves compulsion under the def-
inition advanced above—it induces a defendant to become a witness 
providing evidence by threat of punitive sanctions.  The defendant is in-
duced because he is required to offer the requisite admissions and waivers 
to enter the plea.  The defendant’s guilty plea and attendant admissions 
and waivers, moreover, convert him into a witness providing the evidence 
used to support the plea, and as this occurs, a threat of punitive sanctions 
hangs over the defendant’s head.  Moreover, since the defendant’s admis-
sions and waivers are used to convict him, the defendant is compelled to in-
criminate himself as well.  The Court has therefore rightly concluded that a 
valid plea of guilty, because it is made by one under compulsion to self-
incriminate, requires a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights.  Accordingly, a 
valid guilty plea can be entered only if it is possible for one under compul-
sion to waive Fifth Amendment rights. 
As Professor Alschuler has demonstrated, until well into the nineteenth 
century, in both England and the United States, pleas of guilty were un-
common and generally discouraged, especially when entered by an un-
counseled defendant, and were often condemned under the rule against in-
 
237 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (footnote omitted).  Cf. FED. R. EVID. 410(a) 
(barring admission of evidence of a guilty plea or statements made during guilty plea proceedings 
only if the plea was later withdrawn).  A defendant may plead guilty even while denying that he 
committed the charged offense, but only if the court assures itself that there is a factual basis for 
the plea and that it represents the defendant’s voluntary and intelligent decision.  See North Caro-
lina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31–39 (1970). 
238 Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 (footnote omitted). 
239 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (“Before accepting a plea of guilty . . . the court must address the 
defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result 
from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement).”). 
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voluntary confessions.240  But, as plea bargaining became prevalent in the 
twentieth century, pleas of guilty became more prevalent as well.241  The 
simultaneous rise of plea bargaining and the increasing judicial acceptance 
of guilty pleas was no accident.  When defendants had little to gain from 
pleading guilty, one might be skeptical about whether they could knowing-
ly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive their trial rights.  The rise of plea 
bargaining, however, made it plausible to believe that a defendant might 
receive sufficiently meaningful benefits from a plea of guilty to warrant the 
conclusion that such a decision could be voluntary; indeed, the notion that 
plea bargaining offers the defendant a measure of leniency in return for a 
plea of guilty has been central to the Supreme Court’s willingness to reject 
arguments that plea bargaining is impermissibly coercive.242  Plea bargain-
ing’s scholarly defenders have offered similar defenses.243 
To be sure, critics have launched vigorous attacks on plea bargaining 
and its defenders.244  Whatever force these attacks carry, for present pur-
poses, the important point is that in a system that accepts guilty pleas and 
plea bargaining on the view that it reflects “‘mutuality of advantage’ to de-
fendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for wanting to avoid 
trial,”245 it follows that a defendant could make a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary decision to yield to the compulsion to plead guilty in the belief 
that the plea will likely produce a superior outcome to trial.  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly characterized a defendant’s decision to plead guilty in 
such circumstances as voluntary.246 
It follows that in a system that can reward pleas of guilty, voluntariness 
acquires a particular meaning—a defendant’s ability to choose whether to 
risk trial, or plead guilty and perhaps receive some measure of leniency.  
The defendant is compelled to make the choice, but the government can 
compel a defendant to make this election consistent with the Constitution.  
 
240 See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–13 (1979).  For an 
account of the judicial aversion to guilty pleas in seventeenth and eighteenth-century England, 
see LANGBEIN, supra note 149, at 18–21. 
241 See Alschuler, supra note 240, at 26–32.  For a more recent account along similar lines, see 
GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN 
AMERICA 154–74 (2003). 
242 See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219–22 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 
71 (1977); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363–64 (1978); Alford, 400 U.S. at 31–39; 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769 (1970); Brady, 397 U.S. at 749–55. 
243 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1974–78 (1992); 
Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 626–34 (2005); Robert E. 
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1935–49 (1992). 
244 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 
2469–527 (2004); Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 143, 148–70 (2011); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 
1980–91 (1992). 
245 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 752). 
246 See, e.g., Brady, 397 U.S. at 749–54. 
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Requiring a criminal defendant to choose between pleading guilty and going 
to trial is consistent with the Fifth Amendment because the defendant is not 
compelled to incriminate himself by pleading guilty; he is only under com-
pulsion to provide incriminating admissions and waivers should he elect to 
enter a guilty plea.  Confronting a defendant with a threat of punitive sanc-
tions if the defendant chooses to plead not guilty and is then convicted at a 
fair trial, in turn, is consistent with the Due Process Clause, which permits 
the government to deprive individuals of “life, liberty, or property,” as long 
as the deprivation is accompanied by “due process of law.”247 
In contrast, when the government threatens a suspect with punitive sanc-
tions other than those that might follow a lawful conviction at a fair trial, the 
government puts the suspect to an impermissible choice.  The Due Process 
Clause forbids the imposition of punitive sanctions absent an adjudication of 
guilt at a fair trial.248  It follows that the government may not compel a de-
fendant to exercise the right to trial only if he is willing to face punitive sanc-
tions other than those that can result from a lawful conviction.  A plea of guilty 
to avoid a beating, for example, cannot stand because it involves a threat of 
sanctions that the government may not impose.249  Such a plea would run 
afoul of the Fifth Amendment, in particular, because the government has no 
power to compel a defendant to elect between the right to trial and a beat-
ing,250 just as the government may not compel an individual to choose be-
tween obtaining public employment and surrendering Fifth Amendment 
rights.251  But, if the threat of punitive sanctions that a defendant faces involves 
only the risk of lawful sanctions imposed after conviction at a fair trial, waiver 
is permissible because the defendant confronts a constitutionally permissible 
choice—the choice between pleading guilty and going to trial.252 
This foray into guilty pleas has implications for waiver during interroga-
tion.  If a defendant can waive Fifth Amendment rights by pleading guilty, at 
least when he is faced with a threat of only lawful sanctions following convic-
 
247 E.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979). 
248 See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–
36 (1979); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165–66 (1963). 
249 Cf. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (characterizing use of excessive force 
against a pretrial detainee as “punishment” forbidden by the Due Process Clause). 
250 Cf. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 498 (1967) (“Where the choice is ‘between the rock and 
the whirlpool,’ duress is inherent in deciding whether to ‘waive’ one or the other.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
251 See supra text accompanying notes 31–34. 
252 Cf. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (“[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully 
aware of the direct consequences . . . must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discon-
tinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or 
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the 
prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).” (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th 
Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (brackets in original). 
938 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:4 
tion at a fair trial, the question arises why a suspect cannot similarly waive 
during interrogation.  Bram, as we have seen, reasoned that a suspect under 
custodial interrogation necessarily faces an implicit threat that silence will be 
punished, and cooperation rewarded.253  If a defendant could conclude that 
his interests are best served by pleading guilty, Bram’s reasoning suggests that 
a suspect could similarly conclude that submitting to custodial interrogation 
might advance his interests, either by convincing the interrogator of his in-
nocence, or by suggesting reasons for leniency.  A suspect’s decision to elect 
to submit to interrogation rather than remain silent could therefore be no 
less valid than a decision to plead guilty rather than going to trial.  As long as 
this choice is left to the suspect, an ensuing waiver during interrogation is no 
less voluntary than a defendant’s decision to plead guilty. 
Some might object to this account of waiver during interrogation by ar-
guing that even if a defendant, advised by competent counsel, might validly 
decide to plead guilty to avoid the possibility of a worse outcome after trial, 
an uncounseled layperson under the compulsion of custodial interrogation 
is in no position to make an informed assessment about whether to submit 
to interrogation.254  Miranda, however, leaves it to the suspect to decide 
whether to remain uncounseled by recognizing a right to consult with 
counsel before deciding whether to submit to interrogation.255  For some, 
the right to counsel recognized by Miranda is indefensible since the Fifth 
Amendment makes no reference to a right to counsel.256  Yet, by recogniz-
ing a right to consult with counsel when deciding whether to undergo cus-
todial interrogation, Miranda makes it possible for a suspect to receive the 
same expert assistance available to a defendant facing trial.  And, just as a 
defendant facing trial may waive the right to counsel, so may a suspect un-
der custodial interrogation; thus, in its discussion of waiver, Miranda relied 
on a case holding that a criminal defendant can waive his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, but only if he does so knowingly and intelligently.257  
Miranda jurisprudence, in short, affords suspects the same access to counsel 
that a defendant facing trial enjoys under the Sixth Amendment.  What is 
more, as we have seen, history demonstrates that Fifth Amendment rights 
cannot be effectively asserted unless a suspect has counsel.258  The relation-
ship between the presence of counsel able to speak for a suspect, and the 
 
253 See supra text accompanying notes 166–79. 
254 Cf. William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 986–87 (2001) (arguing that 
many suspects cannot rationally assess whether to speak when under police interrogation). 
255 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469–73 (1966). 
256 See, e.g., GRANO, supra note 47, at 169–72; Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in 
Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 796–801 (2006); Scott W. 
Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, 
Furman, and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 396–403, 434–38 (2001). 
257 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). 
258 See supra text accompanying notes 152–61. 
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ability of a suspect under compulsion to remain silent because he has some-
one to speak for him, explains the constitutional basis for a Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel.  Miranda’s right to counsel accordingly offers a vehi-
cle that affords individuals a meaningful choice about whether to exercise 
or waive Fifth Amendment rights.259 
To be sure, laypersons may have some difficulty assessing whether they 
should waive the right to counsel, but this has never been regarded as a rea-
son to preclude waiver.  Applying the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel, 
for example, the Court has rejected the view that a valid waiver requires 
that a defendant be advised of the value of counsel in identifying defenses 
usually unknown to laypersons.260  A valid guilty plea waiving the constitu-
tional right to trial by jury similarly does not require that the defendant be 
accurately apprised of the strength of the prosecution’s case,261 the existence 
of a meritorious defense,262 or of the existence of exculpatory evidence im-
peaching the prosecution’s witnesses.263  Given that these standards govern 
waivers of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it is hard to understand 
why Fifth Amendment waiver should be held to a higher standard.264  The 
Fifth Amendment, after all, addresses compulsion, not improvidence.265  
Thus, while critics may be right that laypersons are likely to make improvi-
dent waiver decisions, this constitutes no barrier to waiver of the right to be 
free from compelled, as opposed to improvident, self-incrimination. 
The scope of a valid Miranda waiver, however, is limited.  For one thing, 
as we have seen in our consideration of guilty pleas, a waiver is valid only if a 
suspect faces no threat other than the threat of lawful sanctions following 
 
259 Cf. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 747, 754 (1970) (“Bram dealt with a confession given by a 
defendant in custody, alone and unrepresented by counsel.  In such circumstances, even a mild 
promise of leniency was deemed sufficient to bar the confession . . . . But Bram and its progeny 
did not hold that the possibly coercive impact of a promise of leniency could not be dissipated by 
the presence and advice of counsel, any more than Miranda v. Arizona, held that the possibly coer-
cive atmosphere of the police station could not be counteracted by the presence of counsel or 
other safeguards.”) (citation and footnote omitted). 
260 E.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 90–92 (2004). 
261 E.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756–57 (1970). 
262 E.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266–69 (1973). 
263 E.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629–31 (2002). 
264 George Thomas has argued that Miranda is best understood as anchored in due process rather 
than the Fifth Amendment because of the difficulty of “fashioning a waiver standard in the police 
interrogation room comparable to that in the courtroom . . . .”  George C. Thomas III, Separated 
at Birth But Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 
1099 (2001).  Yet, he fails to identify precedent for more rigorous standards governing waiver of 
trial rights.  The discussion above demonstrates, in contrast, that Miranda’s conception of waiver 
has been no less rigorous than has been applied to trial rights. 
265 Cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social 
Costs, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 500, 562 (1996) (“If there were an affirmative right not to incriminate 
oneself . . . then ill-informed, misguided waivers of the right would surely be invalid.  But the 
Fifth Amendment protects suspects only against state-orchestrated compulsion, not against their 
own poor judgment.”). 
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conviction at a fair trial.  There is no reason to apply a different rule to waiv-
er during interrogation.  Moreover, even a valid Miranda waiver does not ex-
tinguish all Fifth Amendment rights.  No one would contend, for example, 
that once a suspect has waived rights under Miranda, the suspect could then 
be subjected to a contempt judgment—much less torture—for failing to an-
swer interrogators’ ensuing questions, just as the waiver a defendant must 
provide in order to plead guilty does not thereafter allow the government to 
compel the defendant to self-incriminate at sentencing.266  A Miranda waiver 
does not extinguish all Fifth Amendment rights; to the contrary, under Mi-
randa, even after a waiver, there remains “the right to cut off questioning,”267 
which, the Court has stressed, must be “scrupulously honored.”268 
A Miranda waiver accordingly represents no more than a revocable 
submission to the compulsion that confronts an individual by virtue of law-
ful custodial interrogation—the implicit threat the suspect faces of punitive 
sanctions, imposed after a fair trial, if interrogators decide to pursue charg-
es.  A Miranda waiver is effective with respect to that and no other form of 
compulsion; it could not be effective with respect to other types of threat-
ened punitive sanctions because, as we have seen, the Constitution does not 
permit the government to threaten a suspect with punitive sanctions other 
than those lawfully imposed after conviction at a fair trial.269  To the extent 
that a suspect is confronted with a threat of punitive sanctions beyond the 
threat of conviction at a fair trial, a Miranda waiver is ineffective.  In this re-
spect, Fifth Amendment jurisprudence is sensitive to the charge leveled by 
Miranda’s critics, that the law can hope to regulate only interrogation tactics 
rather than ascertaining voluntariness.270  The validity of a waiver under 
Miranda jurisprudence turns on the character of the choice with which in-
terrogators confront a suspect, not an abstract inquiry into voluntariness. 
It must be admitted that some language in Miranda is inconsistent with 
the account of compulsion and waiver advanced here, such as when Miran-
da suggests that advising suspects of their rights “dispel[s] the compulsion 
inherent in custodial surroundings . . . .”271  That view, however, is not 
merely inconsistent with the account advanced here, but with Miranda’s dis-
cussion of waiver.  If Miranda warnings somehow dispelled compulsion, sus-
 
266 Cf. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321–25 (1999) (Fifth Amendment rights at sentencing 
are not extinguished by prior guilty plea). 
267 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).  See also id. at 473–74 (“If the individual indicates 
in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the in-
terrogation must cease.” (footnote omitted)). 
268 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (footnote omitted).  For a helpful explication of this 
right to cut off questioning, see Laurent Sacharoff, Miranda’s Hidden Right, 63 ALA. L. REV. 535, 
552–56 (2012). 
269 See supra text accompanying notes 248–53. 
270 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 203, at 84–85; Grano, supra note 203, at 675–89. 
271 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458. 
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pects would not need to waive their right to be free from compelled self-
incrimination; the warnings would have already eliminated the compulsion 
that gives rise to the Fifth Amendment right.272  The fact that Miranda de-
mands a waiver even after the requisite warnings are given, and continues 
to regulate interrogation even after waiver, makes clear that the warnings 
are not properly understood to dissipate the compulsion that gives rise to 
the Fifth Amendment right, but instead are part of the process of obtaining 
a valid waiver of that right. 
Miranda is accordingly best understood to rest on a conception of waiv-
er; little different from the waiver that accompanies a guilty plea.  In both 
contexts, waivers may be foolish or improvident, but that does not also 
make them compelled.  A waiver that has not been compelled, in turn, is 
consistent with the Fifth Amendment.  During both guilty pleas and custo-
dial interrogation, even individuals under compulsion can provide valid 
waivers, as long as the only threat of punitive sanctions they face is the 
threat of a lawful sentence following conviction at a fair trial. 
IV.  COMPULSION APPLIED 
The account of compulsion advanced above explains a great deal about 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence that otherwise seems paradoxical.  Defin-
ing compulsion enables normative assessments of Fifth Amendment juris-
prudence.  Defining compulsion, for example, helps to evaluate what are 
likely the most important issues in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence—the 
Fifth Amendment’s relation to official interrogation, and the protections it 
offers to those who choose to remain silent. 
A.  Custodial Interrogation 
Even after the Supreme Court reaffirmed the status of Miranda as a rule 
of constitutional law in Dickerson v. United States,273 the Court and its Mem-
bers have continued to characterize Miranda and its progeny as prophylac-
tic.274  And, in light of Dickerson’s failure to address the apparently prophy-
lactic character of Miranda, the debate over its propriety has persisted.275  
 
272 A similar confusion is present in the Court’s statement that a “[f]ailure to adminis-
ter Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion.”  Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 
307 (1985).  If compulsion were not already present in custodial interrogation, it is hard to under-
stand how it could be created, presumptively or otherwise, by a failure to provide warnings. 
273 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
274 See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103–12 (2010); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 
638–41 (2004) (plurality opinion); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770–73 (2003) (opinion of 
Thomas, J.). 
275 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 898 (2001).  Even Miranda’s supporters were unsatisfied with Dickerson’s failure to explain the 
propriety of Miranda in light of the Court’s previous characterization of it as a prophylactic rule.  
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Miranda’s critics argue that it goes beyond anything required by the Fifth 
Amendment by erecting what amounts to an unsupportable conclusive pre-
sumption that custodial interrogation always involves compulsion, and that 
Fifth Amendment rights cannot be validly waived absent the prescribed 
warnings.276  Once compulsion is defined, however, it becomes possible to 
assess both Miranda and more general questions about when official interro-
gation implicates the Fifth Amendment. 
1.  Compulsion 
Most Miranda supporters, rather than defending Miranda’s view that 
compulsion is inherent in custodial interrogation, instead defend Miranda 
as offering appropriate prophylactic protection for Fifth Amendment rights, 
albeit without offering a definition of compulsion that can be used to de-
termine the extent to which Miranda’s conception of compulsion differs 
from that in the Fifth Amendment itself.277  Miranda’s critics, however, vig-
orously deny judicial authority to enforce prophylactic rules.278  Indeed, to 
the extent that Miranda restricts the use of statements made during custodial 
interrogation in the absence of compulsion, its scope exceeds that of the 
Fifth Amendment itself, raising a question whether the Court can properly 
enforce rules not required by the Constitution. 
Justice White’s dissenting opinion in Miranda framed the attack on the 
conception of compulsion embraced by the Court thusly: “[U]nder the 
Court’s rule, if the police ask [an arrestee] a single question such as ‘Do you 
have anything to say?’ or ‘Did you kill your wife?’ his response, if there is 
one, has somehow been compelled . . . .”279  Justice White was quite right 
about the Court’s rule, but, as it happens, his hypothetical falls squarely 
within the definition of compulsion advanced above. 
Interrogation of an individual in custody is an official undertaking to in-
duce an individual to become a witness by providing evidence, and there-
fore satisfies the first two elements of the definition of compulsion.  The 
third and fourth elements are satisfied as well; once an individual has been 
 
See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look at the Majority and Dissenting 
Opinions in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 391–401 (2001). 
276 See, e.g., GRANO, supra note 47, at 178–82; Alschuler, supra note 40, at 855–58; Markman, supra 
note 47, at 211–21. 
277 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 
8–20 (2001); Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 465, 
471–76 (1999); Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause and the 
Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 480–88 (1994); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional 
Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1668–72 (2005); 
Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 447–53; David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 190, 190–95, 207–09 (1988). 
278 See, e.g., GRANO, supra note 47, at 173–98. 
279 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 533 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
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deprived of liberty and then asked about a potential criminal charge, there 
is little denying that the individual faces a threat of punitive sanctions.  
There is, in particular, a threat of sanctions associated with a failure to 
submit to questioning; as Bram reasons, there is an implicit threat that a 
failure to answer will be taken as an acknowledgement of guilt, or at least 
an acknowledgement that there is little reason to offer the suspect lenien-
cy.280  When one’s captor asks, “Do you have anything to say?” or “Did 
you kill your wife?,” there is an inescapable implication that unless the sus-
pect can somehow satisfy the interrogator, things will go badly—not only is 
the suspect unlikely to be restored to liberty, but the dissatisfied interrogator 
is likely to have little reason to be lenient, or at least offer the type of lenien-
cy available to those who cooperate with interrogators. 
Under the definition of compulsion advanced above, accordingly, com-
pulsion is present in custodial interrogation—it is an official undertaking to 
induce an individual to become a witness by threat of punitive sanctions.  
The compulsion that inheres in custodial interrogation is more subtle than 
an express threat of a beating or a contempt judgment, but the Fifth 
Amendment is addressed to all forms of compulsion, not merely compul-
sion in its most obvious manifestations.  Miranda’s conclusion that compul-
sion is inherent in custodial interrogation, rather than involving prophylax-
is, nicely tracks the constitutional concept of compulsion.281 
To be sure, on occasion, Miranda may over-enforce the Fifth Amend-
ment.  In New York v. Quarles,282 for example, after a woman told police she 
had just been raped at gunpoint and that her assailant had entered a near-
 
280 See supra text accompanying notes 166–79.  Some suspects, of course, will have the fortitude to 
maintain silence during custodial interrogation; in such cases, they have nevertheless been subject 
to compulsion.  This paradigm of compulsion, as we have seen, does not turn on whether the 
suspect submits or instead faces sanctions such as contempt or a judgment pro confesso; either way, 
there has been compulsion.  To be sure, that a suspect has been subjected to compulsion does not 
make out a Fifth Amendment violation.  The Fifth Amendment, after all, prohibits not compul-
sion without more, but compulsion to be a witness against oneself in a criminal case.  In one of 
the few cases raising the question, a majority of the Court concluded that if compulsion does not 
actually produce evidence that is subsequently used to incriminate in a criminal case, the Fifth 
Amendment has not been violated, not because of an absence of compulsion, but because the 
suspect has not been made a “witness” in a “criminal case.”  Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 
766–67 (2003) (opinion of Thomas, J.); id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).  For a 
more elaborate argument in support of this conclusion, see Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to 
Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 454–502 (2002).  For contrasting views contending that 
the Amendment applies to interrogation regardless of subsequent evidentiary use of its fruits, see 
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 790–95 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Davies, supra 
note 92, at 998–1018; Tracey Maclin, The Prophylactic Fifth Amendment, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1045, 
1057–75 (2017); and John T. Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive Interrogation, and Civil Rights 
Litigation after Chavez v. Martinez, 39 GA. L. REV. 733, 797–814 (2005). 
281 For arguments along similar lines, albeit not tied to a definition of compulsion, see Lawrence 
Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: Miranda Is Not Prophylactic and the Constitution Is Not Perfect, 10 CHAP. 
L. REV. 579, 586–94 (2007); and Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 444–46, 452–53. 
282 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
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by store, an officer entered the store, found an individual matching the rap-
ist’s description with an empty holster in the store, and after taking the sus-
pect into custody, asked where the gun was.283  The suspect nodded toward 
some empty cartons, said “the gun is over there,” the officer retrieved the 
gun, and only then read the suspect his Miranda rights.284  The Court, not-
ing that Quarles had made “no claim that [his] statements were actually 
compelled,”285  recognized a “public safety” exception to Miranda, reason-
ing that “[i]n a kaleidoscopic situation . . . where spontaneity rather than 
adherence to a police manual is the order of the day,” and when officers 
“act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives,” 
it followed that “the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a 
threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule pro-
tecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” 286 
Some commentators, albeit without offering a definition of compulsion, 
have argued that Quarles cannot be reconciled with the Fifth Amend-
ment.287  In light of the definition of compulsion advanced above, however, 
there was likely none present in Quarles.  When official conduct is undertak-
en not to obtain evidence but to address an immediate threat to public safe-
ty, it falls outside the ambit of Fifth Amendment compulsion because the 
undertaking is not directed at inducing an individual to provide evidence.  
To be sure, as the exigency fades, it becomes increasingly less plausible to 
characterize interrogation as focused on protecting the public, rather than 
acquiring evidence, but given the immediate concern about recovering a 
gun in Quarles, it likely was the case that no compulsion in the constitutional 
sense was at work. 
One can perhaps imagine a variety of hypothetical situations in which 
one or more elements of the definition of compulsion is absent in custodial 
interrogation.288  In the vast majority of cases involving custodial interroga-
 
283 Id. at 651–52. 
284 Id. at 652. 
285 Id. at 654. 
286 Id. at 655–57. 
287 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 44, at 165–66; Clymer, supra note 280, at 549–50. 
288 Katherine Darmer, for example, once hypothesized a case in which a suspect who wants to go to 
jail eagerly confesses under custodial interrogation.  See M. Katherine B. Darmer, Miranda Warn-
ings, Torture, the Right to Counsel and the War on Terror, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 631, 640 (2007).  Stephen 
Markman similarly hypothesized that “suspects in custody may respond to interrogation for a va-
riety of reasons that have nothing to do with being pressured or intimidated,” such as “go[ing] 
along with questioning as a means of finding out how much the police know or what evidence 
they have,” “to bolster the credibility of a fabricated defense,” “to rebut false charges and clear 
oneself,” or a desire to confess for varied reasons “including relief from guilt, a desire to explain 
mitigating or justifying circumstances, a belief that denial or resistance is futile . . . or a desire to 
clear relatives or associates who might otherwise also come under suspicion.”  Markman, supra 
note 47, at 215.  Yet, since the concept of compulsion, as we have seen, focuses on the tactics 
used by the interrogator and not the psychology of the suspect, even these examples involve 
compulsion under the definition advanced above. 
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tion, however, the interrogator undertakes to induce the suspect to provide 
evidence, and it is surely the threat of punitive sanctions that requires a sus-
pect to take an officer’s query seriously.  Custodial interrogation, in the main, 
is an official undertaking to induce a witness to provide evidence by means of 
a threat of punitive sanctions, and for that reason involves compulsion. 
Indeed, it is unclear whether Miranda is more likely to over- or under-
enforce the Fifth Amendment in light of the corollary to its holding, reflect-
ed in the invocation requirement, that noncustodial interrogation does not 
involve compulsion.  In Salinas, for example, the officers’ questions were an 
undertaking to induce Salinas to provide evidence, and his decision to sub-
mit to interrogation could easily have been influenced by the implicit threat 
of sanctions if he remained silent.  In Murphy, similarly, the probation of-
ficer’s questions were an effort to induce Murphy to provide evidence, and 
even if Murphy’s probation could not be revoked based solely on his refusal 
to answer questions, his willingness to submit to questioning could well have 
been influenced by the implicit threat of sanctions.  These cases suggest that 
the invocation requirement might sometimes underenforce the Fifth 
Amendment.  But, because it is difficult to gauge the potency of an implicit 
threat of sanctions and its relationship to a suspect’s decision to submit to 
questioning, Fifth Amendment jurisprudence utilizes a rule that requires 
either custody or an invocation followed by a threat of sanctions in order to 
determine whether compulsion is present. 
Miranda’s conclusion that compulsion is inherent in custodial interroga-
tion accordingly operates not so much as a prophylactic rule but as what 
Brian Landsberg labeled “a bright-line rule [that] ‘captures the background 
principle or policy incompletely and so produces errors of over- or under-
inclusiveness.’”289  Miranda uses custodial interrogation as the bright-line 
test for determining whether the threat of punitive sanctions is sufficiently 
clear and related to the official undertaking to induce a suspect to provide 
evidence to constitute compulsion, just as the invocation requirement uses 
invocation followed by a threat of sanctions as a bright-line if imperfect test 
for making the same determination when custody is not present. 
Some might object that a bright-line rule finding compulsion in custodi-
al interrogation, no less than the bright-line rule finding no compulsion in 
noncustodial interrogation that underlies the invocation requirement, has 
no grounding in the text of the Fifth Amendment.  Yet, the semantic mean-
ing of the Constitution’s text is frequently insufficient to resolve many inter-
 
289 Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 
TENN. L. REV. 925, 951 (1999) (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—
Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992)).  Cf. Donald A. 
Dripps, Miranda for the Next Fifty Years: Why the Fifth Amendment Should Go Fourth, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
893, 902–09 (2017) (exploring similarities between Miranda jurisprudence and bright-line Fourth 
Amendment rules governing search and seizure). 
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pretive questions.  While it is possible to define compulsion, that definition 
does not tell us when a threat of punitive sanctions is so potent an influence 
on a suspect’s decision to submit to interrogation that it should be regarded 
as compulsion.  Court-made doctrine is therefore required to facilitate as-
sessments of whether compulsion is present.  The process of “fashion[ing] 
‘interpretative’ implementing rules to fill out the meaning of generally 
framed constitutional provisions,” which is itself “an ancient aspect of 
the judicial function in construing the meaning of any text,” was famously 
dubbed “constitutional common law” by Henry Monaghan, citing Miranda 
as an example.290 
There is in fact near-consensus among scholars that constitutional adju-
dication requires something like constitutional common law.  Even many 
originalists acknowledge that there are occasions on which original mean-
ing is insufficient to resolve a constitutional debate, necessitating resort to 
what they label “construction.”291  Nonoriginalists, for their part, readily 
agree that the interpretation of constitutional text must often be supple-
mented by judicially-created doctrine because of the inadequacy of the text 
to resolve any number of constitutional controversies.292  Whether charac-
terized as constitutional construction or living constitutionalism, Miranda’s 
bright-line rule about compulsion during custodial interrogation, as well as 
the invocation requirement’s equally bright-line rule that compulsion is not 
present in noncustodial interrogation absent an invocation followed by a 
threat of punitive sanctions, are common-law doctrines that enhance the 
administrability of the prohibition against compelled self-incrimination.  
Miranda reasonably presumes that once an individual is taken into custody, 
a threat of punitive sanctions hangs over any subsequent effort at official 
interrogation, while the invocation requirement rests on the reasonable pre-
sumption that the government will not back its requests for information 
with a threat of punitive sanctions once it is placed on notice that the sus-
pect is asserting Fifth Amendment rights.293  As such, these rules are readily 
 
290 See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (1975). 
291 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 95, at 14, 31–32; BARNETT, supra note 95, at 118–30; 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 95, at 5–14; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construc-
tion, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 467–72 (2013); Grégoire C.N. Webber, Originalism’s Constitution, 
in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 147, 
173–76 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
292 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 7–101 (2001); Berman, 
supra note 44, at 79–107; Roosevelt, supra note 277, at 1655–67. 
293 The position advanced above is informed by Mitchell Berman’s distinction between an operative 
proposition, which reflects the meaning of constitutional text, and a decision rule, which enables 
courts to develop administrable rules that apply the operative proposition.  See Berman, supra note 
44, at 9–13 (explaining this terminology).  In the account of the Fifth Amendment advanced here, 
the definition of compulsion functions as the operative proposition, and Miranda and the invoca-
tion requirement function as decision rules.  Where the account here differs from that of Profes-
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defensible; at least once one acknowledges the inevitability of constitutional 
common law. 
2.  Exclusion 
The Miranda exclusionary rule is considerably narrower than the exclu-
sionary rule otherwise employed for evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.  Evidence obtained in violation of Miranda, for example, 
can be used to impeach, and to obtain additional evidence, unlike evidence 
that is said to have been compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment it-
self.294  Applying the account of compulsion advanced here, however, the 
differences between the Miranda and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules 
become readily justifiable. 
Miranda was unusually strict in its approach to waiver.  Miranda famous-
ly held that a statement made during custodial interrogation is not admissi-
ble unless the suspect is “warned that he has a right to remain silent, that 
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that 
he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed,” 
and then “waive[s] effectuation of these rights . . . .”295  Although the Court 
has permitted some variation in the verbal form of the warnings, it has con-
sistently held that Miranda warnings must fairly convey each of the required 
admonitions.296 
Ordinarily, waiver law is not so rigid.  For example, although a plea of 
guilty “could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent 
admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant received ‘real 
notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most uni-
versally recognized requirement of due process,’”297 and a trial court must 
make a record demonstrating that a guilty plea is knowingly and voluntarily 
made,298 the Court does not insist that the record contain a recitation of the 
 
sor Berman, however, is that he argues that Miranda announces a decision rule that determines 
whether compulsion is present.  See id. at 116–55.  Professor Berman is therefore unable to ex-
plain cases such as Quarles in which the Court found no Fifth Amendment violation even though 
the authorities failed to comply with Miranda.  See id. at 165–66 (calling the public safety exception 
“an error”).  Professor Berman also does not consider Miranda’s treatment of waiver, which, as we 
will see in Part IV.A.2 below, is stricter than the ordinary standards for waiver of a constitutional 
right.  Perhaps even more important, Professor Berman’s account overlooks Miranda’s failure to 
define compulsion.  See Stinneford, supra note 42, at 464–68. 
294 See supra text accompanying notes 74–80. 
295 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
296 See, e.g., Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 60 (2010) (“The inquiry is simply whether the warnings 
reasonably ‘conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.’”) (citation omitted); Duck-
worth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202 (1989) (requiring the Miranda warnings in that decision’s orig-
inal form or a “fully effective equivalent”). 
297 Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976) (quoting Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 
(1941)). 
298 See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969). 
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required admonition about the nature of the charge; a record supporting a 
reasonable inference that the defendant received the requisite advice will 
suffice.299  Indeed, outside of Miranda, the Court has required no more than 
that a waiver of a constitutional right be knowing, intelligent and voluntary, 
without requiring particularized warnings or admonitions.300  Even when it 
comes to Fifth Amendment waiver, Miranda is unusual.  During guilty-plea 
proceedings, for example, the Court has not prescribed a specific regime of 
warnings akin to Miranda; it has held only that waiver may not be inferred 
from a “silent record.”301 
Miranda’s unyielding approach to waiver suggests a good deal of prophy-
laxis.  The scholarly commentary considering whether Miranda is prophy-
lactic in character, however, does not distinguish between Miranda’s con-
ceptions of compulsion and waiver.302  This conflation has inhibited clarity 
of analysis.  In terms of compulsion, as we have seen, there is little if any 
prophylaxis in Miranda.  In terms of waiver, in contrast, Miranda is properly 
regarded as prophylactic, at least when compared to ordinary waiver prin-
ciples, but it is hard to understand why that should be regarded as illegiti-
mate.  The Constitution says nothing about waiver; waiver is solely a crea-
ture of constitutional common law.  As long as waiver doctrine is structured 
in a way that does not inhibit the recognition of textually-based constitu-
tional rights, the judiciary should be free to craft a common law of waiver 
with appropriate prudential considerations in mind, including the advisabil-
ity of prophylaxis.  The risk of error when inferring a knowing and volun-
tary waiver from circumstantial evidence is surely far greater than when the 
defendant is specifically advised of his rights.  Thus, there is a sound pru-
dential case for a particularly strict approach to waiver when making diffi-
cult inquiries into the knowing and voluntary character of a suspect’s deci-
sion to submit to interrogation.303 
 
299 See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 182–83 (2005); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 
437–38 (1983). 
300 See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786–87 (2009) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel); 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191–93 (1957) (Double Jeopardy Clause). 
301 E.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). 
302 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 44, at 114–36; Caminker, supra note 277, at 8–20; Clymer, supra note 
280, at 540–50; Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. 
CT. REV. 61, 76–80 (2000); Klein, supra note 277, at 480–88; Roosevelt, supra note 277, at 1668–
72; Thomas S. Schrock, Robert C. Welsh & Ronald Collins, Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 52 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1, 41–56 (1978); Strauss, supra note 277, at 190–95, 207–
09. 
303 This focus on using prophylactic rules to reduce the risk of litigation error has been widely em-
braced by defenders of Miranda as a prophylactic decision, though they have not distinguished be-
tween Miranda’s approach to compulsion and waiver.  See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 277, at 8–20; 
Strauss, supra note 277, at 191–94. 
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Accordingly, Miranda is best characterized as “laying down a right and 
creating a safe harbor for those charged with respecting it.”304  While, as we 
have seen, Miranda’s conception of the right to be free from compelled self-
incrimination contains little if any prophylaxis, its formula for obtaining a 
valid waiver of that right, in contrast, is prophylactic in the sense that it of-
fers a safe harbor for interrogators if they follow Miranda’s special rules for a 
valid waiver, buttressed by an exclusionary rule to encourage use of the safe 
harbor.  It does not follow, however, that such a prophylactic approach to 
waiver must employ an exclusionary rule as robust as would be required in 
a case involving no adequate evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver.  
If a waiver does not meet minimum standards, giving it force would fail to 
give effect to a textually-based constitutional right.  If a waiver fails to satis-
fy a prophylactic standard set above the constitutional floor, however, a 
failure to hew to that standard need not be treated as a constitutional viola-
tion.305  This point explains the cases limiting Miranda’s exclusionary rule. 
In Michigan v. Tucker,306 for example, Tucker told interrogators during 
custodial interrogation that he understood his rights and did not want an 
attorney, and was told that any statements he made could be used against 
him, but was never expressly told that he could obtain a lawyer without 
charge if he could not afford one.307  After concluding that the interrogators 
had not violated the Fifth Amendment but instead had merely “departed 
only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Mi-
randa to safeguard that privilege,”308 the Court reasoned that because the 
interrogation occurred prior to Miranda, there was no reason to exclude the 
testimony of a prosecution witness who was identified as a result of a state-
ment that Tucker made under custodial interrogation in violation of Miran-
da.309  Similarly, in Harris v. New York,310 the defendant was not expressly 
warned of his right to appointed counsel during custodial interrogation, and 
the Court held that his unwarned statements could be used to impeach his 
testimony.311  In both cases, the dissenters complained that the Court’s ap-
proach was inconsistent with Miranda’s holding that unwarned statements 
must be treated as compelled under the Fifth Amendment.312 
 
304 Dorf & Friedman, supra note 302, at 82. 
305 Cf.  David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958, 966–69 (2001) 
(arguing that courts could limit Miranda’s exclusionary rule in ways that would retain adequate 
incentives to comply with its holding). 
306 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
307 Id. at 436. 
308 Id. at 446. 
309 Id. at 446–52. 
310 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
311 Id. at 223–26. 
312 Tucker, 417 U.S. at 462–63 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Harris, 401 U.S. at 229–32 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). 
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This debate was replayed in United States v. Patane,313 in which the arrest-
ing officer started to warn Patane of his rights, Patane interrupted to say 
that he knew them, and then told the officer where his gun was, enabling 
the officer to retrieve it.314  In a subsequent prosecution charging Patane 
with unlawful possession of a firearm, a majority of the Court, though una-
ble to agree on a single opinion, concluded that the gun could be used as 
evidence despite the officer’s failure to complete the process of warning and 
waiver required by Miranda because no “coerced” statements were used 
against the defendant.315  In dissent, Justice Souter argued that the majority 
had failed to respect Miranda’s “insight into the inherently coercive charac-
ter of custodial interrogation and the inherently difficult exercise of as-
sessing the voluntariness of any confession resulting from it.”316 
The Tucker, Harris, and Patane opinions fail to satisfy.  Although the Mi-
randa violations in these cases seem trifling, the majority made little effort to 
square its approach with Miranda’s conception of compulsion.  The concep-
tion of waiver advanced above, in contrast, explains why the Court could 
properly limit the exclusionary remedy in these cases.  In each, the presence 
of compulsion was a red herring; the claimed Miranda violation in each was 
based solely on the insufficiency of a waiver under Miranda.  Thus, these 
cases are best understood to rest on the view that interrogators’ failure to 
comply with the special waiver rules in Miranda does not, without more, 
amount to a violation of the Fifth Amendment itself.  Indeed, in each of 
these cases, the facts suggest that a valid waiver could have been inferred 
under traditional standards, though not under Miranda’s safe harbor. 
Thus, the conception of Fifth Amendment compulsion and waiver ad-
vanced here explains why the Court might properly limit the remedy of-
fered for a violation of a safe-harbor waiver rule without running afoul of 
the conception of compulsion found in Miranda, and, indeed, in the Fifth 
Amendment itself.  The Court has, in other words, limited Miranda’s exclu-
sionary remedy only in cases in which Miranda’s prophylactic waiver rules 
have been breached, without ever retreating from Miranda’s conception of 
compulsion.  When an individual is compelled to self-incriminate in the ab-
sence of a waiver that meets minimally acceptable constitutional standards, 
as opposed to Miranda’s prophylactic safe-harbor for waiver, the full Fifth 
Amendment exclusionary remedy remains appropriate. 
 
313 542 U.S. 630 (2004). 
314 Id. at 635 (plurality opinion). 
315 Id. at 643 (plurality opinion) (“Introduction of the nontestimonial fruit of a voluntary statement, 
such as respondent’s Glock, does not implicate the Self–Incrimination Clause.  The admission of 
such fruit presents no risk that a defendant’s coerced statements (however defined) will be used 
against him at a criminal trial.”); id. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Admis-
sion of nontestimonial physical fruits . . . does not run the risk of admitting into trial an accused’s 
coerced incriminating statements against himself.”). 
316 Id. at 645 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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Prophylaxis is even more evident when it comes to the rules for a valid 
waiver after an invocation of Miranda rights.  Once a suspect under custodi-
al interrogation indicates that he wishes to exercise his right to silence by 
terminating questioning, that preference must be “scrupulously hon-
ored.”317  And, if a suspect requests counsel, no custodial interrogation is 
thereafter permitted without the presence of counsel unless it is initiated by 
the suspect.318  These rules go well beyond the minimum standards for a 
constitutionally sufficient waiver; surely it would be possible for a suspect to 
knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights even after invocation under the 
general rules for Fifth Amendment waiver reviewed in Part III.C above.  
Nevertheless, the Court has embraced a conclusive presumption against 
waiver through the special Miranda rules governing post-invocation waiv-
ers.319  This presumption enhances the administrability of Miranda; after all, 
there is a significant chance that a post-invocation waiver will be the result 
of police badgering, and an inquiry into the possibility that badgering has 
infected the voluntariness of an ensuing waiver presents the psychological 
difficulties of the overborne-will test.  Yet, by utilizing a presumption, the 
rules about waiver after invocation go well beyond the traditional require-
ments for valid waiver.  For this reason, the rules limiting waiver after invo-
cation are properly characterized as prophylactic. 
It follows that the Court can limit the prophylactic presumptions of com-
pulsion to unambiguous invocations without running afoul of the Fifth 
Amendment, as it has done,320 despite criticism that this rule runs afoul of Mi-
randa and the Fifth Amendment.321  Perhaps there are good reasons to extend 
these presumptions to more nuanced invocations, but this is a question of con-
stitutional common law; such an extension of prophylaxis is not required in 
order to prevent compelled self-incrimination in the constitutional sense. 
It also follows that the Fifth Amendment permits the implementation of 
these prophylactic rules without need of the full set of remedies employed 
when a waiver falls short of the minimum standards demanded by the Con-
stitution.  Thus, the Court has held that a statement made after a suspect 
has received Miranda warnings, requested counsel, but later made incrimi-
nating statements without an express waiver, can be used to impeach the 
defendant’s testimony.322  In such a case, a valid waiver could well have 
 
317 Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). 
318 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485–87 (1981).  This prohibition lasts for fourteen days 
after a suspect’s custody for purposes of Miranda ends.  See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 
104–12 (2010). 
319 See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 104 (2010); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 
(1991). 
320 See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380–82 (2010). 
321 See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent 
Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 773, 802–21 (2009). 
322 See Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 715–16, 722–24 (1975). 
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been inferred under traditional standards for an adequate waiver, but not 
when measured by Miranda’s safe harbor.  Accordingly, the Court could 
properly conclude that it has created a safe harbor that is sufficiently attrac-
tive to interrogators to encourage its use since, under the rules governing 
waiver after invocation, a failure to employ safe-harbor waiver rules will re-
sult in the exclusion of a defendant’s statements in the prosecution’s case-in-
chief.323  One can debate whether the Court’s remedial scheme provides 
interrogators with sufficient incentive to utilize the safe-harbor, but this is a 
debate of constitutional common law; it cannot be answered by reference to 
the meaning of compulsion in the constitutional sense.324 
The standards for Fifth Amendment waiver also support the limitation on 
Miranda’s exclusionary rule embraced in Oregon v. Elstad,325 in which the Court 
held that a suspect’s statements made after receiving the requisite warnings 
and then making a valid waiver are admissible despite “the psychological im-
pact of the suspect’s conviction that he has let the cat out of the bag . . . .”326  
The Court’s reasoning is no model of clarity; at points, the Court suggested 
that a Miranda violation cannot be equated with a constitutional violation,327 
an approach subsequently repudiated in Dickerson.328  Beyond that, Elstad has 
drawn considerable critical reaction from commentators who believe that it 
undercuts the incentive to comply with Miranda.329  But, as an application of 
Fifth Amendment waiver principles, Elstad is readily justifiable. 
In Elstad, the Court observed that even after a suspect gives an un-
warned statement that cannot be used as evidence under Miranda, once the 
suspect subsequently receives warnings and waives his rights, the validity of 
the waiver is not impaired “because he was unaware that his prior state-
ment could not be used against him.”330  Citing waiver jurisprudence, in-
cluding guilty-plea cases, the Court concluded that a valid waiver does not 
require “a full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing 
from the nature and the quality of the evidence in the case.”331  Thus, Elstad 
reflects the familiar rule, explicated in Part III.C above, that as long as a 
 
323 Cf. id. at 722 (“[T]here is sufficient deterrence when the evidence in question is made unavailable 
to the prosecution in its case in chief.”). 
324 For an argument that the exclusionary regime fashioned by the Court creates adequate incentive 
to warn suspects of their rights but insufficient incentive to honor invocations, see Clymer, supra 
note 280, at 503–25. 
325 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
326 Id. at 311. 
327 Id. at 305–06. 
328 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000). 
329 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965, 1000–02 
(2012); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 132–40 (1998); David 
A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 805, 840–55 
(1992). 
330 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316. 
331 Id. at 317. 
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suspect is advised of his rights and given a choice between speaking and 
remaining silent, facing no threat of punitive sanctions beyond the risk of 
lawful sanctions following conviction at a fair trial, an ensuing waiver is val-
id, even if the suspect was facing compulsion to speak within the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment. 
The differences between Miranda’s exclusionary rule and the Fifth 
Amendment exclusionary rule are hard to justify if Miranda is conceived as 
merely announcing a rule of Fifth Amendment law.  But they are far easier 
to grasp if Miranda’s required warnings are regarded as part of the constitu-
tional common law of waiver.  Because Miranda adopts a prophylactic view 
of waiver—not compulsion—it can legitimately offer a narrower rule of ex-
clusion when it comes to a violation of its waiver rules than would be re-
quired for a violation of the Fifth Amendment itself. 
3.  Interrogation Tactics 
Despite the prophylactic character of its waiver regime, Miranda and its 
progeny are frequently attacked as insufficiently protective of Fifth 
Amendment rights by permitting manipulative techniques designed to con-
vince a suspect that it is in his interest to speak with interrogators, and un-
der circumstances in which it is unclear whether the suspect is able to un-
derstand his rights.332 
The Court has held, for example, that as long as a defendant has been 
advised of his rights, he may validly waive them even when interrogators 
concealed from him that an attorney is available and wishes to advise him,333 
that the true purpose of their interrogation is to obtain evidence on a far 
more serious charge than the one on which the defendant has been held,334 
and, as we have seen, a suspect need not be told that his prior unwarned 
statement was inadmissible in order to provide a valid waiver.335  Indeed, 
one might argue that Miranda and its progeny permit interrogation tactics 
that lead suspects to misgauge their interests.  Many commentators, for ex-
ample, have condemned deceptive interrogation tactics as undermining con-
stitutional protections in interrogation.336  Moreover, as we have also seen, 
 
332 See, e.g., RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 119–64 (2008); 
THOMAS & LEO, supra note 27, at 185–218; WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING 
PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 139–86 (2001); Susan 
R. Klein, Transparency and Truth During Custodial Interrogation and Beyond, 97 B.U. L. REV. 993, 
1014–17 (2017); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1539–90 
(2008). 
333 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422–28 (1986). 
334 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987). 
335 See supra text accompanying notes 325–31. 
336 See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 332, at 196–215; Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 
DENVER U. L. REV. 957, 967–78 (1997); Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the 
Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 
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Miranda cannot be defended on the view that the administration of warnings 
somehow dissipates the presence of compulsion to speak.337  The available 
empirical evidence, though limited, might be thought to confirm this point; 
suspects subjected to custodial interrogation invoke their right to halt the in-
terrogation only about twenty percent of the time, with the vast majority of 
invocations occurring at the point at which warnings are administered.338 
Yet, as the discussion in Part III.C above makes clear, a waiver is valid 
as long as a suspect is aware of his rights and is confronted with a threat of 
only lawful sanctions; there is no additional requirement that a suspect re-
ceive all information necessary to make a prudent decision.339  Waiver law 
has never required that an individual receive something like a prospectus 
disclosing all material facts relating to the decision whether to waive.  Nor 
does waiver law impose a fiduciary duty on law enforcement officials to 
protect the interests of the very individuals they are investigating.  If a sus-
pect under interrogation wants a fiduciary, he has a right to counsel, not a 
right to expect police or prosecutors to act in the stead of counsel. 
Fifth Amendment waiver doctrine accordingly reflects the longstanding 
rule—hardly unique to the Fifth Amendment—that a waiver can be valid 
even if foolish.  There is particularly little justification for departing from 
that rule when it comes to the Fifth Amendment which, as we have seen, 
addresses compulsion, not imprudence.  In Dickerson, accordingly, Justice 
Scalia was surely correct that “[t]here is a world of difference . . . between 
compelling a suspect to incriminate himself and preventing him from fool-
ishly doing so of his own accord.”340 
Suspects may be foolish to think that interrogators will speak only the 
truth or disclose all material facts, but those who want unvarnished legal 
advice have a right to counsel, not a right to expect that interrogators will 
act as if they were the suspect’s counsel.  As Part III.C above demonstrates, 
when the only threat of punitive sanctions that a suspect faces is the threat 
of conviction at a fair trial, the Fifth Amendment permits a suspect to waive 
the right to be free from that threat when deciding whether to speak.  Inter-
 
101–05 (2006); Godsey, supra note 44, at 515–39; Alan Hirsch, Threats, Promises, and False Confes-
sions: Lessons of Slavery, 49 HOW. L.J. 31, 54–59 (2005); Robert P. Mosteller, Police Deception Before 
Miranda Warnings: The Case for a Per Se Prohibition of an Entirely Unjustified Practice at the Most Critical 
Moment, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1239, 1263–72 (2007); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Ly-
ing in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 456–57 (1996). 
337 See supra text accompanying notes 271–72. 
338 See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 39, at 495–96; Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in 
the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 839, 859–60 (1996); 
Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 653 (1996).  
But cf. Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty Years of Empirical 
Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REV. 685 (2017) (reviewing evi-
dence suggesting that Miranda has reduced confession rates). 
339 See supra text accompanying notes 260–65. 
340 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 449 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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rogators who obtain such a waiver, even if they overstate the evidence or 
otherwise use their superior knowledge and experience to convince a sus-
pect to speak, are engaged in persuasion, not compulsion, so long as they 
make no additional threat of punitive sanctions.  Official compulsion, as we 
have seen, involves obtaining evidence by threat of punitive sanctions.  Of-
ficial deception is different, and the Fifth Amendment addresses compul-
sion, not deception.341 
Waivers, of course, must be both voluntary and intelligent.  On the lat-
ter score, Miranda uses commonsense, nontechnical terms to apprise sus-
pects of their rights.  The fact that invocations most often occur when rights 
are administered suggests that these admonitions have meaning.  There is, 
to be sure, some evidence that some individuals under particular disabili-
ties, such as those with limited education, mental disabilities, or juveniles, 
have less capacity to understand Miranda rights.342  Yet, there is no reason 
why the Miranda waiver inquiry cannot be sensitive to issues relating to ca-
pacity; indeed, the Court seems to be moving in that direction.343   
Putting those under special disabilities aside, a summary of research by 
leading scholars acknowledged that at least under laboratory conditions, 
 
341 Cf. Stuntz, supra note 52, at 823 (“[O]ne cannot fairly label as punishment tactics that deceive 
suspects into thinking that their statements are not incriminating or will not prove harmful to 
them later in court.”).  A similar analysis governs when a waiver is obtained on the basis of a 
promise that is later breached.  A broken promise does not fall within the definition of compul-
sion, and therefore does not afoul of the Fifth Amendment.  Indeed, although the broadest lan-
guage in Bram suggests that confessions could not be obtained by promises, see Bram v. United 
States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897), the Court has since retreated from this position, see, e.g., Ari-
zona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).  To be sure, broken promises that induce confes-
sions may be problematic for a variety of other reasons unrelated to compulsion.  Guilty pleas ob-
tained as a result of an unfulfilled promise, for example, are considered violative of due process.  
See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261–62 (1971).  That suggests that confessions 
obtained on the basis of unfulfilled promises may well be constitutionally suspect, but on the basis 
of a due process rather than a Fifth Amendment objection.  For elaboration on this point, see 
Welsh S. White, Confessions Induced by Broken Government Promises, 43 DUKE L.J. 947, 948–955 
(1994).  To the extent, however, that interrogators falsely lead a suspect to believe that his silence 
will be used to incriminate him, they are engaged in compulsion under the definition advanced 
above; they are undertaking to induce the suspect to become a witness providing evidence by 
threat of punitive sanctions. Cf. Christopher Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and Unrecorded Ques-
tioning: After Fifty Years of Miranda Jurisprudence, Still Two (Or Maybe Three) Burning Issues, 97 B.U. L. 
REV. 1157, 1168 (2017) (“[F]alse threats to impose a legal penalty if a confession is not forthcom-
ing are coercive, as these threats would be coercive if true.  The Supreme Court’s Fifth Amend-
ment jurisprudence has long prohibited imposition of legal sanctions for refusing to make self-
incriminating statements.” (footnote omitted)). 
342 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 75–90 (2005); THOMAS & LEO, supra note 27, at 196–207; Weisselberg, 
supra note 332, at 1564–74. 
343 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272–277 (2011) (finding that a juvenile’s age must be 
considered in determining whether he was in custody for purposes of Miranda); cf. BARRY C. 
FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS: INSIDE THE INTERROGATION ROOM 60–102 (2013) 
(reviewing evidence suggesting that juveniles have reduced capacity to understand and validly 
waive Miranda rights). 
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“average adults exhibit a reasonably good understanding of their rights.”344 
To be sure, it might be possible to craft even more explicit or comprehensive 
warnings, such as admonishing detainees that no adverse inference can be 
drawn if they remain silent, or that they may cut off questioning at any 
time.345  Additional warnings, however, might be counterproductive; in-
creasing the length and complexity of warnings might reduce their effica-
cy.346  In any event, additional warnings of this character go beyond any-
thing that the law of waiver has ever required.  Under traditional principles 
of waiver, to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to be free from 
compelled self-incrimination, an individual must be told only of the exist-
ence of the right to be waived—a right to remain silent—and the conse-
quences of a waiver—that anything the individual says if he chooses to speak 
can be used to incriminate.  The additional rights Miranda and it progeny 
confer, such as the right to cut off questioning, are not Fifth Amendment 
rights that a detainee is being asked to waive at the time a Miranda waiver is 
sought.  Accordingly, Miranda offers most individuals fair warning of, and a 
fair chance to assert, the Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to self-
incriminate, consistent with traditional principles of waiver.347 
Given that the warnings are given in plain terms, it is not obvious that the 
frequency of waiver is a function of compulsion or incomprehension as op-
posed to improvidence.  In fact, there is ample reason to believe the latter ex-
plains most waivers.  There is substantial evidence, for example, that offend-
 
344 Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAVIOR 3, 8 (2010) (citations omitted).  There is, of course, reason to be skeptical of interroga-
tion research under laboratory conditions—in actual interrogations, suspects may be under 
greater stress that may interfere with comprehension, but they also may be more motivated to lis-
ten carefully to an interrogator.  The most comprehensive analysis based on observations of actu-
al custodial interrogations was performed by Richard Leo and Welsh White, and although they 
found that interrogators sometimes issue warnings in a neutral manner, endeavor to deemphasize 
their significance, or seek to persuade suspects that it is in their interest to waive, and were gener-
ally critical of interrogation tactics, they did not claim that the observational data suggest that 
suspects do not understand their rights.  Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: 
Modern Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 
431–47 (1999). 
345 For examples of proposals to expand the scope of the warnings, see Geoffrey S. Corn, The Missing 
Miranda Warning: What You Don’t Know Really Can Hurt You, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 761, 782–94 (de-
tainees should be told that no adverse inference can be drawn from silence); Godsey, supra note 
256, at 792–94, 812–16 (detainees should be told that they cannot be penalized if they remain si-
lent and that they have a right to halt questioning); and Sacharoff, supra note 268, at 583–85 (de-
tainees should be told of their right to cut off questioning). 
346 For a helpful discussion of this issue, see Richard Rogers et al., An Analysis of Miranda Warnings 
and Waivers: Comprehension and Coverage, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAVIOR 177 (2007) 
347 Cf. Thomas, supra note 264, at 1104–09 (arguing that Miranda and its progeny are best under-
stood as resting on a right to fair notice of rights during custodial interrogation). 
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ers have limited capacity for self-control.348  It may well follow that offenders 
have difficulty restraining themselves from an effort to convince interrogators 
of their innocence.  As for the innocent, there is evidence that they tend to 
over-estimate their ability to convince interrogators of their innocence, which 
may make them even more likely to submit to interrogation.349 
In the face of the paucity of evidence that most suspects are incapable of 
giving a valid waiver, and given that the warnings are delivered in plain 
terms, there is little reason to believe that the frequency of waiver under 
Miranda is because its warnings fail to make individuals aware of their 
choice between silence and speech.  If a suspect is aware of the choice 
whether to speak, and unwisely chooses to waive the right to remain silent, 
the Fifth Amendment is not offended. 
It may be that many under custodial interrogation are prone to make 
improvident waiver decisions, overconfident of their ability to talk their way 
out of trouble,350 desirous of appearing to cooperative with police,351 or 
perhaps underestimating the long-term consequences of making an incrim-
inating statement.352  Whatever the policy implications, this presents no 
Fifth Amendment problem.  The Fifth Amendment does not forbid im-
provident waiver; it is directed at compulsion, not improvidence.  And, as 
we have seen, the law of waiver merely requires that waivers be knowing 
and voluntary, as opposed to prudent and well-considered.  Under 
longstanding waiver principles, as long as a suspect is told of his rights and 
confronts no threat of punitive sanctions beyond the risk of conviction at a 
 
348 See, e.g., MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 85–
120 (1990); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and the Psychology of Self-Control, 61 
EMORY L.J. 501, 523–29 (2012). 
349 See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive their Miranda Rights: The Power of 
Innocence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAVIOR 211, 217–18 (2004); Maria Hartwig, Pär Anders Granhag 
& Leif A. Strömwall, Guilty and Innocent Suspects’ Strategies During Police Interrogations, 13 PSYCHOL., 
CRIME & L. 213, 224–25 (2007).  The limited empirical evidence suggests that suspects with 
criminal records may be somewhat more likely to invoke their rights during interrogation.  See, 
e.g., Cassell & Hayman, supra note 338, at 895; Leo, supra note 338, at 654–55. 
350 Cf. Schulhofer, supra note 265, at 561 (“[T]oday’s suspects typically confess not because of fear of 
mistreatment but primarily because of misplaced confidence in their own ability to talk their way 
out of trouble.”); George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1999 
(2004) (“Many suspects talk, not because police are skilled or calculating, but because at some 
level they want to talk to police.  They want to tell their story because they think they can skillfully 
navigate the shoals of police interrogation and arrive safely on the other shore.”). 
351    Cf. George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Spider Web, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1215, 1224–33 (2017) (using 
statistics demonstrating the prevalence of consent searches in New Jersey after suspect has been 
advised of the right to refuse consent to suggest that innocent and guilty suspects alike wish to ap-
pear cooperative). 
352 There is reason to believe that individuals under interrogation are likely to discount the long-term 
consequences of making statements under interrogation and over-estimate the short-term benefits 
of making statements that may shorten an interrogation.  See, e.g., Yueran Yang, Stephanie Ma-
don & May Guyll, Short-Sighted Confession Decisions: The Role of Uncertain and Delayed Consequences, 39 
LAW & HUM. BEHAVIOR 44 (2015). 
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fair trial, he has been confronted with a form of compulsion subject to 
waiver.  It would be a tall order for the law to endeavor to save those with 
poor judgment from themselves.353 
A more difficult problem is presented by Missouri v. Seibert,354 which in-
volved a two-part interrogation strategy in which an interrogator engaged in 
unwarned interrogation and, only after obtaining a confession, provided the 
suspect with warnings and sought a waiver, after which the suspect repeated 
the confession that he had already made, albeit in violation of Miranda.355  A 
bare majority of the Court, though unable to agree on a single opinion, con-
cluded that the warnings were ineffective to render the waiver valid, making 
the repetition of the previous unwarned confession inadmissible.356 
On the view of Fifth Amendment waiver advanced above, Seibert is a dif-
ficult case because of the tension between the Seibert majority’s understand-
able view that a two-part strategy drains Miranda warnings of their efficacy, 
and the general rule that a waiver is not impaired if a suspect is not made 
aware of all facts material to its wisdom, including advice about the inad-
missibility of the suspect’s earlier statements—the rule on which Elstad rest-
 
353 Some have proposed that interrogation features associated with significant numbers of false con-
fessions, such as lengthy interrogations, interrogation of vulnerable suspects, and the use of 
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tecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions—and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 497, 503–38 (1988); Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is 
Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1188–97 (2001); Rosenthal, supra note 281, at 613–19; Miller 
W. Shealy, Jr., The Hunting of Man: Lies, Damn Lies, and Police Interrogations, 4 U. MIAMI RACE & 
SOC. JUST. L. REV. 21, 55–69 (2014).  Others have proposed requiring substantial indicia of cor-
roboration to admit a confession, see, e.g., LEO, supra note 332, at 286–91, though in many cases 
sufficient corroborative evidence may be unavailable even for accurate confessions, see, e.g., Welsh 
S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2024–28 (1998).  
Thus, assessing these proposals is a policymaking exercise fraught with uncertainty.  Conversely, 
my colleague Scott Howe has advanced what he characterizes as a “pro-confessional” proposal to 
offer sentencing discounts to those who confess, creating a predictable incentive and perhaps ob-
viating the need to resort to other interrogation tactics.  See Scott W. Howe, Moving Beyond Miran-
da: Concessions for Confessions, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 905, 947–60 (2016).  For a similar if less fully 
developed proposal, see Klein, supra note 332, at 1027–31. One wonders, however, whether 
mandatory sentencing reductions would prove palatable in cases involving quite serious offenses, 
especially when a confession is partial or unnecessary to convict, or increase the rate of false con-
fessions. Of course, as Part III.C above suggests, the current regime of plea negotiation offers sim-
ilar, if less predictable but more flexible, incentives to confess. 
354 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
355 Id. at 604–06 (plurality opinion). 
356 Id. at 611–17 (plurality opinion); id. at 620–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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ed.357  The discussion above, however, suggests that the majority reached 
the correct result. 
That the two-part interrogation was strategic suggests an official under-
taking to induce Seibert to provide evidence through a manipulation of 
Seibert’s choices in a manner at odds with the Fifth Amendment.  As we 
have seen in Part III.C above, a suspect can give a valid waiver only when 
the compulsion he faces involves no more than the threat of lawful sanc-
tions, within the government’s power to impose, following conviction at a 
fair trial.  The Fifth Amendment, however, does not permit the government 
to offer a suspect under compulsion a choice to remain silent and put the 
government to its proof only after the suspect has been compelled to con-
fess.  Yet, that was the choice that the two-part strategy endeavored to pre-
sent.  The strategy undertook to induce Seibert to provide evidence by sug-
gesting that he had already confessed, making the threat of punitive 
sanctions he faced especially—but impermissibly—potent.  The two-part 
strategy therefore undertook to present Seibert with a threat of sanctions 
forbidden by the Fifth Amendment itself—sanctions premised on a sus-
pect’s compelled confession. 
There is therefore considerable appeal to the majority’s conclusion that 
when there is an official undertaking to induce a suspect to provide evi-
dence by threat of punitive sanctions of this character, the suspect cannot 
give a valid waiver absent some effort to apprise the suspect that he retains 
a meaningful choice to remain silent and put the prosecution to its proof at 
trial.358  Otherwise, there has been a form of compulsion not subject to 
waiver under the account of waiver advanced above.  Accordingly, the two-
part strategy presented Seibert with a threat of punitive sanctions that are, 
under the Fifth Amendment, beyond the government’s power to impose.  
Perhaps that conclusion is debatable, but at least a focus on the view of 
Fifth Amendment compulsion and waiver advanced above identifies the 
right question in Seibert—whether interrogators confronted the suspect with 
an impermissible choice.  The Seibert dissenters, in contrast, advocated reli-
ance on “voluntariness standards.”359  As we have seen in Part I above, that 
descent into subjectivity produces only chaos. 
 
357 See supra text accompanying notes 325–31. 
358 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611–12 (plurality opinion) (“The threshold issue when interrogators question 
first and warn later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the 
warnings could function ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.  Could the warnings effectively advise 
the suspect that he had a real choice about giving an admissible statement at that juncture?”); id. 
at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If the deliberate two-step strategy has been 
used, postwarning statements that are related to the substance of prewarning statements must be 
excluded unless curative measures are taken . . . . Curative measures should be designed to en-
sure that a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would understand the import and effect of 
the Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver.”). 
359 Id. at 628 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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4.  Replacing Voluntariness Inquiry with the Fifth Amendment 
All too often, as long as a suspect receives the requisite warnings during 
custodial interrogation, ensuing interrogation techniques are assessed only 
under the due process voluntariness test.360  As Part I.A above demon-
strates, application of this overborne-will test poses many problems.  As 
Part III.C above demonstrates, however, even for one under compulsion, a 
waiver of the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination is valid as 
long as a suspect is confronted with no threat of punitive sanctions other 
than those following conviction at a fair trial.  This standard provides, if not 
mathematical precision, at least considerably more clarity than a voluntari-
ness inquiry.  And, inasmuch as the Fifth Amendment addresses the extent 
to which a suspect can be compelled to submit to interrogation, it is unclear 
why a parallel due process voluntariness inquiry remains appropriate.  The 
Court’s general view has been that “[w]here a particular Amendment pro-
vides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a partic-
ular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more general-
ized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing 
these claims.”361  When it comes to compulsion to incriminate, the Consti-
tution’s text suggests that the Fifth Amendment sets out the “process” that 
is constitutionally “due” a suspect.  To the extent that either the Fifth  or 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is thought to contain 
broader protections for those facing compulsion to incriminate themselves 
than the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, due process not on-
ly renders the Self-Incrimination Clause surplusage, but also reinjects into 
confession jurisprudence all the difficulties of an overborne-will test.  
A useful illustration of the clarity afforded by a focus on the approach to 
compulsion and waiver advanced above as opposed to the murky due pro-
cess concept of voluntariness is provided by Miller v. Fenton,362 where the 
court, applying a due-process overborne-will test, upheld the use of a con-
fession as voluntarily given following custodial interrogation involving 
feigned sympathy, a misrepresentation about the evidence, and implied 
promises of leniency.363  In dissent, Judge John J. Gibbons argued that the 
interrogation tactics overbore the suspect’s will; they so thoroughly under-
 
360 See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109–10 (1985). 
361 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 
266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion)); cf. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773–74 n.5 (2003) 
(opinion of Thomas, J.,) (“If, as Justice Kennedy believes, the Fifth Amendment’s Self–
Incrimination Clause governs coercive police interrogation even absent use of compelled state-
ments in a criminal case, then . . . the Due Process Clause would not.”). 
362 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986). 
363 Id. at 603–13. 
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mined the suspect’s resistance that it produced his psychological collapse 
into a catatonic state.364 
 Under the overborne-will test, Judge Gibbons likely had the stronger po-
sition.  Even so, it is understandable that the majority resisted the conclusion 
that a suspect’s subjective reaction to the threat of lawful punishment—or 
his own guilt—means that a confession has been unconstitutionally ob-
tained, at least if the Constitution is understood as a limitation on the gov-
ernment’s investigative powers and not a probe into suspects’ psyches.  In 
Miller, the suspect was confronted with no threat of punitive sanctions other 
than the possibility of conviction at a fair trial.  As we have seen in Part III.C 
above, when the compulsion a suspect faces involves no more than the 
threat of conviction at a fair trial, a suspect can give a valid waiver, even if 
he is subject to the compulsion that inheres in custodial interrogation.  And, 
if a suspect validly waives his right to be free from compelled self-
incrimination, it is hard to understand how the suspect’s resulting confession 
can nevertheless be considered involuntary under the Due Process Clause. 
Miller is usefully contrasted with cases in which the Fifth Amendment is 
offended because a suspect has been confronted with an impermissible 
choice.  Forcing a suspect to choose between silence and physical violence 
is an easy case; there the suspect is confronted with a choice between si-
lence and a form of summary punishment that the Constitution forbids.365  
Nearly as easy is Ziang Sung Wan, in which the defendant was effectively 
confronted with a choice between confessing and indefinite detention with-
out medical care, even though he was seriously ill.366  In such cases, the sus-
pect is confronted with an effectively punitive sanction—prolonged in 
communicado custody—equally forbidden to the government in light of the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial,367 as well as the obligation to provide 
medical care to pretrial detainees.368 
 
364 Id. at 613–28. 
365 Cf. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (characterizing use of excessive force 
against a pretrial detainee as “punishment” forbidden by the Due Process Clause). 
366 See supra text accompanying notes 171–74. 
367 Cf. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) (“Obviously, one in respondent’s position could 
not be detained indefinitely in the face of repeated protests of innocence even though the warrant 
under which he was arrested and detained met the standards of the Fourth Amendment.  For the 
Constitution likewise guarantees an accused the right to a speedy trial, and invocation of the 
speedy trial right need not await indictment or other formal charge; arrest pursuant to probable 
cause is itself sufficient.”). 
368 See, e.g., City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (“The Due Process Clause, 
however, does require the responsible government or governmental agency to provide medical 
care to persons, such as Kivlin, who have been injured while being apprehended by the police.  
In fact, the due process rights of a person in Kivlin’s situation are at least as great as the Eighth 
Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.”).  There is also likely a constitutional 
right to a prompt determination of bail after arrest.  Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114–16 
(1975) (noting the common-law rule requiring prompt judicial determinations of probable cause 
and bail). 
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Lengthy custodial detention is problematic because, at some point, pro-
longed custody for purposes of interrogation becomes a punitive sanction 
beyond the government’s power to impose.  Current doctrine offers no 
mathematical formula for determining when custodial interrogation has be-
come unduly prolonged, and in this sense the definition of compulsion ad-
vanced above might be thought to reintroduce some of the uncertainties of 
due-process voluntariness jurisprudence.369  A focus on Fifth Amendment 
compulsion, however, at least asks the right question.  The overborne-will 
test expects us to determine the effect of prolonged detention on the sus-
pect’s will.  As we have seen, this is an inquiry fraught with difficulties.370  
The concept of compulsion, in contrast, focuses solely on the character of 
the threats confronting the suspect.  This objective inquiry, whatever its dif-
ficulties, avoids an effort to plumb a suspect’s psychological depths. 
Another example of the manner in which added clarity is provided by a 
focus on the view of compulsion and waiver advanced above is provided by 
People v. Thomas.371  In that case, the court concluded that a confession made 
after interrogators told Thomas that if he did not confess to abusing his 
child, interrogators would arrest his wife, and physicians would be unable 
to understand his child’s injuries sufficiently to save his life, should be sup-
pressed as involuntary.372  The court reached this conclusion without dis-
turbing the finding that Thomas had received Miranda warnings and had 
thereafter given interrogators a valid waiver.373  The court’s focus on volun-
tariness reflects the continuing effects of the problematic overborne-will 
test; confronted with the claim that the interrogator’s tactics created no sub-
stantial risk of a false confession, the court responded by citing the Supreme 
Court’s due process jurisprudence to support the view that even reliable 
confessions can be involuntary.374  Yet, this observation does nothing to 
identify the boundaries of voluntariness; not all confessions induced by 
threats or deception, whether reliable or not, are considered involuntary.375 
Disaggregating compulsion from waiver, in contrast, provides greater 
clarity, and suggests that the interrogator’s tactics raised distinct issues.  
Although Thomas gave a waiver under Miranda, as we have seen, such a 
waiver is effective only with respect to the compulsion inhering in a threat 
of punitive sanctions following conviction at a fair trial.  When silence will 
 
369 But cf. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52–58 (1991) (presumptively requiring a 
judicial determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours of arrest under the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure). 
370 See supra text accompanying notes 19–26. 
371 8 N.E.3d 308 (N.Y. 2014). 
372 Id. at 314–16. 
373 See People v. Thomas, 941 N.Y.S.2d 722, 728–29 (App. Div. 2012), rev’d, 8 N.E.3d 308 (N.Y. 
2014). 
374 Thomas, 8 N.E.3d at 314–15 (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540–41 (1961)). 
375 See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737–39 (1969). 
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result in criminal charges against one’s spouse, silence comes with another 
kind of punitive sanction attached.  If the threatened loss of a job amounts 
to the kind of sanction that triggers the Fifth Amendment, surely there is 
little reason to treat the threatened loss of one’s spouse differently.  Con-
versely, it is harder to characterize the threat of facing moral responsibility 
for failing to assist physicians treating one’s child as a threatened punitive 
sanction sufficient to satisfy the final element of compulsion.  Urging a sus-
pect to speak to help physicians treat his child may be a powerful technique 
of persuasion, but it is far less readily characterized as compulsion—
inducing a witness to provide evidence by threat of punitive sanctions.  A 
defendant’s decision to credit an officer’s assertion about the need for in-
formation to assist treatment of his child might be regarded as unduly cred-
ulous or understandable, but either way, it is not compelled. 
The proper question when it comes to the validity of an asserted waiver 
of Fifth Amendment rights, in short, is framed in Part III.C above—
whether interrogators have confronted a suspect under the compulsion of 
custodial interrogation with a permissible choice: speaking or remaining si-
lent and facing no punitive sanctions beyond the threat of lawful punish-
ment after conviction at a fair trial.  This is the terrain on which the battle 
over the admissibility of confessions is properly fought; and it is the terrain 
of the Fifth Amendment, not due process. 
B.  Evidentiary Uses of Silence 
It remains to consider the application of the definition of compulsion to 
those who remain silent.  The seminal case on this subject is the holding that 
a defendant’s failure to testify cannot be used as evidence of guilt in Griffin v. 
California,376 but, as we have seen, critics argue that it lacks support in fram-
ing-era practice and fails to explain how an individual who is granted and 
exercises a right to remain silent can be said to be to have been compelled to 
incriminate himself.377  There is, however, a flaw to this line of argument, 
made plain by application of the definition of compulsion advanced above. 
1.  Griffin Assessed 
The historical case against Griffin may be put aside as inconclusive.  Be-
cause, in the framing era, criminal defendants were not permitted to testify, 
there is no framing-era practice to consult when it comes to what inferences 
may be drawn from a defendant’s failure to testify.378  To be sure, some 
 
376 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
377 See supra text accompanying notes 67–70. 
378 Cf. Alschuler, supra note 40, at 853 n.18 (“Although the Framers had no objection to drawing an 
adverse inference from an unsworn defendant’s silence before a magistrate or at trial, they might 
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have argued that, in the framing era, it is likely that if the unsworn defend-
ant at a preliminary examination held under Marian procedures failed to 
answer questions, or if a criminal defendant, at trial, failed to offer an un-
sworn statement, an adverse inference might well have been drawn by the 
trier of fact, though this claim is unsupported by concrete evidence of how 
frequently this occurred.379  Perhaps a defendant’s silence was so infrequent 
in the framing era that the question of an adverse inference rarely arose.  
More important, as we have seen, the framing-era failure to assert Fifth 
Amendment rights may well have been attributable more to factors other 
than to the framing-era understanding of the Fifth Amendment—in partic-
ular, the absence of defense counsel at preliminary examinations able to as-
sert the rights of the accused.380 
Moving past the framing era, most nineteenth-century statutes granting 
criminal defendants a right to testify provided that no adverse inference could 
be drawn from a defendant’s failure to testify out of concern that such a pro-
hibition was constitutionally required.381  Such prohibitions were not univer-
sal, and they followed the ratification of the Fifth Amendment by decades, 
but they suggest that constitutional concerns about an adverse inference 
based on a defendant’s failure to testify are not ahistorical.  In jurisdictions 
that permitted consideration of a defendant’s failure testify, state-court deci-
sions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries interpreting state 
constitutional prohibitions on compelled self-incrimination reached conflict-
ing results, again suggesting that history does not speak with one voice.382  
The historical record is, in short, too mixed to permit reliable conclusions. 
It is more productive to focus on the Fifth Amendment’s text instead of 
an ambiguous historical record.  Griffin’s characterization of an adverse in-
ference as “a penalty imposed by the courts” that “cuts down on the privi-
 
not have approved of drawing an adverse inference from a defendant’s refusal to offer sworn tes-
timony.”) (citation omitted). 
379 See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332–36 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); MAYERS, 
supra note 126, at 12, 16, 175–76, 188; OLP Memo, supra note 69, at 1025–26; Sampsell-Jones, 
supra note 69, at 1348–49. 
380 See supra text accompanying notes 151–61. 
381 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 580 (1961); Alschuler, supra note 25, at 2661–62; 
Bodansky, supra note 109, at 126. 
382 See OLP Memo, supra note 69, at 1034–45.  The Fifth Amendment was not regarded as applica-
ble to state prosecutions until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).  In the nineteenth century, the 
closest a federal court came to this question was a case concluding that the court could draw an 
inference adverse to a grand jury witness based on his invocation of the Fifth Amendment in an 
inquiry into alleged violations of neutrality laws, and on that basis require the witness to post a 
bond, although relying heavily on the view that the case involved no criminal punishment.  Unit-
ed States v. Quitman, 27 F. Cas. 680, 682 (C.C.E.D. La. 1854) (No. 16,111).  When Congress 
later removed the bar on testimony by a criminal defendant, it also provided that a defendant’s 
failure to testify “shall not create any presumption against him.”  Act of Mar. 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 
30, 31.  The Supreme Court subsequently held that any prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s 
failure to testify violated the statute.  See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893). 
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lege by making its assertion costly,”383 however, is not rooted in any defini-
tion of compulsion; moreover, as we have seen, subsequent cases have re-
jected the view that the Fifth Amendment prohibits anything that makes 
assertion of Fifth Amendment rights “costly.”384  Nevertheless, the striking 
thing about a rule that permits a defendant’s failure to testify to be used as 
evidence of guilt is that the defendant is left with no means to avoid becom-
ing a “witness” who has provided evidence.  As Justice Frank Murphy 
pointed out in the first case in which California’s rule permitting comment 
on a defendant’s failure to testify reached the Supreme Court, if the de-
fendant does not testify, “his silence is used as the basis for drawing unfa-
vorable inferences against him as to matters which he might reasonably be 
expected to explain,” and, “[i]f he does take the stand, thereby opening 
himself to cross-examination . . . he is necessarily compelled to testify 
against himself.”385  This insight offers strong justification for Griffin. 
If a defendant is effectively required to provide evidence whether he tes-
tifies or not, each of the elements of compulsion outlined in Part II.B above 
is satisfied.  A rule permitting evidentiary use of a defendant’s failure to tes-
tify satisfies the official inducement element as an undertaking to induce the 
defendant to provide evidence either through testimony from the witness 
stand, or an inference of guilt flowing from the defendant’s failure to testify.  
The second element of compulsion is also satisfied: the defendant becomes 
a witness because he provides evidence either by express testimony or si-
lence.  After all, even when the defendant remains silent, the adverse infer-
ence permits the jury to conclude that the defendant’s failure to testify re-
flects implicit testimony through application of the longstanding rule that 
silence in the face of an accusation can be treated as evidence of the sus-
pect’s consciousness of guilt.386  The final two elements are satisfied as well; 
a threat of punitive sanctions is what requires the defendant to appear in his 
defense as a “witness” in the form of either testimony or silent acquies-
cence.  It is the threat of punitive sanctions that requires the defendant to 
mount a defense in which he effectively becomes a witness whether he testi-
fies or not, at least when an adverse inference from silence is permitted. 
When a defendant’s failure to testify is treated as evidence of guilt, ac-
cordingly, the defendant is deprived of the option of declining to become a 
 
383 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). 
384 See supra text accompanying note 70. 
385 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting).  To similar effect, see 
Alschuler, supra note 25, at 2628 n.11 (“When the defendant in Griffin refused to testify, the pros-
ecutor invited a jury to infer this defendant’s consciousness of guilt and his knowledge of incrimi-
nating circumstances . . . . The defendant in Griffin thus might have had no way to avoid incrimi-
nating himself; either his truthful speech or his silence would have been treated as evidence of 
guilt. Because the defendant lacked an alternative, he was compelled to become a witness of sorts 
against himself.”). 
386 See supra text accompanying note 178. 
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“witness” who provides evidence.  For that reason, the very process of hal-
ing the defendant into court and requiring him to defend under a threat of 
punitive sanctions amounts to compulsion to become a “witness” within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment.  And, because a defendant faced with a 
threat that his failure to testify will be used against him at trial is subject to 
compulsion in this fashion, there is no requirement to invoke Fifth 
Amendment rights in order to gain the benefit of Griffin; as Part III.B above 
demonstrates, the invocation requirement is not imposed against those who 
are subject to compulsion even if their invocation is respected.387 
To be sure, a defendant is required to make many difficult choices that 
are not regarded as inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment, such as wheth-
er to testify, or to give the prosecution notice of an intention to present de-
fense witnesses.388  The adverse comment on silence, however, differs criti-
cally from these other choices; it means that the defendant is given no 
option but to become a “witness” by providing evidence.389  Either the de-
 
387 Conversely, at least when the defendant is sentenced by a judge, the Court hewed to the invoca-
tion requirement, albeit without explaining the distinction from Griffin.  See Roberts v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 552, 560–61 (1980).  The definition of compulsion offers the missing explana-
tion.  In Roberts, the defendant argued that his refusal to provide information at sentencing “was 
justified by legitimate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination.”  Id. at 559.  The for-
mer, because it involves nongovernmental coercion, is not a form of compulsion within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment because the official-inducement element of compulsion is lack-
ing.  In cases in which it is unclear whether an individual is subject to Fifth Amendment compul-
sion, invocation is properly required so that the court can assess the propriety of the invocation.  
See supra text accompanying note 228. 
388 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215–16 (1971). 
389 This point serves to explain Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), in which the Court found 
no Fifth Amendment violation when the defendant testified at his second trial and was im-
peached by his failure to testify at the first.  Id. at 497–98.  In Raffel, the defendant was able to de-
cline to testify at his first trial without fear of adverse comment, and it was only his decision to 
take the stand at the second trial that produced the evidentiary use of his failure to testify.  Ac-
cordingly, the prosecution did not leave the defendant with no option but to provide evidence; it 
was his own decision to testify at the second trial, after having remained silent at the first, that 
permitted evidentiary use of his silence.  Far more questionable is the Court’s reliance on Griffin 
to invalidate a rule requiring the defendant to testify before other defense witnesses on Fifth 
Amendment grounds in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).  The rule was defended on the 
theory that if the defendant could testify after other defense witness, his testimony might be im-
properly influenced by the testimony of the other witnesses.  Id. at 607.  To the extent that the 
rule was calculated to induce the defendant to testify as the first defense witness by the threat of a 
punitive sanction—loss of the right to testify later—the rule falls within the definition of compul-
sion advanced above.  Yet, one can question whether the rule is properly understood in this fash-
ion.  Unlike the adverse comment on silence at issue in Griffin, the challenged rule in Brooks left 
the defendant free to remain silent under the protection of Griffin’s no-adverse-inference rule, and 
for that reason one could argue that it was not an undertaking to induce the defendant to provide 
evidence.  Indeed, Brooks did not take the stand at his trial.  See id. at 614 (Burger, C.J. dissent-
ing).  For additional criticism of Brooks, concluding that it is best understood as a decision about a 
defendant’s due process right to control the manner in which the defense case unfolds, see gener-
ally Peter Westen, Order of Proof: An Accused’s Right To Control the Timing and Sequence of Evidence in His 
Defense, 66 CALIF. L REV. 935 (1978). 
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fendant’s sworn testimony or the defendant’s implicit testimony by silence 
become part of the evidence before the trier of fact.  When an inference of 
guilt based on a defendant’s failure to testify is permitted, accordingly, by 
compelling the defendant to defend the charge, the government also com-
pels him to be a witness, regardless whether he takes the stand.390  Thus, the 
adverse inference amounts to compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment.  Griffin, in short, is sound. 
2.  Griffin’s Limits 
Focusing on the conception of compulsion advanced above not only ex-
plains Griffin, but also the subsequent cases identifying the limits of its holding. 
As we have seen, Griffin’s conclusion that the government may not make 
an assertion of Fifth Amendment rights costly not only fails to explain why 
a defendant who remains silent has been subject to compulsion, but is also 
difficult to square with subsequent cases permitting the failure to testify to 
be the basis for an adverse inference in a variety of other contexts.391  Be-
cause the Court has failed to offer a definition of compulsion, in the cases in 
which adverse inferences from silence have been permitted, the Court has 
struggled to explain the limits of Griffin, offering a hodge-podge of reasons 
for limiting its reach. 
For example, the Court sustained a requirement that a prisoner accept 
responsibility for his crime before being admitted to a sex-offender treat-
ment program on the ground that this serves legitimate penological inter-
ests and is not unduly harsh.392  The Court has also written that Griffin does 
not forbid the use of an adverse inference based on a failure to testify in civ-
il cases because, in criminal cases, the prosecution can respond to an asser-
tion of Fifth Amendment rights with immunity, and the stakes are greater 
in criminal litigation.393  But, the Court also held that an adverse inference 
can be drawn from a prisoner’s failure to testify at a prison disciplinary 
hearing without any inquiry into the severity of the sanctions at issue or the 
government’s ability to offer prisoners immunity.394  And, it sustained an 
 
390 Professor Alschuler acknowledges that this view “rests on a plausible reading of the word ‘com-
pulsion,’”  but adds, “[t]he Framers of the Fifth Amendment meant to save people from improp-
er pressures to confess—pressures exerted by human beings.”  Alschuler, supra note 40, at 868 
n.79.  This overlooks that it is the prosecutor who decides to hale a defendant into court, and if 
comment on silence is permitted, the prosecutor is guaranteed evidence from the defendant 
whether he testifies or not.  In this fashion, Griffin protects defendants from compulsion exerted as 
a prosecutorial tactic.   
391 See supra text accompanying note 70. 
392 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 29 (2002) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 50–52 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (stressing that the burden imposed on the prisoner choosing not to 
participate was not severe). 
393 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 328–29. 
394 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316–20 (1976). 
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adverse inference drawn if a prisoner under a death sentence refuses to 
submit to a clemency interview, without evident concern for the life-or-
death stakes, on the ground that the prisoner has a choice whether to seek 
clemency.395  Yet, the fact that a defendant voluntarily chooses whether to 
testify in his own defense did not stop the Court from barring the use of an 
adverse inference in Griffin. 
The account of compulsion advanced above, in contrast, makes the lim-
its of Griffin understandable.  When an individual is given the option to re-
main silent in a civil proceeding in which he faces no punitive sanctions, the 
individual is not subject to Fifth Amendment compulsion.  In such cases, 
the individual may experience pressure to speak by threat of nonpunitive 
sanctions, such as civil liability, but Fifth Amendment compulsion excludes 
the threat of solely civil sanctions, permitting silence to be afforded whatev-
er probative weight is carried by any adverse inference that a trier of fact 
may draw from silence.396 
Indeed, the cases in which the Court has permitted adverse inferences 
from silence involve no threat of punitive sanctions to induce individuals to 
speak.  For example, sex-offender treatment programs are considered reha-
bilitative, not punitive.397  Similarly, given the institutional interests in en-
forcing prison discipline, the Court has rejected their characterization as 
punitive; observing that prison discipline “does not impose retribution in 
lieu of a valid conviction, nor does it maintain physical control over free cit-
izens forced by law to subject themselves to state control over the educa-
tional mission.  It effectuates prison management and prisoner rehabilita-
tive goals.”398  Thus, even if prisoners are denied rehabilitative services or 
face prison discipline if they remain silent, they are not confronted with a 
threat of punitive sanctions for remaining silent and hence are not subject 
to compulsion.  For that reason, the final element of the definition of com-
pulsion is not satisfied. 
It is also hard to characterize clemency proceedings as an official under-
taking to induce a defendant to provide evidence through a threat of puni-
tive sanctions; instead, they involve the defendant’s effort to remove puni-
tive sanctions already embodied in an adverse judgment.  Accordingly, in 
clemency proceedings, the government does not undertake to induce an in-
dividual already under a final judgment of conviction to provide evidence 
by threat of punitive sanctions; for that reason, a defendant’s incentive to 
 
395 Ohio Adult Par. Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285–88 (1998). 
396 See, e.g., Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 328. 
397 See McKune, 536 U.S. at 34. 
398 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (citations omitted); see also Baxter, 425 U.S. at 319 
(“Disciplinary proceedings in state prisons, however, involve the correctional process and im-
portant state interests other than conviction for crime.”). 
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provide a statement in clemency proceedings is not properly characterized 
as Fifth Amendment compulsion. 
In short, by defining compulsion, the soundness of both Griffin and its 
limits become clear. 
3.  Extrajudicial Silence 
Adverse inferences from silence are not confined to a defendant’s failure 
to testify at trial.  Whenever a suspect fails to provide information to the au-
thorities, the question arises whether evidentiary use may be made of si-
lence in an ensuing criminal prosecution. 
The only case in which the Court has held that the use of an adverse in-
ference based a defendant’s extrajudicial silence violated the Constitution is 
Doyle v. Ohio.399  In that case, the Court held that using a defendant’s silence 
after receiving Miranda warnings to impeach the defendant’s testimony at 
trial violated the Due Process Clause because “[s]ilence in the wake of these 
warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of these Miranda 
rights,” adding that “while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no 
express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is im-
plicit to any person who receives the warnings.”400 
In Doyle, the Court presumably relied on the Due Process Clause rather 
than the Fifth Amendment because it had already “permitted use for im-
peachment purposes of post-arrest statements that were inadmissible as evi-
dence of guilt because of an officer’s failure to follow Miranda’s dictates.”401  
Yet, Doyle’s due process rationale is dubious, not only because Miranda warn-
ings nowhere expressly promise that an arrestee’s silence cannot be used for 
its evidentiary value, but because the defendants in Doyle did not claim that 
they had remained silent in reliance on the warnings.402  In any event, a due 
process objection based on Doyle can readily be cured if arrestees are express-
ly warned that their silence can be used against them in subsequent proceed-
ings—unless such a qualification would violate the Fifth Amendment.403 
 
399 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
400 Id. at 617, 618. 
401 Id. at 617. 
402 Id. at 621–25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
403 See OLP Memo, supra note 69, at 1105–07; cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565–66 
(1983) (rejecting a due process challenge to the prosecution’s evidentiary use of a driver’s refusal 
to take a blood-alcohol test since the driver had not been assured that refusal would not be used 
against him).  For a proposal to permit the trier of fact to draw an adverse inference when a sus-
pect refuses to submit to interrogation, see Klein, supra note 332, at 1022-23, 1031.  For a pro-
posal permitting an adverse inference when a counseled suspect refuses to submit to interroga-
tion, see David Rossman, Resurrecting Miranda’s Right to Counsel, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1129, 1137–55 
(2017). Notably, both proposals fail to offer a definition of compulsion against which they can be 
tested to determine whether they offend the Fifth Amendment. 
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The definition of compulsion, however, means that the Fifth Amend-
ment precludes a modification of the Miranda warnings to permit eviden-
tiary use of a suspect’s post-warning silence.  If the requisite warnings told 
the suspect that silence could be used against him, the suspect would be 
placed in a dilemma no different from that condemned in Griffin.  In such a 
case, the arrestee would be required to provide evidence no matter what he 
does.  Compulsion is present since the suspect must either speak, thereby 
providing evidence for the prosecution’s use, or remain silent, which could 
also be used for its evidentiary value.  All of the elements of compulsion are 
present—the suspect has been induced to provide evidence through the 
threat of punitive sanctions.404  Thus, the concept of compulsion advanced 
above explains why the Fifth Amendment would not permit a modification 
of Miranda’s warnings to permit the use of a suspect’s silence in response to 
custodial interrogation. 
Aside from silence during custodial interrogation following the Miranda 
warnings, Doyle’s due process holding supplies no basis to limit the eviden-
tiary use of silence because, unless a suspect has received warnings, ensuing 
silence does not reflect reliance on the warnings.405  As for the Fifth 
Amendment, the Court has never held that it bars the evidentiary use of ex-
trajudicial silence outside of the context of custodial interrogation; the Court 
has held, for example, that a defendant’s testimony that he acted in self-
defense could be impeached by his failure to make the claim during the pe-
riod that he remained at large prior to his arrest because this imposes no 
impermissible burden on silence.406  Yet, because Griffin and its progeny cas-
es offer no definition of compulsion, they seemingly turn on an uncertain in-
quiry into “whether a constitutional right has been burdened impermissibly . 
. . .”407  Many commentators have argued that the evidentiary use of silence 
could readily be regarded as an impermissible burden on Fifth Amendment 
 
404 In Doyle, relying on Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), Justice Stevens argued in dissent 
that the Fifth Amendment never forbids the use of silence to impeach a defendant’s testimony.  
Doyle, 426 U.S. at 628–33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The Fifth Amendment, however, forbids all 
compulsion to be a witness, whether the evidence provided goes to the defendant’s guilt or his 
credibility.  Indeed, it is settled that evidence obtained by compulsion within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment cannot be used for any purposes, including impeachment.  See supra text ac-
companying notes 74–75.  As for Raffel, as we have seen, in that case the defendant was not 
placed in a position where he was compelled to provide evidence no matter what he did; his si-
lence became impeaching only because he chose to testify at his second trial after remaining si-
lent at his first.  See supra note 389. 
405 See, e.g., Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 74–75 (2000); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 
628 (1993); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605–07 (1982) (per curiam); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 
U.S. 231, 238–40 (1980). 
406 See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236–38. 
407 Id. at 238. 
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rights.408  Once compulsion is defined, however, the Court’s refusal to ex-
tend the Fifth Amendment to a suspect’s pre-arrest silence, or even silence 
after arrest but before interrogation begins, is readily explicable. 
The Fifth Amendment does not confer a right to remain silent but a 
right to be free from compulsion to incriminate.  When a suspect remains at 
large prior to arrest, or even after arrest, and when a suspect remains silent 
prior to the commencement of custodial interrogation, there has been no 
compulsion.409  Because the suspect has not been interrogated, the govern-
ment has not undertaken to induce the suspect to become a witness.  
Therefore, the first element of the definition of compulsion is not satis-
fied.410  It follows that the evidentiary use of an individual’s silence places 
no burden, impermissible or otherwise, on the right to be free from com-
pelled self-incrimination.  In contrast, as we have seen, during custodial in-
terrogation, compulsion is nearly always present, and for that reason plac-
ing an arrestee in a position where he is compelled to provide evidence 
whether he speaks or remains silent runs afoul of the Fifth Amendment, 
and not merely the uncertain due process rationale of Doyle. 
The question on which no majority of the Court could be assembled in 
Salinas remains to be considered—whether silence in the face of noncusto-
dial interrogation can be used against a defendant in an ensuing criminal 
prosecution.  In Salinas, Justice Breyer advanced an argument similar to the 
defense of Griffin forwarded above; he reasoned that if the prosecutor were 
permitted to make evidentiary use of Salinas’s silence, Salinas would be ef-
fectively required to provide evidence regardless whether he spoke or re-
mained silent.411  Beyond that, others have argued that making evidentiary 
use of silence is perilous since it is fraught with ambiguity; indeed, among 
the reasons that suspects may remain silent is their awareness of their Fifth 
Amendment rights.412  Some also argue that the potential for coercion ex-
 
408 See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Evidentiary Use of Silence and the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 205–18 (1984); Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 101, 154–59 (2001); Stone, supra note 27, at 146–47. 
409 Cf. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination is simply irrelevant to a citizen’s decision to remain silent when he 
is under no official compulsion to speak.”) (footnote omitted). 
410 For a similar argument, albeit not based on a definition of Fifth Amendment compulsion, see 
David S. Romantz, “You Have the Right To Remain Silent”: A Case for the Use of Silence as Substantive 
Proof of the Criminal Defendant’s Guilt, 38 IND. L. REV. 1, 47–50 (2005). 
411 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2185–86 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  For arguments along 
similar lines, see Poulin, supra note 408, at 210–11, and Andrew J.M. Bentz, Note, The Original 
Public Meaning of the Fifth Amendment and Pre-Miranda Silence, 98 VA. L. REV. 897, 929–30 (2012). 
412 See, e.g., Rinat Kitai-Sangero & Yuval Merin, Probing into Salinas’s Silence: Back to the “Accused 
Speaks” Model?, 15 NEV. L.J. 77, 92–94, 97–98 (2014); Barbara Rook Snyder, A Due Process Analysis 
of the Impeachment Use of Silence in Criminal Trials, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 285, 334–36 (1988); 
Strauss, supra note 408, at 144–46 . 
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ists in any official questioning in light of the suspect’s fear that that if he fails 
to cooperate his guilt may be inferred.413 
Once compulsion is defined, however, this inquiry becomes much easier.  
Compulsion requires not only interrogation but also a threat of punitive 
sanctions.  By virtue of the Fifth Amendment, however, a suspect does not 
face a threat of punitive sanctions for failing to submit to noncustodial inter-
rogation.  Whatever implicit threat might be present in noncustodial inter-
rogation is subject to the bright-line rules reflected in Miranda and the invo-
cation requirement—absent custodial interrogation, the presumption is that 
the suspect faces no threat of punitive sanctions for remaining silent because 
of the ability to invoke Fifth Amendment rights.  Thus, unless the subject of 
noncustodial interrogation is expressly confronted with a threat of sanctions 
for remaining silent, compulsion is not present.  Had the officers threatened 
to arrest Salinas unless he agreed to answer questions, the case would pre-
sent the kind of threat that the Court has suggested would trigger Fifth 
Amendment protection even absent an invocation.414  No threat of that kind 
was made, however, in Salinas.  It follows that even if the government can 
make evidentiary use of a suspect’s response to noncustodial interrogation 
regardless whether the suspect speaks or remains silent, the government has 
not acquired this evidence through compulsion.  Perhaps a suspect’s silence 
in the face of noncustodial interrogation is ambiguous, but this presents no 
Fifth Amendment problem.  The Fifth Amendment prohibits the use of evi-
dence obtained by compulsion, not the use of ambiguous evidence. 
Accordingly, of the three opinions in Salinas, Justice Alito’s reliance on 
the invocation requirement comes closest to the mark.  Justice Thomas’s 
attack on Griffin, as we have seen, fails to explain how a criminal defendant, 
consistent with the Fifth Amendment, can be placed in a position in which, 
even if he remains silent, he provides evidence to the prosecution by being 
compelled to defend a charge.  Justice Breyer’s reliance on Griffin fails to 
explain how Salinas was compelled to provide evidence during a noncusto-
dial interview.  Yet, the confusion that flows from a failure to define com-
pulsion flaws Justice Alito’s opinion as well. 
Justice Alito concluded that Salinas’s failure to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment meant that he could not advance a Fifth Amendment claim.415  
What was fatal to Salinas’s Fifth Amendment claim, however, was not his 
failure to invoke.  Even if Salinas had expressly invoked a right to remain 
silent during the interview, he still would not have been subject to compul-
sion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment unless, after the invoca-
 
413 See, e.g., Kitai-Sangero & Merin, supra note 412, at 98–100; Maclin, supra note 64, at 289–90. 
414 See supra text accompanying note 232. 
415 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2177–78, 2184 (plurality opinion). 
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tion, he was threatened with punitive sanctions for remaining silent.  That 
point, however, only comes clear once one defines compulsion. 
CONCLUSION 
The ultimate normative question that overhangs any consideration of 
the Fifth Amendment is whether the prohibition on compelled self-
incrimination has any persuasive justification.  Although there are occa-
sional and generally inconsistent scholarly efforts to advance a normative 
justification for the Fifth Amendment,416 there is something approaching a 
consensus among scholars that no normative account, whether premised on 
privacy, autonomy, avoidance of cruelty, maintenance of an adversarial sys-
tem of justice, protection of the innocent, or a concern for the reliability of 
evidence, adequately justifies the Fifth Amendment.417  There are, after all, 
lots of ways in which the criminal justice system can infringe on privacy or 
autonomy, permit cruelty, tolerate non-adversarial investigative tactics and 
unreliable evidence, or threaten the innocent without running afoul of the 
Fifth Amendment.  The Fifth Amendment is poorly crafted to achieve any 
of these goals.  Measured against the lofty objectives usually advanced to 
justify it, the prohibition on compelled self-incrimination comes up short. 
Focusing on the concept of compulsion, however, not only explains and 
helps to evaluate Fifth Amendment doctrine, but also sheds light on this fi-
nal and largest of normative inquiries.  The prohibition on compelled self-
incrimination, when applied with a rigorous definition of compulsion in 
mind, offers a modest dose of what David Sklansky has called, albeit rather 
pejoratively, “anti-inquisitorialism.”418 
The Fifth Amendment does not guarantee a fully adversarial system of 
justice—as we have seen, it permits a good deal of official questioning in non-
adversarial settings, whether custodial or not.  The Fifth Amendment does, 
however, offer some assurance that interrogation of a suspect to build a case 
against him must be reasonably consensual.  The government may do many 
things in order to acquire evidence, but it may not threaten punitive sanc-
tions to convince a suspect to submit to interrogation that may incriminate.  
If the state cannot secure some degree of cooperation from a suspect con-
sistent with the law of waiver, it must look elsewhere to build its case.  This 
 
416 See, e.g., Amar & Lettow, supra note 11, at 922–27 (reliability of evidence); Robert S. Gerstein, 
Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87, 90–94 (1970) (privacy); Mike Redmayne, Rethinking the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 27 OXFORD J. LEG. STUDIES 209, 221–28 (2007) (undue harsh-
ness contrary to autonomy); Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: 
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 451–74 (2000) 
(protecting the innocent). 
417 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 23, at 730–39; Dolinko, supra note 116, at 1074–1147; Dripps, supra note 
21, at 711–18; Friendly, supra note 69, at 679–98. 
418 David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1635, 1635–36 (2009). 
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may not offer ironclad protection for the innocent, and it may often aid the 
guilty, but it is a real limitation on the investigative reach of the government. 
The Fifth Amendment offers modest virtues, and a modest limitation on 
the coercive powers of the state.  The government can use immunity to 
compel testimony, and it may use a variety of techniques to persuade a sus-
pect to surrender Fifth Amendment rights.  There is no Platonic ideal of 
dignity, autonomy, privacy, or liberty lurking in the Fifth Amendment.  In 
a Constitution meant to operate in the real world of crime and punishment, 
however, Platonic ideals are hard to come by.  A modest constraint on gov-
ernment, and modest protection for liberty, may be the best we can realisti-
cally expect.  On that score, the prohibition on compelled self-
incrimination may not look so bad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
